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ABSTRACT
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES,
A THEORETICAL INVESTIGATION AND AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY
by
EQBAL AL-RAHMANI 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1988
The main goals of this dissertation are three-folds: (i) to define 
the concept of economic independence through theoretical investigation 
of five schools of thought: 1) The United Nations Economic Commission 
On Latin America (ECLA); 2) The Dependencia School; 3) The Soviet
School; 4) The Work on Self-Reliance; 5) and the Work on Small Open 
Economies; (ii) to evaluate the main proposed strategies in the 
literature for achieving a higher level of economic independence for 
Third World Countries. These strategies include: Import-Substitution
Industrialization, Basic Industrialization, Regional Cooperation and 
the New International Economic Order; (iii) to examine the Cuban 
experience since the revolution in its attempt to reduce its heritage 
of dependency, a legacy of more than four centries of colonial and 
neocolonial domination.
This dissertation views economic independence as a function of the 
internal level of productive and technical capacity and the degree of 
national integration. Economic independence is not viewed as an 
equivalent of autarky, nor as an absolute condition, but rather as a
viii
process toward a higher level of national integration and of a more 
equal interdependence.
Utilizing Such definition of economic independence, this 
dissertation shows that the Cuban economy, mainly through the commited 
efforts at industrialization and provision of basic needs, has 
undoubtly became more independent since the revolution and especially 
since the 1970s. This achievement refutes the claim of Cuba's 
continued dependency especially in the forms of "Soviet dependency" and 
"sugar dependency". Such a claim mistakenly equates "dependency" with 
"dependence" and focuses only on external quantitative factors.
ix
CHAPTER I
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 
Introduction
Political independence from colonial powers has been perceived, by 
Third World leaders and liberation movements, as the necessary 
condition for any attempt to combat the economic backwardness and 
social injustice; economic independence, on the other hand, has been 
perceived as a sufficient condition for it. In many cases economic 
independence has been linked to the economic and social development of 
the country. Despite the dispute in the literature about the nature of 
the causal relationship between development and economic independence, 
most writers would agree that a country's economic independence is an 
increasing function of its level of social and economic development. A 
greater dispute in the literature, however, revolves around other 
important questions and issues such as: what is meant by economic
independence? is it a goal that is confined to certain social systems? 
or is it pursued by all regardless of the social and political 
orientation, i.e of the mode of production? what are the prerequisite 
conditions and strategies for achieving it? and who are the main 
beneficiaries of achieving it? This chapter will attempt to address 
these questions, through the examination of different schools of 
thought.
Before exploring the first question, however, it is important to 
tackle another fundamental question: Why economic independence? This
1
question is important because many theoretical contributions in the 
literature and the orientation of many of the international development 
organizations increasingly point towards economic interdependence among 
all countries. Therefore, why "bother" with economic independence when 
most of the international development conferences point towards more 
integration? First, it is important to clarify that economic 
independence should not be viewed as the opposite of economic 
interdependence. Emphasizing the issue of economic independence is by 
no means a call for a reduction of international economic relations 
whether in the form of trade or cooperation among nations. It is not a 
call for autarky, which is not a viable option even for the large and 
richly endowed countries. Most writers on the subject, as we will see 
later, would equate economic independence with a more equitable level 
of economic interdependence between the developing countries and the 
developed ones.
For most Third World countries, the long and bitter experiences of 
colonization remain as an important factor for their concern with 
economic independence. The goal of economic independence, however, has 
been the center of much recent attention for the following reasons:
(i) the worsening financial situation of many of the Third World 
countries (including both poor and rich ones), manifested in the huge 
external debt and exacerbated by the international economic recession 
of the 1970s; with the consequent increased interference of the IMF 
through the implementation of its austerity measures; (ii) the 
increased volume of direct foreign investment and the much advanced 
role and control of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in many of 
the Third World countries; (iii) the theoretical development of
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different perspectives about dependency and independence, which have 
enhanced the understanding of the underlying causes of the experienced 
dependency situations.
Green (1973:51) has identified seven classes of reasons of why 
economic independence is accepted as a priority political economic 
goal:
(1) Psychic satisfaction. Individuals and nations feel more human, 
fulfilled and confident if they have, or believe they have, 
greater control over decisions, forces, and institutions 
affecting their lives;
(2) Power to control one's economic destiny. This power is based on 
the assumption that only citizens, interest groups and 
governments of a particular country are ever concerned with their 
collective economic welfare;^-
(3) Altering the divisions of economic gains and opportunities from 
foreign to national beneficiaries. This is an important 
motivation which, when separated from the pattern of distributing 
the transformed gains, is shared by different social and 
political groups;
(4) Resolving of interest conflicts between external and internal 
economic forces;
(5) Achieving structural change in the pattern of production, resource 
allocation and institutions;
(6) Altering the domestic socio-economic patterns and power divisions;
(7) Altering the dominant mode of production, which means the 
transformation to socialism.
3
Some of these motivations might be specific to certain social 
systems. In some cases more than one motivation can operate.
Finally, the interest in the issue of economic independence is an 
outcome of the previous emphasis on economic dependence which is 
considered an undesirable state of affairs. This position, as Brewster 
argues, is usually presented along two. lines: i) The positive
proposition which views economic dependence as an inherently unstable 
state that would hinder attempts to predict economic performance and 
hence to plan for economic growth, ii) the normative proposition which 
views economic dependence as a state of inherent inequality (both 
internally and externally) which as such is condemned (Brewster, 
1973:90).
It is difficult to find any country, regardless of its level of 
development and its social and political orientation, that does not 
considers economic independence as one of its major goals. Despite 
this shared goal, however, there is no one shared and accepted 
definition of economic independence. Many theorists and interest 
groups would differ in defining it. As a result there is no general 
agreement on identifying the prerequisites and the strategies for 
achieving it.
This chapter examines how different schools of thought in the 
literature have dealt with the issue of economic independence. This 
examination will include the following schools of thought: 1) The
United Nations Economic Commission Of Latin America (ECLA); 2) the 
dependencia school; 3) the soviet school; 4) the advocates of self- 
reliance; and 5) the work on small open economies.
My focus on these schools of thought should by no means indicate 
the absence of other theoretical contributions. Other writers who are
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not associated with these schools have written on the subject; while 
some reference to their work will be made, the major emphasis will be 
on those five schools of thought in order to focus and define the 
theoretical framework of this thesis.
I. ECLA
ECLA's theoretical propositions reflect a Third World perspective 
that has challenged the traditional international trade theory and the 
modernization theory that have dominated the economic development 
literature. From the beginning ECLA, which was established under the 
leadership of Raul Prebisch in 1948, has attacked the conventional 
international trade theory which saw all countries involved in trade 
relations as benefiting mutually according to their comparative 
advantage.^ To the contrary, ECLA argued that international trade has 
operated, since the late 19th century, against the interests of Latin 
American countries and for the interests of the advanced capitalist 
countries. As a result underdevelopment remains a characteristic of 
the former group. Although ECLA's argument was specifically about the 
deteriorating economic position of Latin American countries in the 
world market, it was equally applicable to other Third World countries.
ECLA's emphasis was not directly on the issue of economic 
independence as such, but on the unequal exchange, between the center 
and the periphery, which was exacerbated by the deteriorating terms of 
trade. This situation was caused by an outward oriented strategy based 
on exporting raw materials and food stuffs to the industrialized 
countries and importing their manufactured products. The argument was 
based mainly on the structural disparities of demand. ECLA has argued
5
that the income elasticity of demand for raw materials, imported by the 
center, is less than one and for the manufactured products, imported by 
the periphery, is greater than one. This assertion was supported by 
Engels' law, agricultural protectionist policies of the advanced 
countries and the development of synthetic substitutes. Therefore, 
ECLA believed that the long run impact of this disparity is a reduction 
in Latin American countries' earnings and a deteriorating position in 
the world market.
ECLA's theorists viewed the deteriorating terms of trade not only 
as an obstacle to development (because it curtailed foreign exchange 
earnings and hence capital accumulation) but also as a means for the 
transfer of surplus "fruits of increased productivity" from the 
periphery to the center (Baer, 1969). To support this assertion, 
Prebisch links the structural differences in the supply side between 
the center and the periphery to the terms of trade. He argues that 
while the increase of the productivity in the center leads to a higher 
wages without changes in the prices of both domestic and export 
industries goods, the increased productivity in the periphery's export 
sector will not lead to an increase in the wages due to the unlimited 
supply of labor and the weakness of its unions.^ However, due to the 
downward trend in the terms of trade part of the marginal profit of the 
increased productivity in the periphery will be transferred to the 
center.
While the centers kept the whole benefit of the 
technical development of their industries, the 
peripheral countries transferred to them a share 
of the fruits of their own technical progress 
(Prebisch, quoted in Baer, 1969:208).
ECLA's argument and proposed policies, however, were reformist in 
their nature. Meier cites the limits to their propositions:
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Unlike Marxists who concentrate on the unfavorable 
efforts of imperialism, these critics did not
concentrate their critique on any "deliberate 
exploitation" by the advanced capitalist nations.
Instead, their contention was simply that the free
play of the international market forces creates
disequalizing effects that operate to the
disadvantaged of the less developed nations 
(Meier, 1984:190).
As a consequence ECLA saw economic dependence mainly as an economic 
relation between the center and the periphery, or what could be 
referred to as external dependence that is perpetuated by the 
international division of labor. "The consequence is that due to 
exterior pressure the country cannot decide autonomously what it should 
do or cease doing" (Prebisch, 1980; quoted in Chilcote, 1984:26).
Dependency in this analysis came to mean the lack of autonomy 
(Roxbourgh, 1979). And the alternative clearly points towards an 
autonomous capitalist development as opposed to the "imitative" and 
dependent form that dominates the periphery.
The main proposed strategies and nolicv recommendations of ECLA:
To overcome the structural disparities and increase the autonomy 
of the peripheral economy, ECLA proposed a structural change of 
production and trade. As a result of his strong emphasis on the long- 
run deteriorating terms of trade and the structural difference of the 
wage-productivity relationship, Prebisch proposed policies that 
emphasized both industrialization accompanied by tariff protection and 
a redistribution of income aimed at improving the living standards of 
the masses. In referring to industrialization, Prebisch has emphasized, 
especially in his early writing, the strategy of import substituting 
industrialization (ISI).
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Import substitution (defined as an increase in the 
proportion of goods that are supplied from 
domestic sources and not necessarily as a 
reduction of the ratio of imports to total income) 
is the only way to correct the effects on 
peripheral growth of disparities of foreign trade 
elasticity (Prebisch, 1959:253).
However, later on Prebisch included export of the manufactures as a way
to overcome some of ISI limitations.
Export of manufactures by the countries of the 
periphery, together with import substitution, will 
enable their industrialization to be made 
increasingly efficient and in the same time 
promote their technological development (Prebisch,
1985:20).
Besides criticizing conventional international trade theory, 
Prebisch has also questioned the neoclassical theory of income 
distribution in which workers, entrepreneurs and capital are 
remunerated according to their marginal contribution in the production 
process. In the periphery, Prebisch argues, the increase in labor's 
productivity is not transferred into an increase in its wages. 
Instead the generated surplus is transferred, in part, to the center 
via the downward trend of export prices and internally to the 
privileged groups. Prebisch proposed deliberate measures of income 
redistribution to be taken by the state as the means to both retain the 
surplus internally and to enlarge the domestic market.
Besides the proposed redistributive measures of income, ECLA's 
analysis pointed to regional integration as another means to enlarge 
the domestic market and increase the effective demand. In addition, 
regional integration was viewed as a means of ISI on a regional scale. 
As a practical consequence, ECLA had an important role in the formation 
of Latin American integration efforts: Latin America Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common market.
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Gurrieri notes in his assessment of Prebisch* s work that in his
later writings, Prebisch put more emphasis on the issue of the use of
economic surplus as opposed to his previous emphasis on structural
reforms, Intensive capital formation and international cooperation. 
This new emphasis came about as a result of the continued internal 
inequality despite the increased economic growth in some Latin American 
economies (Gurrieri, 1983).
Finally, ECLA has always actively advocated certain measures to
improve the current structure of the international division of labor.
These measures form a part of the general demands addressed by many
Third World countries, and which are known as the demands for a New
International Economic Order (NIEO).
Prebisch asserts that the development of the 
periphery requires supressing the center-periphery 
system and establishing a new international 
economic order in which the reordering of the 
functions of its components and the corresponding
modifications in the domestic productive
structures would make it possible to achieve a 
more equitable distribution of power and income 
among nations (Gurrieri, 1983:392).
ECLA's emphasis on industrialization with protectionist measures
and income distribution was accompanied with explicit social and
political implications. ECLA's program called for a broad alliance of
nearly all social classes against the landed oligarchy. Roxbourgh has
summarized ECLA's social and political scenario as follows:
The peasantry, once freed from the oppressive and 
inefficient latifundio system would produce more 
foodstuffs and their income would increase. This 
would increase their demand of domestically- 
produced manufactured goods, thereby stimulating 
national industry. Deliberate state intervention 
in the economy would foster the creation of new 
industrial enterprises, and the industrial 
bourgeoisie and/or the urban middle class would 
take over state power from landed oligarchy. The 
industrial working class would benefit from
9
increased employment, and the policy of maximizing 
consumer demand by redistributing income would 
ensure that they would benefit in real terms from 
economic growth (Roxbourgh, 1979:30).
Criticism of ECLA came from all directions. In his often 
mentioned article, Fernando Cardoso identifies three of these 
directions: 1) the "orthodox" line, led by Haberler who denied the
possibility of inferring a constant trend toward decline in the terms 
of trade and criticized ECLA's argument for lacking explicit analysis 
of the role of economic cycles; 2) the "heterodox" liberal line, which 
focussed on the circularity of underdevelopment to the restriction of 
the markets; on the political front, the liberal right accused ECLA of 
being the "Trojan horse of Marxism"; and 3) the Marxist line, which 
criticized ECLA's reformist measures (Cardoso, 1979). Other leftist 
writers also criticized ECLA for its failure to denounce sufficiently 
the exploitation mechanisms within the capitalist system (Palma, 1979) .
Despite all the criticism, however, ECLA's theoretical 
contributions have formed an important challenge to the previously 
dominant conventional theory of international trade. In addition they 
have enhanced the understanding of some of the obstacles facing the 
process of capital accumulation in the Third World. Further, ECLA's 
analysis constituted an important factor in the development of other 
theoretical perspectives, especially that of the dependencia school.
II. The Dependencla School**
By the 1960s ECLA's proposed policies and strategies which had 
been adopted by some Latin American countries did not fulfill their 
promises. Besides the increased inequality of income distribution, 
unemployment, and balance of payments difficulties, there was a
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"growing loss of national control over economic, political, social and 
cultural life" (Palma, 1978:908). The dependencia argument arose 
around this period was concerned with analyzing the causes of these 
continuing problems and others. The dependencia theorists (or 
dependistas) were influenced both by the Marxist theory of imperialism 
and by ECLA.^ The dependencia analysis differed, however, from the two 
trends of thought in its focus: it differed from the classical Marxist 
theory of imperialism by focussing on the disadvantages to the 
peripheral economies rather than on the gains and changes occurring in 
the center. It differed from ECLA by emphasizing not only the economic 
impact of the relationship between the "core" and the "satellites" but 
also the internal social and political manifestations of this 
relationship.
Most critics would agree that the dependencia analysis cannot be 
treated as one theory; rather it should be treated as a set of theories
O
or a paradigm. It can be said, however, that the dependistas are 
unified in their focus on the economic, social and political aspects of 
the dependent pattern of development or underdevelopment that 
characterize the peripheral economies as a result of their relationship 
with the center.
The dependistas' main focus has been on the causes and features of 
dependency and not on economic independence or overcoming dependency.
" (T)he dependency perspective tells us much more about what is wrong 
and why than about what is correct and how to get there" (Gereffi, 
1983:22). However, one could infer what is not dependency through an 
examination of what was meant by dependency. This task, however, is 
not a straightforward one mainly because of the different implications
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of the term and, at times, the vague, and circular presentation which
O'Brien expresses as:
The actual mechanisms of dependency are seldom 
spelt out in detail (...). One looks in vain 
through the theories of dependency for the 
essential characteristics of dependency. Instead 
one is given a circular argument: dependent
countries are those which lack capacity for 
autonomous growth and they lack this because their 
structure are dependent ones" (O'Brien, 1975:24).
In an attempt to understand what was meant by dependency, perhaps
it is best to start with the most quoted definition in the literature,
that of Dos Santos:
By dependence we mean a situation in which the 
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the 
development and expansion of another economy to 
which the former is subjected. The relation of 
interdependence between two or more economies, and 
between these and the world trade, assumes the 
form of dependence when some countries (the 
dominant ones) can expand and can be self- 
sustaining, while other countries (the dependent 
ones) can do this only as a reflection of that 
expansion (Dos Santos, 1970:231).
Sunkel and Furtado share a similar view, though they differ from Dos
q
Santos in their policy conclusions. Sunkel sees dependency and 
marginalization as inevitable outcomes of the dependent pattern of 
development in the periphery in which an increasing share of ownership 
and control of natural resources is given to foreign firms. In 
addition the increasing role played by these firms in the industrial, 
financial, marketing and distribution activities has fundamentally 
changed the social structure and the political system (Sunkel, 1972). 
Similarly, Furtado sees the alliance of certain groups (e.g. the 
landowners and commercial capitalists) with foreign interests as 
facilitating the latter's expansion and weakening the national 
entrepreneurial class which will necessarily exclude the "possibility
12
of self-sustained national development, along the lines of classical 
capitalist development" (Furtado, quoted in Sunkel, 1972:527).
For these theorists, and others, dependency means the lack or 
weakness of an autonomous national pattern of development, which causes 
and aggravates many of the social and economic distortions of the 
peripheral societies. The obstacles facing an independent development 
are seen in: the industrial and technological expansion of the foreign 
firms and their monopolistic control of the world market; the skewed 
internal pattern of income distribution; the traditional structure of 
the agrarian system and; the tendency of the state to facilitate 
foreign expansion. These obstacles will tend to preserve the 
traditional export sector and hinder the development of the industrial 
sector. To some extent this view shares some similarity with ECLA's. 
The alternative is seen in the advancement of national development 
which Sunkel defines as "a force of national affirmation, an aspiration 
to self-determination and sovereignty" (Sunkel, 1969:32). As seen by 
ECLA, these writers find the potential leadership of such national 
development in the national (entrepreneurial) bourgeoisie.
A more radical line within dependencia is led by Frank. According 
to this line the historical relationship with the center, has not only 
conditioned the internal economic, social and political structure of 
the dependent peripheral economies, but also has determined it. This 
same relationship has led to the development of the 'core' and the 
underdevelopment or "development of underdevelopment" of the periphery 
by the continual transferring of surplus from the latter to the former. 
Frank believes that underdevelopment was not an original state but was 
a result of the mercantilist and capitalist expansion of the center.
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Underdevelopment is not due to the survival of 
the archaic institutions and the existence of 
capital shortage in regions that have remained 
isolated from the stream of world history. On the 
contrary, underdevelopment was and still is 
generated by the very same historical process 
which also generated economic development: the
development of capitalism itself (Frank, 1972:9).
Hence the only periods, Frank argues, where the satellites were able to
develop were when ties to the metropolis were weakened by wars or
depressions.
For this line within dependencia, dependency is viewed as an 
outcome of the historical process of incorporating the peripheral 
economies into the capitalist world system. Unlike the previous line, 
Frank considers the national bourgeoisie (together with imperialism) as 
the enemy of national development. He believes that the policies of 
this class will strengthen economic dependence by coinciding with the 
interest of capitalist class of the center.
Hence, the only way out of this dependency condition lies in
breaking the ties with the center and pursuing a socialist development:
(T)he historical process of underdevelopment 
cannot be reversed and turned into economic and 
social development for the majority of Latin 
American people until they destroy the capitalist 
class structure through revolution and replace it 
with socialist development (Frank, 1972:19).
A third line within dependencia, advanced mainly by Cardoso and 
Faletto, has focussed on the analysis of the "new dependency". Unlike 
the previous line, it acknowledges the possibility of the development 
of the periphery despite its incorporation in the capitalist world. 
Unlike the enclave economies that perpetuated both dependency and 
underdevelopment, a new type of economy has developed, in some of 
peripheral countries, which is characterized by the contradictory 
notion of development and dependency. This latter situation, which
14
Cardoso labels as "associated-dependent development”, has been caused
mainly by the dynamic interaction between new forms of national
political powers and new international economic forces:
Changes in the international capitalist 
organization have produced a new international 
division of labor. The moving force behind these 
changes is the multinational corporation.
Assuming as it does the immersion of industrial 
capital into peripheral economies, the new 
international division of labor puts a dynamic 
element into operation in the internal market.
Thus, to some extent, the interests of the foreign 
corporations have become compatible with internal 
prosperity of the dependent countries. In this 
sense they help promote development (Cardoso,
1973:149).
The view of this line of argument within dependencia shares some
element of the classical Marxist theory of imperialism which predicted
that capitalist expansion into the underdeveloped countries would bring
about and facilitate the capitalist development of these countries.
However, this line, though accepting the possibility of this kind of
development, sees it only in a dependent form with no independent
internal dynamics.
Development under this set of conditions implies, 
quite obviously, a definite articulation with the 
international market. Development in this 
situation also depends on technical, financial, 
organizational, and market connection that only 
multinational corporations can assure (Cardoso,
1973:149).
Thus, this line would disagree with the pessimistic view of the 
previous line of dependencia which foresaw nothing but underdevelopment 
and stagnation for peripheral economies within the capitalist system. 
On the other hand, it disagrees with the first line's optimism of the 
possibility of an autonomous capitalist development that would bring 
about better conditions for the majority of the people. To the
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contrary, this line argues that the pattern of associated*dependent 
development will be based on a regressive profile of income 
distribution, with emphasis on luxury consumer durables as opposed to 
basic necessities and will contribute to social marginality 
(Cardoso, 1973:149). Cardoso and Faletto distinguish between the 
features of the capitalist development in the center and in the 
periphery. However, they do not subscribe or propose a "theory of 
dependent capitalism" or a "theory of dependency". Rather, they 
concentrate on "situations of dependency" that exist in concrete cases 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).
In summary, therefore we can see two general definitions of non 
dependency or independent development. For some writers within 
dependencia the alternative to dependency is national development which 
will bring about a higher degree of autonomy and equal interaction 
relationship in the world market. For others, however, the only way 
out of dependency is a revolutionary change towards socialism.
The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations of dependencia:
As a result of their analytical concern with the causes of
dependency and its features, dependencia's writers have not proposed
clear strategies to overcome dependency and achieve a higher degree of
economic independence. In his assessment of dependencia's policy
conclusions, O'Brien argues that:
For policy conclusions are (...) (perhaps 
deliberately) left very vague. It is never clear 
whether the multinational corporation is to be 
nationalized or to be controlled by an Andean 
Pact-style foreign investment code, nor which 
specific policies are to be followed with regard 
to technical transfer and technical development, 
unemployment and income distribution, etc.
(O'Brien, 1975:24).
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It seems fair to argue, however, that the absence of explicit 
policy recommendations is a logical consequence for those writers who 
see underdevelopment and dependency as the only possible outcome of 
the center-periphery relationship. On the other hand, those who see 
the possibility of either an autonomous national development or 
dependent one, have suggested some policy recommendations.
Sunkel has argued in favor of industrialization. However, he
opposed IS1 which, as he sees it, not only did not "free the economy
from its heavy reliance on primary exports, foreign capital and
technology, (...) but has in fact aggravated the situation and nature
of "dependencia" (Sunkel, 1972:518). Sunkel identifies three essential
development tasks for the social groups that are trying to regain
control over the economy and break out of the structure of a dependent
£ teconomy. Assuming their control of the power, these tasks are: 1 ,
transforming the agrarian structure (which is the main root of 
inequality and marginalization); 2n<*, using the primary export sector
to support the expansion of heavy and consumer industries; and finally, 
organizing the industrial sector away from satisfying the conspicuous 
consumption of the minority into satisfying the basic needs of the 
majority (Sunkel, 1972:530). He further recognizes the importance of
the role of regional integration in enhancing national development, 
though he acknowledges the possible limitations or even adverse 
effects. "Integration, in fact, can be either a basic instrument of 
national realization in Latin America; or it can be the instrument of 
accelerated dependence" (Sunkel, 1969:33). In order to avoid the 
latter possibility, Sunkel emphasizes the importance of multinational 
planning particularly of existing and additional basic industrial 
activities. Furtado, who shares a similar perspective, has emphasized
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economic planning and programming as the means to regulate ISI and to 
broaden the industrial structure. Cardoso, though subscribing to a 
different perspective, sees the lack of a fully developed capital - 
goods sector as the crippling factor to the capital accumulation 
process in the dependent economy (Cardoso, 1973).
Perhaps no paradigm or school of thought, in the literature, has 
been more controversial than the dependencia. Their analysis has been 
heavily criticized by many leftist as well as bourgeois writers. They 
have been criticized for: over emphasizing external over internal
factors that shape underdevelopment and dependency (Palma, 1978); over 
emphasizing national and international conflict over internal class 
conflict (Angotti, 1982); attributing the social, political and 
economic features of capitalism to dependency (Lall, 1976), which led 
to conceptualizing dependency as a mode of production with its own laws 
of motion (Cueva, 1976); failing to incorporate analysis of "socialist 
dependency" (Ray, 1973); and methodologically for being both static and 
ahistorical (Palma, 1978). The criticisms have been aptly summarized 
elsewhere, and hence 1 will not attempt to present them here.^® While 
some critics have specified the writers or the line within dependencia, 
some have generalized their criticism, based on the work of some 
writers, to include the whole paradigm of dependencia. Such 
generalization has been in many cases, in my opinion, unfair. For 
example, many dependistas (e.g., Cardoso and Falleto) are aware of the 
importance of internal causes of dependency. Similarly, they clearly 
reject conceptualizing dependency as a mode of production.
Before ending this section it is important to mention that some of 
the "vagueness" and multiple implications that are attributed to the
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concept of dependency have arisen because of the misapplication of the
concept by some other writers, especially in North America, who have
attempted to analyze dependency in quantitative terms. Duvall has
differentiated this group as:
The tradition of rigorous empiricism is 
distinguished by a commitment to precise 
measurement criteria and on that basis alone is 
distinguishable from the dependencia tradition. 
Unfortunately the distinction does not end here 
because empirical scientists have generally been 
guilty of ignoring the degree of precision of 
meaning which is provided by dependencia theorists 
for the concept of dependence. Instead, they have 
started with more common-sensical meanings of the 
term, and have given the impression that 
measurement rules developed in accord with those 
meanings are all that matter. Precision is
provided by, and meaning is captured in,
operational criteria. The result is a distortion 
of the primary meaning of the term as it appears 
in dependencia theory (Duvall, 1978:59).
As a result another conceptualization of dependency appears in the
literature causing some confusion. This other concept which is
differentiated by some writers^ as "dependence" refers to external
economic relations, for example reliance on the importation of certain
products from other countries. In this sense all countries can be said
to be dependent. This concept is totally different from the dependency
situations or structural dependency that the dependistas see prevailing
in the peripheral economies.
The structural dependency of the periphery on the 
metropolis resulting from the asymmetrical process 
of penetration cannot be compared with the simple 
dependency of the metropolis on the peripheries 
for further deliveries of energy resources and raw 
materials. What in the first case is reflected in 
a special socio-economic structure; i.e. in 
periphery capitalism is in the second reduced to a 
question of the price of use value (Senghaas,
1975:290).
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Perhaps this dichotomy of the concept is best expressed by 
Brewster in his often quoted statement: "(T)here may be a difference 
between a country which depends on external factors and a country which 
is dependent on them" (Brewster, 1975:290),
These two conceptions of the term "dependence" have caused errors 
in the classification of which countries are dependent, and which are 
not.12
III. The Soviet School
The issue of national independence in its two forms - political 
and economic - has been the center of the Soviet analysis of the Third 
World nations. As Clarkson notes in his book on the Soviet theory of 
development,
(the) best conceptual bridge for an outsider 
wanting to enter the Soviet view of the developing 
countries' position in the world - historically, 
politically, and economically - is their under­
standing of national independence (Clarkson,
1978:135).
The current Soviet perspective springs from the Marxist-Leninst
theory. It goes further, however, by incorporating analysis of the
changing internal conditions of the politically independent Third World
countries (referred to as the "newly free countries") and of their
international relations. In addition, the clear focus within the
literature on the issue of economic independence and sovereignty is
related to the official position taken by the Soviet Communist party,
which has been reaffirmed by the 27th CPSU Congress.
However different the newly free countries may be 
from one another and whatever road they follow,
their people are united by a desire to develop
independently, on their own, and to run their
affairs without foreign interference (New edition 
of the CPSU program, quoted in Rymalov, 1986:61).
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The Soviet analysis of the Third World always takes into
consideration the international context and especially the role played
by imperialism. Soviet writers view the political independence of the
Third World nations as only the beginning of a complex process of
struggle for national independence. This complexity is related to the
unchanged essence of imperialism. Almost all Soviet writers would agree
that imperialism is
doing everything possible to retain the former 
colonies within the framework of the capitalist 
system, to slow down their advance toward stronger 
independence, and social progress (Editors' 
introduction, International Affairs, 1978:65).
They fully analyze the new forms of imperialism or neocolonialism, 
which is defined as a system of indirect control and exploitation based 
on financial and economic monopoly (rather than the former military and 
political monopoly). The major difference between neocolonialism and 
its older form, however, is the new tendency to cultivate and 
facilitate some forms of capitalism in the politically independent 
countries (Simonya, 1985). Vernikov and Shibayev identify imperial­
ism's current mechanisms of economic control over the developing 
countries as in the form of capital export, seizure and division of 
markets by major monopolies, machinations with interest rates and 
expansionism of MNCs (Vernikov and Shibayev, 1987:45). To these
mechanisms, Volkov adds the growing foreign debt of the developing 
countries (Volkov, 1985:68).
Most Soviet writers would view the world capitalist system and the 
international division of labor as the main obstacle to an independent 
capitalist development, especially with the increasing role played by 
the MNCs. There are some writers, however, who accept the theoretical
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possibility of an independent capitalist development. In his book,
titled The Newly Free Countries in the Seventies. Brutents argues:
It should be born in mind that there is a 
possibility for transition from dependent to 
national capitalist development. One cannot wholly 
agree with the idea, often encountered in relevant 
literature and tinged with fatality, that 
dependency is bound to increase in every instance.
There is not a single influential social stratum 
or political group that can be regarded as forever 
associated with prospect of dependent capitalist 
development. On the contrary, we believe that, 
once they become stronger and more consolidated, 
they are more likely to start searching for a 
new way of development (Brutents, 1979:73).
In analyzing the different forms of capitalist development in the 
Third World, Simonya cites India and Nigeria as examples with a form of 
national capitalist development (Simonya, 1982). These writers, 
however, see the potentials of an independent capitalist development as 
highly restricted in the developing countries. And they all come to 
the conclusion that if it were not for the existence of the socialist 
system one could not speak of any genuinely independent national 
development (Simonya, 1985:205).
Despite the explicit analysis of issues related to economic 
independence, it is difficult to find just one definition because of 
the complexity of the issue and its national and international 
economic, social and political aspects. However, by presenting the 
different emphasized aspects in the literature, one can understand what 
meaning(s) economic independence holds in the Soviet view. Many Soviet 
writers equate the dependency of Third World countries with their 
unequal position in the world economy. They recognize these countries' 
need to engage in the world market as a means to promote their own 
development. Hence economic independence is defined as an equitable 
and mutual position in the world economy.
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Economic independence in no sense means economic 
autarchy and isolation. On the contrary, it 
implies the establishment of an equitable, 
mutually advantageous and fair international 
division of labor to promote the balanced economic 
development of the former colonies and 
semicolonies (E. Tarabrin, 1978:19).
Though Soviet writers emphasize equal interdependence they oppose 
the Western or bourgeois notion of interdependence which is equated 
with "collective neocolonialism." They see this form of interdepen­
dence as an attempt to organize a single production mechanism, based on 
the capitalist mode of production, in which all countries are connected 
components (Gorokhov, 1980). As Simonya puts it:
Indeed there is interdependence between countries 
(...). However, there are equal and unequal types 
of interdependence (...). It is against their 
unequal status in the international division of 
labor, not against their interdependence as such, 
that the developing countries' struggle (Simonya,
1984:109) .
From the political standpoint, most Soviet writers associate 
economic independence with the Third World countries' ability to 
conduct independent foreign policies. Such independence is basically 
manifested in the strength of the non-alignment movement.
On the national level, Soviet writers have emphasized 
nationalization, not in the narrow legal notion, but as a broad and 
deep process of transforming foreign and foreign-oriented local 
elements into national elements. Nationalization here is equated with 
economic independence. "Nationalization in the broad sense is 
synonymous with the gaining of the full political, economic and 
cultural independence of the developing countries" (Simonya, 198:109).
Some writers have defined economic independence in terms of 
greater domestic control over the production and capital accumulation
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process; more specifically as "self-sufficiency in the production of 
the means of production" (mentioned in Clarkson, 1979:139).
The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations:
Most of the proposed strategies and policies clearly stem from the
emphasis given in defining economic independence. As a result of the
shared emphasis on the need to achieve a more equitable interdependence
in the world economy, Soviet writers have emphasized the importance of
the NIEO, cooperation with the socialist and other Third World
countries. Simonya sees the NIEO as a logical outcome of the Third
World nations' struggle for economic independence (Simonya, 1984). And
Nukhovich sees it as a major prerequisite for any successful struggle
against international monopolies (Nukhovich, 1980). The cooperation
with the socialist countries is proposed as a means to strengthen the
demands for NIEO. Further, the cooperation with the socialist
community is seen to enhance the national effort for independence.
(T)he Soviet Union and other members of the 
socialist community do not pursue self-seeking 
goals in their relations with developing countries 
and do not place them in subordinate position 
(...). The credit granted to young states and the 
aid extended to them are normally repaid by the 
deliveries of the goods produced at the enterprise 
built with that aid or by traditional export goods 
(Vernikov and Shibayev, 1987:51).
Another strategy that would strengthen Third World countries' 
position in the world economy is their own cooperation. Politically 
this cooperation is reflected in their engagement in the non-alignment 
movement. Another important form of this cooperation is their economic 
relations, especially in the form of regional cooperation. The 
emphasis on this latter strategy arises from recognizing the limitation 
of most developing countries* size and resources.
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On the national level, those writers who emphasize the importance 
of nationalization would clearly point it out as prerequisite policy 
for economic independence. As mentioned earlier, nationalization is 
not confined to the legal ownership but to a structural transformation 
of the economy. In the economic sphere, it means not only the national 
ownership of productive assets but also the ability to control the 
process of production and marketing (Simonya, 1984). Soviet writers 
emphasize the importance of the public sector and the role of the state 
for both socialist and capitalist oriented economies. In his recent 
book devoted to the analysis of the destiny of capitalism in the 
Orient, Simonya argues that the only "way out" for those countries that 
are trying to attain economic independence while remaining within the 
capitalist formation is to leap over the phase of private capitalism 
(as experienced by the advanced capitalist countries) and move directly 
into the specific phase of state monopoly (Simonya, 1985:120).
One of the major national strategies put forward by the Soviet 
writers is industrialization. The stress on industrialization is 
influenced to a great extent by the Soviet Union's own experience, for 
this reason most Soviet writers on the Third World would agree that 
"economic independence is inconceivable without a certain degree of 
industrialization" (Levkovsky, 1973:47). Levkovsky argues that there 
are two economic factors vital for achieving economic independence: i) 
modernizing and expanding the local industry which will pave the way, 
technically and economically, for large scale reproduction, and as a 
consequence; ii) increasing the national labor productivity to the 
world average which will enable the Third World to become part of the 
world economy on equal and mutually advantageous terms (Levkovsky,
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1973:53). In their early references to industrialization Soviet 
writers have stressed heavy industrialization. However, taking account 
of the limitations of size and resources of most developing countries, 
Soviet writers have shifted their emphasis to small scale basic 
industrialization.
Finally, it comes as no surprise that economic planning is a 
policy that is continuously emphasized, whether in arguing in favor of 
nationalization, state involvement, industrialization, regional 
cooperation or any other activity. Different methods of planning are 
suggested: long-term economic forecasting; planning for capital
investment in the state sector or inter-sectoral and project levels; 
current financial planning; specific state regulatory measures for the 
private sector. The choice of the method or combinations would depend 
on the level of the country's economic development and its political 
structure and property relations (Stanis, 1976:65).
In emphasizing the international context and the role played by 
imperialism, Soviet writers gave less attention to the internal class 
structure in the developing countries. The internal classes are 
identified with their position in the "anti-imperialist" struggle. 
While it is clear in the case of the socialist oriented countries that 
the vanguard Marxist-Lenist party will pursue an independent 
development on behalf of the majority (workers, peasants), in the case 
of other countries references point to an "anti-imperialist" front or 
groups. These latter groups would include all classes except the large 
land owners and compradors. In the theoretical debate of the "non­
capitalist path," Soviet writers point to the progressive role played
by the petty bourgeoisie who were believed to lead an anti-imperialist
13independent development benefiting the majority of the population.
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It is this strength of national element and not 
only the unclear social barriers and the level of 
consciousness of the masses which allow one to 
explain that a division - one that would be very 
clear in terms of social classes - of forces 
standing on the opposite side of the barricade has 
often not yet occurred in the developing 
countries, and that the controversy within the 
bourgeoisie in those countries about position to 
be taken with imperialism is continuing. 
Motivated by nationalist considerations (...), a 
section of the bourgeoisie is ready (as in India) 
to support serious progressive measures even if 
they go as far as to encroach on the interests of 
big business (Brutents, 1979:45).
IV. The Work on Self-Reliance
The work on self-reliance in the West represents the most explicit 
discussion of policies to reduce dependence. The politics of self- 
reliance are seen as "an important part of contemporary history - an 
effort to undo five centuries of dependency on the West" (Galtung, 
1981:173).
Self-reliance as a concept entered the debate on the Third World
13development during the 1970s. Self-reliance theorists represent a
range of different perspectives mostly with Marxist and liberal
influence. The diversity of the ideological influences is perhaps best
expressed by Galtung, one of the strongest proponents of self-reliance:
The ideology of my vision encompasses some 
insights about inner man found in Buddhist 
thinking in the East and existentialist thinking 
in the West; anarchist thinking on the
significance of local autonomy; liberal thinking 
on freedom and outer man in general; (...) Marxist 
thinking on social structure; and antiimperialist 
theory and practice from recent years (Galtung,
1981:177).
Such diversity of background is responsible for the lack of a 
well-defined conceptual socio-economic framework within which the
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advocated policies would be pursued. Some theorists insist on the 
alteration of the existing class relationships and increased political 
participation as a means to achieve domestic self-reliance (Biersteker, 
1980); others see the possibility of such defined self-reliance in both 
socialist and capitalist economies (Amin, 1977). Sometimes self- 
reliance seems to include the best of the two systems: "self-reliance
ideology might be similar to capitalism in its emphasis on creativity 
and initiative, but highly dissimilar in its emphasis on mass 
participation" (Galtung, 1981:177). And sometimes self-reliance is 
presented as a "third way" in the present epoch after the previous 
existence of only capitalism and socialism (Ogundowole, 1985:135).
The work on self-reliance differs from that of the other schools 
of thought in two aspects. First, while other schools present their 
policies and strategies to be advanced within either a capitalist or a 
socialist development path, self-reliance is presented as an 
alternative development path aiming primarily at the satisfaction of 
the minimum needs of the entire population and reducing dependency. 
Second, while previous schools generally give more weight to the 
external factors, self-reliance theorists insist on the necessity of 
combining the three levels of self-reliance: local, national and
collective, since self-reliance at one level only does not mean the 
absence of exploitation within the other levels.
There is general agreement among the theorists of self-reliance 
that there are three levels or phases of the process of self-reliance: 
local, national and collective. The first level includes small units 
like families, communes and ethnic groups; the second level represents 
the country as a whole; and the third includes regional cooperation, 
continental and sub - continental (Preiswerk, 1980). The local and
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national levels are basically attempts to "depend on one's own 
resources" meaning using local creativity, raw materials, land and 
capital and directing them to produce for local consumption and the 
satisfaction of basic needs. Self-reliance as presented by its 
advocates does not mean self-sufficiency or autarky. Recognizing Third 
World countries' need for external finance (aid and loans), self- 
reliance theorists do not reject the use of external resources as long 
as they are not at the cost of "one's self-respect" and "one's autonomy 
of choice and action" (Rahman, 1980:83). Self-reliance theorists argue
that trade and other economic relations should not be cut but rather
redirected and recomposed by giving preference to cooperation with 
those in the same position and from the closer to the more distant 
(Galtung, 1980).
One can deduce a definition of economic independence, which is an
essential objective of the development strategy of self-reliance, from
examining how self-reliance itself is defined. Galtung offers us a
lucid definition:
Self-reliance is the antithesis of 
dependence (...). For ’dependence' has two
negations in English, both of them implicit in the
idea of self-reliance: independence and
interdependence. Independence is autonomy, that 
invaluable combination of self-confidence, a high 
level of self-sufficiency, and the fearlessness 
out of which invulnerability is forged. 
Interdependence is equity, which means a style of 
cooperation that does not engender new patterns of 
dependence (Galtung, 1981:173).
The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations:
Within the local and national levels, self-reliance theorists
propose a set of social, political and economic policies. All self-
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reliance writers emphasize the Importance of mass participation 
reflected in a high level of popular control over the local economy and 
in decision making, "(Mass) participation becomes the alpha and omega 
of self-reliance, as necessary and, often, as sufficient condition" 
(Galtung, 1980:28). These writers also emphasize the satisfaction of 
basic needs. A report from the Fugwash symposium on self-reliance 
indicated that the participants viewed the central objective as the 
attainment of minimum needs for the entire population as speedily as 
possible (Pugwash Symposium Report, 1977:260). The symposium specified 
three key areas for public policy (Pugwash Symposium Report, 1977:260- 
261): (1) changing the pattern of land and resource use through
redistribution of land and agricultural reforms in favor of the rural 
population, the construction and development of human settlements, and 
physical planning of the location of agricultural and industrial 
activities in relation to resource supply and environment; (2) linking 
consumption patterns to income redistribution and employment. 
Alternation of the pattern and level of consumption is suggested 
through the redirection of public finance, organizational and 
managerial resources to the: (a) creation of employment opportunities 
in services directly related to minimum needs such as health and 
education; (b) development and conversion of some of the existing 
industrial capacity towards the production of goods required for 
meeting basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter; (3) changing 
technological styles through the proper evaluation, selection and 
generation of technologies (appropriate technology). Third World 
countries are advised to develop individually and through collective 
cooperation, the technological styles that are suited to their
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environment, their human and natural resources, and most importantly 
their minimum needs-oriented development strategy.
Within the collective level of self-reliance both strategies of
regional cooperation and the NIEO are emphasized. At the regional
level, cooperation or integration efforts are seen to enhance the
industrial and technological capacities.
Industrial integration and complementarity 
schemes, particularly those concerning neighboring 
countries, can save resources and accelerate 
development, provided that integration takes place 
within a framework the objective of which is the 
satisfaction of basic needs for entire population 
rather than the benefit of small local minorities 
and foreign corporations" (Oteiza and Sercovich,
1976:668).
Finally, self-reliance theorists advocate the participation of
Third World countries in bringing about the NIEO through their
collective effort in order to enhance their independence.
It was the recognition of the true nature and the 
suffocating impacts of colonial relationships on 
their overall activities that led the new states 
to call for a new international economic order - 
NIEO. Hence the word 'self-reliance' is central to 
conceptual framework in which the demand for a 
NIEO has been put forward and expressed 
(Ogundowole, 1985:141).
Despite the explicit and elaborated policies and strategies in 
self-reliance analysis, there is no such explicit reference to the form 
of the internal class structure. The policy of self-reliance is
believed, by its advocates, to be carried out by and for the benefit of 
the masses.
With the masses in control of the productive 
machinary, especially in the countryside, such 
ideas as using land for cash crops in order to 
"earn foreign currency" (for the elites to buy 
consumer good, means of destruction - arms - and 
some means of production) would less easily emerge 
(Galtung, 1980:27).
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However, it is not clear what is the exact class structure of these
masses nor of the state, and within which social structure can these
masses pursue their control. While few writers point to socialism as
the social framework within which such collective effort can be pursued
(Rahman, 1980), most writers refrain from specifying the socio-economic
structure and adopt a "utopian1* vision or that of a "class-neutral
point of view".
The driving force behind the self-reliancist 
transformation is (...) assumed to be inherent in 
the individual and the collective, or more 
accurately, in their togetherness, in harmonious 
social relationship. The horizontal orientation 
of the self-reliancist principle provides little 
room for considering antagonistic contradictions 
as an important driving force for social change, 
societal progress. The principle of self- 
reliancism may therefore be regarded as a class- 
neutral point of view (Ogundowole, 1985:145).
V. The work on small open economies
Writing around the same period as dependencia, though less 
recognized, William Demas has questioned the relevance of the accepted 
doctrine on economic development to the small countries. Similarly, he 
sees the Soviet Union's model of development, especially its emphasis 
on accelerating heavy industrialization, as feasible only in a large 
continental country with large population. Taking the Caribbean 
countries as an example, Demas finds their economies suffering from 
certain disadvantages in terms of their autonomous economic 
development. "These disadvantages are the legacy of external 
dependence combined with small size of population and narrow range of 
natural resources at the individual country level" (Demas, 1978:237).
Demas argues that because of the small economies' size and limited 
resources, their leading sector is the export one; and the rate of
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growth of experts is more tied to the rate of growth of the gross
domestic product (GDP) than in the larger economies. Therefore, foreign
exchange always constrains the small countries.^
In his book published in 1965, Demas in his analysis of the small
economies, elaborates the notion of "self-sustained growth," which was
introduced by Rostow. The previously accepted notion of self-sustained
growth implied the ability of a country to rely on its own domestic
savings to finance its domestic investment. Demas criticizes the
underlying assumptions of this notion: (1) the level and rate of
change of the per capita income of a country are uniquely related to
its state of development and; (2) the country has a closed economy
which is also likely to be very large (Demas, 1965:6). Demas then
links the notion of "self-sustained growth" to the structural
transformation of the economy.
It is my view that the fundamental criterion of 
underdevelopment is the extent to which an 
economy has undergone structural transformation 
and has acquired the continuing capacity to adapt 
and to apply innovations. Furthermore, within the 
category of transformed economies, it is possible 
to have different degrees of self-sustenance in 
the growth process (Demas, 1965:6).
Demas defines this transformation process to include the following
seven elements (Demas, 1965:8):
(1) The capacity to transform, which is determined by political and
social processes. This implies the development of the economy's
capacity to apply innovations continually and to adapt to changing 
situations.
(2) The unification of the fragmented localized markets into a
national market, so all potential economies of scale can be
utilized.
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(3) The continuing shift and reallocation of production and labor 
between sectors of the national economy in accordance with changes 
in relative productivity and demand.
(4) The development of an increasing degree of interdependence among 
domestic industries and activities. The interdependence manifests 
itself in the development of a whole network of forward and 
backward linkages within the internal structure of production.
(5) Changes in the importance and composition of foreign trade.
(6) The reduction of dualism in the economy. This step Involves the 
reduction (though not necessarily an equalization) in the 
disparities between returns to factors of production.
(7) The development of appropriate institutions such as a capital 
market and other financial, educational and training institutions. 
Taking all these elements into consideration, Demas distinguishes
between structural transformation and what has been experienced by some 
countries as the growth of either short or long duration in the export 
sector. This type of growth has been experienced by countries that 
enjoyed a relative surplus for exporting certain minerals or raw 
materials which led to a high GNP and per capita income without, 
however, changing the production structure of their economies.
Demas further argues that in order to be more independent from 
changing external conditions, the smaller economies have to be 
structurally more flexible and adaptable, a condition they can obtain 
by achieving a higher degree of structural transformation. However, 
given their small size and their large dependence on both trade and 
capital flows, these economies will not be fully self-sustaining even 
though they might achieve structural transformation (Demas, 1965:20).
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He concludes that "the fullest degree of ’self-sustenance' in the 
growth process is possible only in a very large continental - type 
economy" (Demas,1965:33).
More recent theoretical and empirical studies have elaborated the 
analysis of small open economies with special focus on the socialist 
ones.*-® Though these studies have focussed mainly on the development 
process of the small open economies' transition to socialism, many of 
the analytical aspects and policy recommendations are similar to those 
presented by Demas. Because of their small size and limited resources, 
these countries are "forced to play by the rules of the global game in 
trade, finance, and investment" (Fagen, et al., 1986:11) which affects 
their degree of control over the internal process of accumulation. 
Based on the work of Kalecki and Dobb, Fitzgerald (1985 (a), (b)) has
presented a theoretical model for small open economies in their planned
process of capital accumulation and income distribution. In this model 
the primitive socialist capital accumulation is not generated from the 
labor or peasants' surplus as experienced by larger socialist 
economies, but rather from the differential rent earned in the
international market. Like Demas, Fitzgerald sees the export sector as 
the leading sector or as the "heavy industry" of the economy, and the 
foreign exchange as the major constraint. For this reason the small 
peripheral economy cannot be completely planned; in addition this 
economy is "far more vulnerable than its larger cousins, in terms both 
of the exposure to fluctuations in the world market and macro-economic 
effects of single investment projects." (Fitzgerald, 1985 (a):105).
Thus, in the case of small open economies (both socialist and
capitalist) the issue becomes, in a sense, attempts to "diversify 
dependence" rather than reduce it. Even though the economy cannot be
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completely "self-sustained" or "planned" it can be structurally 
transformed to reduce the level of its dependence.
Similarly, Thomas, in his book on Dependence and Transformation
(1974), addresses the problem of underdevelopment and dependence of the
small economies. He argues that the most important forms of economic
dependency to the economic structure are: 1) reliance on foreign
technology, 2) the critical role of foreign decision-making plays in
domestic employment, output, and income generation, and 3) the
persistent income drains via the transfer of surplus from the economy
to the owner of capital, technology and managerials skills in
metropolitan countries (Thomas, 1974:51). Thomas, however, does not
view the smallness as a constraint imposed by nature on the social
development but that which will affect the form in which production is
organized. And that the major constraint on an economy's development
is not the size of its market but rather the size of its social surplus
and its allocation. He believes that a socialist form of organization
is the only form (for the small countries) within which the economy can
develop the capacity to overcome underdevelopment and dependency.
Hence in Thomas's view, independence is a function of the internal
organization and development. Unlike many neoclassical and socialist
writers, Thomas believes in the possibility and ability of such small
countries to pursue eoprehensive planning, industrialization and
transformation.
We believe that transformation becomes possible in 
the context of a strongly entrenched 
worker/peasant alliance seeking to establish a 
socialist society - despite the widly held (and 
qouoted) views that even then they cannot have a 
modern and highly differentiated economic 
structure (Thomas,1974:301).
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The main proposed strategies and policy recommendations:
One of the main strategies proposed for the small economies to
overcome the limitations of their size is their regional integration
and cooperation. Demas argues that economic regionalism offers an
important avenue to achieve a more fully self-sustained pattern of
growth (Demas, 1965:35). Taking the Caribbean countries as an example,
he argues that:
the prospects for autonomous development of the 
Caribbean Archipelago and the more geographically 
limited Caribbean community would obviously be 
enhanced by schemes of integration and economic 
cooperation bringing a wider market and a wider 
range of human and natural resources (Demas,
1976:239).
In addition, he links regional integration to another strategy, 
that of ISI,
the value of regional economic integration in 
terms of development patterns it makes possible a 
strategy of development based on import- 
substitution rather than export creation and 
therefore a less ’dependent' pattern of 
development (Demas, 1965:36).
The latter strategy is seen also as a means to maximize foreign 
exchange earnings. Furthermore, Demas has suggested another pattern of 
industrialization that would provide some of the basic needs (e.g., 
food, textiles and shelter) and a limited range of intermediate goods 
such as cement, wood and other building materials. The output of this 
type of basic industrialization could be utilized in the construction 
sector which "could assume a more propulsive role in such economies" 
(Demas, 1965:49). In addition to the two types of industrialization 
that are directed to home consumption, Demas sees the development of an 
industrial structure that is geared to export as another way to enhance 
the economy's capacity to transform (mainly by virtue of export
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diversification). Recognizing the negative effect of the unfavorable 
terms of trade on the amount of the generated surplus in the 
international market, Demas points to the importance of the small 
countries' participation in the demand for a NIEO (Demas, 1976). 
Finally, Demas has emphasized the importance of economic planning as a 
means to accelerate the small economy's process of transformation. 
However, because of the small size and the openness, both the private 
sector and the international investors play an important role in the 
planning process.
It is interesting to note that while Fitzgerald's model specially 
addresses the experience of the small socialist economies, the model's 
policy recommendations coincide with all those suggested by Demas 
(which indicates the dominance, in some cases, of the material 
conditions of an economy over its social and political orientation). 
Rather than a reduction of dependency as such the diversification of 
dependency is the aim; by the same token, the maintenance of a wide 
range of exports and negotiation of long-term supplier's contracts of 
barter agreements are aimed at mitigation of the negative effect of the 
external terms of trade on accumulation. Nonetheless, in the longer 
run, the transition strategy must involve a greater degree of 
"industrialization" to overcome the structural heterogeneity (...); 
this will have to take the form of integration with other economies in 
the region (Fitzgerald, 1985(a):108).
In addition to regional integration, ISI, basic industrialization, 
NIEO and planning, Fitzgerald has emphasized another strategy, that of 
the provision of basic needs. This strategy is emphasized for two 
major reasons:
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at the center of economic strategy must be the 
increasing supply of basic needs; this is an end 
in itself (and a necessary condition for continued 
popular support in peace time) and a requirement 
if the effective contribution of the work force to 
production is to be realized (Fitzgerald,
1985(a):99).
In Thomas's analysis, the main proposed policies are constructed
within the general strategy of structural transformation towards
socialism. He has criticized both neoclassical and radical analyses
for the limited recognition of the possibility of industrialization in
the small economies. Thomas views the major structural problematic
features of the small underdeveloped countries as: (1) the lack of an
organic linkage between the pattern and growth of domestic resource use
and those of domestic demand; and (2) the divergence between domestic
demand and the needs of the broad mass of the population (Thomas,
1974:59). Both could be overcome by pursuing a structural
transformation of the agricultural and industrial sectors, based on
indigenous technology, geared to the production of basic materials and
the satisfaction of basic needs as defined by the society. In addition
Thomas does not share other theorists' enthusiasm for the strategy of
regional integration.
(At) present there is little likelihood of 
meaningful political/economic integration among a 
significant enough number of states to permit a 
serious combined effort at structural 
transformation. It follows that other strategies, 
apart from waiting for the achievement of economic 
integration, will have to be devised (Thomas,
1974:192).
His major emphasis is on the strategy of industrialization that is 
geared to the production of basic materials (e.g. textile, cement, 
glass, industrial chemicals) which would create the organic linkage 
between the domestic demand and output. Furthermore, Thomas emphasizes
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the necessity of a comprehensive planning of both production and 
consumption and the transformation of the agriculture structure. 
Finally, while Demas did not pursue his analysis within a specific 
social structure, both Fitzgerald and Thomas present their analysis of 
the small open economies within a socialist framework. Fitzgerald's 
model assumes a mixed economy in transition to socialism with a 
relatively small size of the proletariat, peasant majority and remnants 
of the capitalist and petty mercantile sectors. The State in 
controling the "commanding hights” tends, during the transition to 
strengthen the former two at the expense of the latter. Thomas, on the 
other hand, starts his analysis with the assumption that the dominance 
of a worker/peasant alliance has been established. These classes form 
the social structure of the state, and are the beneficiaries of the 
social and economic transformation of the economy.
Conclusions and further remarks:
The five theoretical perspectives reveal, either explicitly or 
implicitly, two definitions of economic independence: (1) Delinking
from the world capitalist system and the pursuit of an anti-capitalist 
path, i.e., of a socialist development; or (2) the development of the 
productive structure of the economy, with increasing the level of 
integration (linkages) among its productive sectors and between them 
and the domestic resources and needs. This process requires increasing 
the national control over the internal process of capital accumulation 
and hence over the social product. In addition, the attempt to 
increase the benefit of interdependence; i.e. , structural transforma­
tion of the economy towards a higher degree of national integration 
and equal interdependence in the world economy. These two positions
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are shared by many other writers who are not necessarily associated
with any of the presented theoretical perspectives. The debate
concerning which definition is more "correct" continues in the
literature and in both academic and political conferences. A recent
conference in Jordan on Independent Development in the Arab Countries
reflects clearly this division of opinion.^ While some of the
participants (e.g., Ismael Sabri) equated economic independence with
socialism, others (e.g., Sa'ad A1 Deen Ibrahim) argued that economic
independence stems from the development of the productive structure
which can be achieved by socialist, capitalist, or cooperative means.
The two distinct positions are also reflected in the collection of
studies on Economic Independence in Africa edited by Ghai (1973). Some
writers in these studies (e.g., Saul) argue that economic independence
should imply a disengagment from the capitalist system and the adoption
of a socialist strategy. Others (e.g., Ghai and Green), however, take
it to imply a national control over the economic structure.
Economic independence can be formulated as a 
situation in which national institutions 
(including private business and interest groups) 
have the right, capacity and power to take and 
implement decisions affecting the national economy 
and its component units without a de jure or de 
facto veto power being held by foreign 
individuals, enterprises, interest groups or 
governments (Green, 1973:46).
These two definitions of economic independence are directly 
related to the discussion on the possibility and ability, both 
theoretically and empirically, of the Third World countries to achieve 
an independent capitalist development.
In this dissertation I will take the second definition as the 
starting point for different reasons:
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(1) While the two definitions represent two different orientations of 
thought, I believe that the first one is a special case of the 
second definition. Economic independence, as defined in terms of 
greater domestic control over the internal process of accumulation 
and not in terms of more welfare and social equality, is 
theoretically compatible with capitalist development.
(2) Analysis of the conditions and strategies for economic 
independence according to the first definition should, in my 
opinion, be viewed within the more general conditions and 
strategies of constructing the material basis of a socialist 
society with all its specific social, political, and economic 
aspects.
(3) Many of the strategies and policies advocated for economic 
independence that have been applied in different social structures 
are generally based on the second definition.
This second definition is not clearly spelled out in the 
literature, with the exception of the work of some writers within the 
fifth school of though (the work on small open economies) specifically 
in the work of Thomas Clive and William Demas.
In working with the second definition, it should be emphasized 
that economic independence is perceived as a gradual process towards a 
relatively higher degree of national integration and not as an absolute 
condition. In this sense we cannot speak of countries or economies 
that are independent and those which are not, but rather of degrees of 
dependence or independence. Thus, a historical perspective becomes a 
necessary framework in evaluating economic independence since an 
observation at one time will not reveal the dynamic changes in the 
productive structure, whether towards a reduction or aggravation of
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dependence. In evaluating the case of India, Kelkar has emphasized the
importance of a 'time-frame' and argued for the necessity of
distinguishing between short duration or 'tactical* dependence and long
duration or 'strategic' dependence.
(It) is perfectly possible that for a short 
duration an economy can be 'dependent' on other 
economy for increasing rapidly the state of 
accumulation or capital formation. However, such
process itself can lead to the limitation of 
'asymmetry' due to its increased economic and
technological power via accretion of capital 
stock, technology etc. (Kelkar, 1980:247).
Hence, utilizing some external sources of finance (e.g., loans and 
aid) in the development of the productive structure of the economy 
might be considered a ’tactic' or short duration dependence. Yet, 
utilizing a similar amount of external finance (or even less) totally 
for consumptionist products and services might lead to a long duration 
dependence.
Taking the second definition with its two emphasized aspects - 
national integration and equal interdependence - the answer to the 
question ’independent of what?' should be clear: national integration
reflects the endogenous aspect of the process, a higher degree of 
articulation among the different sectors of the economy and among these
sectors and domestic resources and needs. In addition, it is a higher
capacity to manipulate the operative elements of the economic system in 
order to structurally transform it according to the national 
objectives; i.e., to rephrase Brewster: a system which is ’independent' 
from its own weaknesses (Brewster, 1973:91). Equal interdependence, on 
the other hand, implies that economic independence is not autarky, and 
is not independence from 'others', but rather interaction on an equal 
basis with them.
43
Another question that could be raised here is: is it possible to 
measure the degree of economic independence, and how? I am not 
familiar with studies that have attempted to measure economic 
independence as such, however, some studies have attempted to measure 
the opposite situation, economic dependence. Evans and Gereffi, in 
their assessment of Brazil's and Mexico's dependency situation, argue 
that direct foreign investment gives the external owners of capital 
the right to decide how and what to produce, and how to utilize the 
generated surplus (Evans and Gereffi, 1982:116). Hence, they consider 
foreign ownership as a "good 'first cut' indicator of external control
of the internal productive apparatus" (Evans and Gereffi, 1982:117).
18This indicator is accepted by many writers. "(A) country can hardly
be characterized as economically independent when a substantial 
proportion of its assets and jobs are in foreign hands" (Ghai, 
1973:xii).
Brewster argues, however, that such an orthodox measure as the 
proportion of foreign to local ownership (as well as import and export 
coefficients, ratios of foreign to domestic investment) has to be 
downgraded (Brewster, 1973:92). While national ownership is an 
important factor for economic independence, the absence of foreign 
ownership in one country does not necessarily imply the economy's 
higher level of national integration and the capacity to manipulate the 
domestic operative elements, nor its equal participation in the world 
economy and hence its independence. Defining economic dependence as 
the wide and growing disparity between the structure of the domestic 
demand and the structure of domestic resource use, Brewster suggests 
using a matrix of inter-relationships between the operative economic
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functions of the system. He has constructed a partial matrix of the
association between the changes in a small selection of variables
(employment, wage rate, export, import ratio, output, consumption,
prices, and investment) in Trinidad and Tobago. The values of the
coefficients of correlation were insignificant which he considers: "a
major distinguishing feature between a dependent economy like Trinidad
and Tobago and an economy depending on external trade like Britain"
(Brewster, 1973:92).
Sylvan has argued against measuring the degree of economic
dependence by computing the percentage of total accumulation and
investment accounted for by foreign sources. Instead, he is concerned
with "the contingency of domestic processes on foreign sources"
(Sylvan, 1979:20). In an attempt to measure this concept, he takes the
per capita liquid surplus as a measure of the adequacy of domestic
capital accumulation, and the level of money incomes as a proxy for the
degree of the "heaviness" of investment and hence the adequacy of
19domestic technology. These two factors, Sylvan argues, account
mainly for the contingency of domestic processes on foreign sources.
The measure suggested by Sylvan is, in my opinion, based on a rigid
causal mechanism that cannot be generalized to different economic and
20social structures. I do, however, agree with his emphasis on
technology as defined not in terms of machines only but as all means of 
production.
The major problem in reducing economic dependence 
is to find a way of increasing accumulation while 
at the same time channeling that capital into 
domestic rather than foreign technology 
(Sylvan, 1979:160).
Gaporaso has correctly argued that while economic dependence as a
pure economic relation is easily measured, dependency is a much more
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complex concept and thus Is more resistant to measurement suggestions
(Caporaso, 1978). As mentioned earlier, many of the conducted
quantitative studies, by incorporating only some external factors
(e.g., volume of trade and foreign debt), have reached the misleading
conclusion that many of the advanced industrial countries (e.g., Canada
21and Japan) are more 'dependent' than many developing countries. This
is not to argue against quantitative studies, but rather to signify the
importance of examining different economic, political and social
factors. One might examine a set of indicators such as: changes in
the level or ratio of national to foreign ownership; changes in the
domestic ability and capacity to produce the needed capital and
technology; changes in the composition (domestic vs. foreign) of
scientific and managerial expertise; and changes in the ability to
conduct independent domestic and foreign policies. The following
definition by Helleiner points to some additional important indicators
of economic independence:
No state without an economy basically oriented to 
production for national needs, without a high 
capacity for generating nationally at least the 
bulk of the investable surplus and educated- 
skilled manpower necessary for rapid and sustained 
growth has the economic base for fully meaningful 
independence (Helleiner, 1979b:223).
Because of the difficulty of incorporating many of the social and 
political indicators (in terms of data and the use of proxy), I believe 
in the necessity of undertaking a qualitative examination of specific 
cases within a historical perspective.
Finally, the examination of the different schools of thought has 
revealed a set of different proposed strategies and policy 
recommendations (summarized in Table (1)). The major proposed economic
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strategies are: Industrialization either as ISI or basic industry,
regional cooperation, and the demand for the NIEO. The evaluation of 
these strategies will be the subject of the next chapter. Both 
nationalization and economic planning, which have been emphasized by 
many schools, are necessary policies with which a higher degree of 
economic independence can be achieved. While nationalization lays the 
foundation of the structure of a more independent economy (by allowing 
a higher control over the productive assets), planning enhances the 
implementation of the development process and reduces the ill effect of 
conflicting interests that might develop within this process. Another 
policy recommendation that has been emphasized by all schools is income 
distribution. The emphasis on this policy, however, is justified 
differently. ECLA sees income redistribution as a means to increase 
the aggregate demand and hence the domestic market. Some writers 
within dependencia see income redistribution as a means to reduce the 
transfer of surplus to the center via the the depressed level of 
domestic wages. The other schools see the redistribution of income 
towards the provision of basic needs as means for increasing both the 
mass support and the level of productivity. Therefore, whether the 
attempt at increasing the level of economic independence is conducted 
within a socialist or a capitalist oriented development, there is a 
need to link the process to a certain level of income distribution. 
Though this policy will not be theoretically analyzed separately in 
the second chapter, I will take it into consideration in discussing 
other strategies and in evaluating the Cuban experience.
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Table (1)
Summary of Definitions and Proposed Strategies of 




Economic Independence Proposed Strategies
(1) ECLA National integration and ISI, RC, ID,
(50s-60s) Equal Interdependence planning
(2) Dependencia National integration/ BIS, RC, ID,
(60s-70s) Socialism planning
(3) Soviet National integration/ BIS, RC, ID, planning
(60s-80s) Socialism nationalization, NIEO
(4) Self-Reliance National integration/ BIS, RC, AT, PBN,
(70s-80s) Equal Interdependence NIEO
(5) Small open National integration/ ISI, BIS, RC,
Economies Socialism planning, PBN, NIEO
(60s-80s) export diversification
ISI: import substituting industrialization. 
BIS: basic industry strategy.
RC: regional cooperation.
ID: income distribution.




Green, however, acknowledges that the converse of this assumption
does not hold. He recognizes that In certain cases some national
groups may see their interest best served by uniting with external
economic forces.
Roemer correctly points that
Western economics has not yet accepted national 
independence as a national goal of 
development(...) . (The) goal of independence 
raises fundamental differences on which economists 
from the North and South are likely to find much 
less common ground(Roemer,1981:429).
It is important to note that though the concern with economic
independence is not addressed in contemporary Western economics,
it was the concern of some of the now advanced countries in their
early stages of development. Such concern was reflected, for
example, in the writings of Friedrich List who addressed the issue
in relation to the American economy in the late 19th Century. For
a review of List's argument see Otfried Garbe, 1977.
Prebisch's theoretical contributions on related issues started
long before the establishment of ECLA. His analysis appeared in
Revista Economica as early as 1937. For a presentation of the
economic and social background within which Prebisch's thoughts
have evolved see Love, 1980.
In the 1940s, studies made by Kindleberger, Hilgerdt, and Singer 
have similarly questioned the conventional international trade 
theory and advanced an opposite hypothesis of a secular trend in
the terras of trade. Singer and Prebisch, however, extended the 
argument further to indicate the tendency for a steady decline 
terms of trade of the developing countries (Sarker, 1986:355).
5. Prebisch has elaborated this argument in recent articles; see for 
example Prebisch (1980).
6. The presentation on this section will only cover some of the
original work associated with dependencia in Latin America. Other 
influential writers (e.g., Samir Amin) have elaborated the 
analysis for other regions.
7. For an assessment of the evolution of the dependencia school see 
Palma (1978).
8. Many critics have classified the writers within dependencia 
differently. For a summary of some of the classifications see 
Chilcote (1981).
9. There is, to a certain extent, an overlap between the work of ECLA
and that of the dependencia school. Some critics (e.g., Chilcote,
1984) associate the work of both Sunkel and Furtado with ECLA. 
Other critics (e.g., Palma, 1978), however, consider their work as 
a distinct approach within dependencia. Both critics, however, 
agree that Sunkel's and Furtado's main emphasis is on the 
obstacles to national development, and that both have enhanced the 
social and political perspective of ECLA.
10. For some references see Palma (1978), Chilcote (1981), Browett 
(1972), and Werker (1985).
11. See for example Caporaso (1978), Ohierhenuan (1979) and Roxbourgh 
(1979).
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12. Based on such confusion, some writers have argued that Cuba 
depends on the Soviet Union as it did on the United States before 
the revolution. This point will be analyzed in chapter III.
13. For a summary and critical assessment of the "Non capitalist 
path" see Thomas (1978), Ohiorhenuan (1979-80) , and Amirahmadi 
(1987) .
14. Berger has traced the origin of the term self-reliance to the 
Chinese phrase that translate as "regeneration through our own 
efforts" which appeared in Mao Tse-Tung's speech in 1945 
(mentioned in Galtung, 1980:19). Another writer has traced its 
origin to Ghandi's philosophy (mentioned in Sagasti, 1976:939).
15. In his more recent article Demas incorporates the "political 
economy constraints". These constraints reflect a complex set of 
psychological, economic, political and social phenomena (e.g., 
inappropriate level of consumption, high level of unemployment, 
inappropriate system of education) . These phenomena are 
influenced by historical and external factors (e.g., impact of 
western consumption patterns brought about by media and tourists) 
(Demas, 1976).
16. The most recent collection of these studies is in Fagen et al., 
1986.
17. The collection of these studies has been published in Arabic 
under the title: Al Tanmia Al Mustakela Fi Al Watan Al Arabi 
(Independent Development in the Arab Countries), Markaz Derasat 
Alwehda Al Arabia, Lebanon, 1987.
18. See for example the collection of studies in Ghai (1973).
19. Sylvan argues that the higher the level of money incomes (wages, 
salaries or peasant receipts) the less the money that is available
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to buy the complex machinery needed for heavy industry. In 
addition, the higher this average level of money income the 
greater is the pressure for capital to be invested in consumer 
goods rather than in producer goods. Finally, by assuming that 
heavy Industry requires higher reliance on foreign technology than 
light industry, Sylvan argues that a rise In the income of the 
average person implies a diminuation in the contingency of 
investment on foreign technology.
20. Sylvan's suggested mechanism implies that as the income of the 
"average" person increases, the contingency of investment on 
foreign technology will decrease and hence the degree of economic 
dependence will also decrease. However, there are many cases 
where this mechanism does not apply. In some countries (e.g., 
some oil producing ones) the income of the average person was 
raised substantially leading to an increase demand for consumption 
goods. The demand, however, was not met by domestic production but 
rather by increased imports of these goods. On the other hand, in 
a country like Cuba, the gradual move toward heavy Industry was 
neither at the expense of suppressed incomes of the "average" 
person nor has it led to increased dependence on foreign 
technology.
21. President Kennedy remarked once that the most dependent powers in 
the world were the super powers (Saunders (ed), 1981:74): The
Political Economy of New and Old Industrial Countries. 
Butterworths, London & Boston.
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CHAPTER II
STRATEGIES OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the four main strategies that have been 
advocated by most schools of thought reviewed in the previous chapter. 
They include the nationally conducted strategies of import-substituting 
industrialization and basic industrialization and two strategies 
constructed within the broader international context: regional
cooperation and the demand for the new international economic order
The focus on industrialization at the national level should not 
imply the neglect of agriculture and the role of external trade. None 
of the presented schools in chapter I advocates autarky or the neglect 
of agriculture. Rather, policies to benefit the trade and agriculture 
sectors are conceived as important short and medium run strategies. 
Besides fulfilling domestic consumption needs, agricultural products 
can serve as basic material in some of the industries and as exported 
products which could secure additional foreign exchange needed for 
capital goods imports. Industrialization, however, is conceived as the 
long-run strategy with the greatest potential for accelerating the 
development of the other sectors (as a direct stimulus to other new 
activities through linkage effect) and for increasing the economy's 
productive capacity, its flexibility, and hence its economic 
independence (see chapter I).
Industrialization has also been cited as contributing to other 
goals. Most writers would agree that "the principal potential of
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industrialization was seen in its contribution to rapid economic 
growth" (Hughes, 1978:1). To economic growth, others add the 
elimination of human poverty and increasing the material standard of 
living (Sutcliffe, 1972) by increasing the employment level, labor 
productivity and supply of goods. Beyond any theoretical 
justification, however, industrialization has been perceived as one of 
the most important strategies by many political leaders "for whom 
industrialization represented progress, stability, diversification, 
high wages and development. Above all, it meant economic independence" 
(Pazos, 1985-86: 58).
The process of industrialization in the now developed countries
took different forms. It proceeded from a light industry emphasis to
heavy industry in Britain; a similar, but shorter process took place
later in other European countries and in the United States. The
opposite of this sequence was pursued by the Soviet Union where
priority was given to the development of heavy industry. The debate
continues in the economic development literature about the differences
and similarities between the pattern of 19^ century industrial
development in the now advanced countries and the pattern in the Third
World.^ While many writers, especially within the dependencia
perspective, see these two patterns as having different internal
dynamics and hence different outcomes, others (e.g., Gunnarson (1985)
and Warren (1980)) emphasize their similarity. This debate will not be
presented here; it is sufficient to quote here Sutcliffe's evaluation
of these two positions:
The available statistics suggest to me that both 
extremes in the argument over the 
industrialization record of the Third World are 
wrong: both Warren's optimistic view that
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industrialization, the equivalent of the process 
which transformed the advanced countries, is now 
taking place quite rapidly in the underdeveloped 
ones; and the orthodox dependency view that hardly 
anything significant is happening. The truth 
seems not to be midway between the two but more 
complex and ambiguous than either. A form of 
industrialization has been taking place in quite a 
wide spread manner. But in many countries it is 
composed of different elements which are not 
homogeneous and do not unambiguously represent 
economic modernaisation (Sutcliffe, 1984:128).
Various theorists classify the types of industrialization in 
different ways. Some classify them according to their emphasis on 
capital intensive vs. labor intensive industries, or on large vs. small 
scale industries. Roemer (1981: 166) further classifies the industrial 
strategies into those which emphasize: (1) import-substituting
industrialization (ISI), (2) further processing of primary exports, (3) 
promotion of diversified, mostly manufactured exports (an outward-
looking strategy), (4) basic industrialization (with specific emphasis 
on heavy producer goods industries), and (5) small-scale labor
intensive industries. The "choice" of the industrial strategy will
depend on the social nature of the state and its goals, and also to a 
large extent, on the level of economic development, the economy's size 
and the available human, financial and natural resources.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on ISI and on the basic
industry strategy as the two major strategies that have been advocated
in the literature, with the former being more pursued by many of the
Third world countries. As argued by Ahmad,
(given) the current structure of international
trade, it was inevitable that any attempt at 
industrialization in the less developed countries 
will result in import substitution (Ahmad,
1978:25).
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I. Import-Substituting Industrialization flSI^
ISI as a strategy aims at producing domestically the manufactured 
goods which were formerly imported. ISI is generally perceived to 
follow a sequence similar to the process of industrialization that took 
place earlier in the advanced capitalist countries, i.e., starting from 
the manufacture of finished consumer goods and then, through backward 
linkage effects, moving on to the production of intermediate and
n
capital goods. Different definitions of ISI appear in the literature. 
In this dissertation, ISI is taken as the replacement of the foreign 
supply of goods and services by domestic production regardless of the 
sequence of the process.
ISI was pursued by some Latin American countries in the 1920s-30s 
mainly as a response to some external events (World War I and the 
Great Depression). Production of mostly consumer goods took place in 
that period in many Latin American countries as a result of a decline 
in their foriegn exchange, decline in non-militery production in Europe 
and United States and interuption of shipping. It was only after the 
Second World War and the elaborated work of ECLA that ISI became a 
deliberate economic policy of development in many of the Third World 
countries. Different countries used different policy instruments in 
their application of ISI. These instruments included protective 
tariffs, overvalued exchange rates, credit and cheap loans by the 
government to certain industries.
Theoretical assessment of ISI:
One gets the impression in reviewing the literature that ISI is an 
outdated strategy (Bhagwati, 1986) that led to many disappointing 
results (Ballance et. al. , 1982). As noted by Ahmad: ISI "has been
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portrayed as the single greatest disaster that has ever happened to the
LDCs" (Ahmad, 1978:8). ISI has been criticized from the conservative,
liberal and radical perspectives. Neoclassical economists decry the
limits on free trade and specialization according to comparative
advantage. They oppose its main policy instruments of protection and
government intervention. Accordingly they believe that ISI has led to
inefficiency and misallocation of resources. Liberals point to ISI's
negative social consequences, such as its failure to create direct
employment opportunities and its contribution to social and regional
inequality. In addition, they criticize other structural consequences
such as the bias of ISI towards production of non-essential luxury
goods and its inevitable slowing down and exhaustion stage. Radical
writers, on the other hand, view ISI as a development strategy that
serves the interest of the bourgeoisie (national and foreign) at the
3
expense of the poorest majority (Loup, 1983: 196).
By its own definition, by its deliberate inward direction, and by 
its economic and political aim of increasing the economy's self- 
sufficiency and independence, ISI is incompatible with the basic 
neoclassical view of maximizing world welfare through the 
specialization of each country according to its "given" comparative 
advantage. Hence any socio-economic consequence of ISI is condemned by 
neoclassical writers.
In pointing to inefficiency and "waste", these critics tend to
decry the difficulties that are bound to occur in any initial attempt
at industrialization, planning or any other economic activity.
It is well to remember in this connection that 
initial low productivities in manufacturing 
activity are simply the cost of learning. Low 
productivities, in any event, are neither unique
57
to import substituting industries nor are caused 
by them. They are a pervasive fact of life in all 
less developed countries (...). It makes no sense 
to isolate import-substituting industries as the 
only ones with low productivity and imply that 
abandoning them will somehow increase 
productivity ( Ahmad, 1978:38).
Most critics cite ISI's inevitable tendency toward slowing down
and stopping after "easy" import-substitution opportunities are taken.
These critics seem to ignore the different possibilities for ISI
extension. As Hirschman suggests, ISI can be expanded by the
possibilities of enlarging the market size, through some policies of
income redistribution and by the formation of common markets. In
addition, ISI can open up new opportunities for further domestic
manufacture through the creation of new incomes and through backward
linkages (Hirschman, 1968:14). Furthermore, this limitation would tend
to disappear when ISI is extended to intermediate and capital goods
production. In a recent assessment of Latin American countries, Fazos
argues that many countries have been progressively able to manufacture
substitute goods that are more difficult to produce as their technical
and managerial ability has developed (Pasos, 1985-86:61). Hirschman
further challenges the claim that ISI tends to concentrate on non-
essential luxury goods. He argues that ISI leads to a bias in favor of
non essential industries only when it is motivated by balance-of-
payments difficulties. The main reason Hirschman gives is that the
control will aim at permitting continued supply 
of the more essential goods traditionally imported 
at the cost of shutting out non-essentials and 
thus cause domestic production of the latter to 
become specially profitable (Hircschman, 1968:5).
However, a "deliberate development policy, is likely to produce exactly
the opposite bias "(Hirschman,1968: 5).
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While income and regional inequality have been exacerbated in many 
countries adopting ISI, the underlying cause of such social 
inequality must be understood within the dynamics specific to certain 
social structures. The profile of the productive structure after the 
pursuit of ISI reflects the demand profile which existed before. This 
demand profile was based, in most cases, on unequal income distribution 
(Georgescu-Roegen, cited in Baer, 1972: 108). The existing relations 
of production which determine the pattern of income distribution will 
define the type of products (e.g., luxury goods vs. mass consumption 
goods) that ISI domestically supplies, and not the other way around. 
However, while ISI may contribute to different economic and social 
problems and is not socially nuetral, it is important to acknowledge 
that these problems were already in existence. In other words, it is 
misleading to attribute social and economic ills of a certain social 
structure to the pursuit of a specific industrial strategy.^
The main question here, however, remains: what is the effect of 
ISI on the broader attempt at increasing the country's level of 
economic independence? In his evaluation of the effect of ISI on 
different forms of dependence, Roemer (1981) argues that ISI 
intensifies rather than ameliorates at least four types of dependence: 
market dependence, technological dependence, foreign capital dependence 
and economic inflexibility (the lack of the capacity to transform); 
with positive impact only on reducing dependence on foreign managers 
and entrepreneurs.
Many writers within the dependencia perspective believe that ISI 
has encouraged the penetration of foreign interest in the economy 
through the import of foreign capital and technology, which has 
aggravated the situation of "dependencia" (Sunkel, 1972). The level of
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economic dependence has indeed increased in those economies where ISI
(and industrialization in general) meant only the establishment of
large "assembly plant" operations. In these cases MNCs have the
dominant control over decision making in production, employment,
marketing and other activities. In addition, these plants often act as
isolated pockets in these economies with no backward or forward
linkages, and with small opportunities, if any, to develop indigenous
technological capacity. By the same token, similar consequences may
develop when ISI is confined to the production of consumer goods
(especially durables), without developing the capacity for capital
goods production.
Countries with no local capital goods capacity, 
then, are forced to import not only the capital 
goods but very often the whole package that goes 
with it. In so far as various aspects of the 
package are inappropriate they have to accept 
inappropriate patterns of development (Stewart,
1976:132) .
Some critics use different statistical indicators (e.g., imports 
coefficients) to determine the impact of ISI on the economy's level of 
dependency. These indicators, while helpful in assessing specific
cases, are misleading when generalized. The basic problem with most 
of the theoretical evaluations of ISI is that they are done in
isolation from reference to the specific socio-economic structure of 
each country. They tend to be methodologically static (ignoring 
dynamic factors such as "accumulation of experiences and skill" 
(Stewart, 1982) and linkages). The impact on economic independence
through the changes in import composition, technology, and foreign
finance, should be evaluated within specific case studies. Specific 
considerations should be given to the long-term effects of the
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structural change in the industrial process, the change in the import 
components of the produced goods, the development of externalities and 
linkages, the increasing level of productivity from operating 
experience and technological advances, and the changes in ownership of 
the employed capital. Taking all these factors into consideration will 
provide a more profound evaluation of actual experiences. Therefore, 
while ISI has intinsified in many cases market, foreign capital 
dependence and economic inflexibility, as argued by Roemer (1981), 
these outcomes are not the general case for all countries. As will be 
shown in chapter III, Cuba's adoption of a certain form of ISI (with
emphasis on utilizing domestic resources) has decreased its market and
technological dependency, and has significantly increased the country's 
economic flexibility.
The attribution of many negative social and structural
consequences to ISI reflects a naivete similar to the common
attribution of all the "evil" to machinery. It ignores the social
context within which the strategy (or machinery) has been applied. ISI
will definitely exacerbate income inequality and unemployment when it
is directed to the production of narrowly consumed goods.
The dominant classes in every society define a
"standard of living" which in turn defines a range 
of required goods. When the range of goods that 
can be produced internally is narrow relative to 
the socially defined ranged of required goods, 
then reliance on external sources of those goods 
becomes a central part of maintaining the
"standards of living" (Evans and Geriffi,
1982:115).
Further, ISI will exacerbate economic dependence (through 
increased foreign penetration), when the groups with power are those 
whose interests coincide with those of foreign capital. A national 
state (with national bourgeoisie or workers/peasants base) that
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actively intervens in the economy would tend to use stricter measures 
with foreign capital. In this respect, the state's regulation of 
foreign investment becomes an important complementary policy to ISI.
Citing all the alleged negative impacts of ISI, many writers 
(e.g., Bhagwati, 1986) and financial institutions (e.g., World Bank) 
announce its failure and advocate export-oriented industrialization 
(EOI) as an alternative strategy. These writers ignore two aspects of 
this conclusion: First, the cited examples of successful EOI (e.g., 
Brazil and South Korea) are in countries that have developed the strong 
base for their industrial export through their experience acquired 
from ISI (Pazos (1985-86) and O'Brien (1979)); Second, the pursuit of 
EOI will not necessarily alleviate the social and structural problems 
attributed to ISI, since they are mostly an outcome of the specific
C
social system within which they are pursued. Therefore, instead of 
abandoning ISI in favor of EOI, the latter can be adopted, in a later 
stage, as a complementary strategy and not as a substitute. In 
addition, instead of greater reliance on the market forces, the social 
and structural limitations associated with ISI can be reduced or
countered by pursuing additional policies such as:
(1) a more comprehensive process of economic planning. This policy 
would help in reducing the problems of the wasteful misallocation 
of resources and regional Inequality. Such a policy has been 
pursued by many socialist countries.
(2) Emphasis on applying ISI In intermediate and capital goods
sectors and not in the consumer goods sector. Contrary to what
many critics of ISI believe, UNECLA argued that
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import substitution with respect to a particular 
consumer good, specifically if it is a consumer 
durable, may cause more severe demands with 
respect to investment and technical know-how than 
other alternative substitution possibilities in 
the field of capital goods or intermediate 
products (quoted in Havenvik, 1978:143).
Focus on these two sectors would have the dynamic tendency to
reduce foreign investment by developing an indigenous technical
capacity. Such policy has been pursued by some developing
countries (e.g., China, India).
(3) Emphasis on the utilization of domestic resources in the different 
industries. Such utilization will reduce the country's import of 
raw materials, and would increase the technical capacity by 
increased experiences in adapting available resources to final 
needs.
(4) Both regional cooperation and the demand for NIEO should be 
perceived as policies complementary with ISI. These complementary 
policies could expand the market and counter the "exhaustion" 
possibilities.
Therefore, instead of dismissing ISI offhand because of its 
alleged inefficiencies and limitations, Third World countries should 
make a conscious choice based on a careful examination of the 
implications of ISI.
II. Basic Industrialization (BI)
While ISI has been advocated mainly by ECLA, forms of BI have 
been supported by Soviet theorists, self-reliance writers, writers on 
small open economies, and some of the dependencia school writers (see 
chapter I) . ISI has been pursued for decades in many different Third
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World countries; as a result many theoretical and empirical assessments 
exist in the literature, which is not the case for BI.^
This strategy emphasizes investment in the producer-goods sector. 
Such emphasis has been the center of the "Soviet industrialization 
model" of heavy industry which was theoretically supported by 
Feldman's model. Similar versions, adapted to developing countries, 
have been put forth by Hahalanobis, Raj and Sen and De Bernis.^ BI, 
however, differs from these models in some aspects. These models 
presuppose the existence of large continental countries, where the 
requirement and range of heavy industry is feasible; BI is a model for 
the small underdeveloped economies which characterize most of the Third 
World countries. Another important difference is that these previous 
models neglect the problem of technology and deal with technology as a 
parameter and not as a variable (Stewart, 1976). BI, on the other 
hand, strongly emphasizes the development of an Indigenous technology 
as part of the process of industrialization. In addition, and as a 
result of their awareness of dynamic technological changes, BI's 
advocates acknowledge a certain level of flexibility in the resources
O
base, which other models do not. Such level of flexibility implies a 
higher degree of linkage between the industry and the available 
domestic resources. Finally, while the previous models focus on the 
conflict of investment allocation between the producer-goods sector 
(Department I) and the consumer-goods sector (Department II), BI's main 
focus is on the convergence of domestic resource use, domestic demand 
and domestic needs and the consequence development of the technological 
capacity (with emphasis on heavy industry as a complementary policy). 
As Thomas argues:
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Our basic strategy for transforming these 
economies (the small underdeveloped) is to plan 
the convergence of domestic resource use, domestic 
demand, and needs in such a way as to create the 
basis of an indigenous technology (Thomas, 1974:
195).
BI involves the production of basic goods (basic in the Sraffian 
sense) i.e., goods that are used, directly or indirectly, in the 
production of all other goods. They consist essentially of wage goods 
and the means of production. Analyzing the case of Tanzania, Rweyemamu 
argues that: "these are the only goods that can transform our economy 
from a dependency relationship to one of economic independence" 
(Rweyemamu, 1973:181). More specifically, Thomas identifies these 
basic goods with the two main industries: iron and steel and
Q
textiles. To these main elements, he adds other important basic goods
which include: paper, plastic, rubber, glass, cement, fuel, industrial
chemicals and other intermediate and final materials. The production
of these goods, by providing strategic linkages, forms the backbone of
the industrial structures.
(If) these goods are not produced locally the 
organic linkages between domestic demand and 
domestic output will forever lie abroad in the 
countries from which these imports are derived.
The growth of domestic demand will then simply 
result in transferring the bulk of the value added 
(Thomas, 1974:196).
Stressing the importance of the linkage effects has been long 
addressed in the literature (Hirschman, 1958). However, in addition to 
the inter-sectoral and inter-industrial linkage, the advocates of BI 
stress the general linkage among the selected industries (providing 
basic goods) and domestic resources and domestic neesds. This 
additional linkage reduces the possibility of the negative outcome of 
some of the "consumption linkages" that occured in some developing
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countries.'*'® In addition, the early writing of Hirschman (1958) on the 
importance of the linkages effects have singled out the relation 
between the market size and economic size of the plant as the key 
factor that would trigger private and public investment in backward and 
forward linkages (Hirschman, 1977:77). On the contrary, advocates of 
BI, while stressing the importance of inter-sectoral and inter­
industrial linkages, undermine the market size as a determinant 
factor; instead they point out the size of generated surplus and its 
allocation to industry (Thomas, 1974). Finally, the advocates of BI 
consider the linkage among domestic resources, demand and output as the 
necessary condition for the growth of an indigenous technology.
Many theoritical and empirical studies have shown that indigenous
technology develops when the industrial production is geared to
producer-goods. *■*■ In an attempt to supply certain intermediate and
final basic goods, local technological innovations would gradually,
through a process of accumulated experiences, skills and organization,
adapt the use of available resources to the production of these 
12goods.
Theoretical assessment of BI:
In his survey of the literature on resource-based 
industrialization, Roemer argues that because of the low direct labor 
coefficients of most of these industries (typically capital intensive), 
they do not seem to be a good instrument for generating employment. He 
further argues, however, that the case for these basic industries 
should rest not so much on the direct impact as on their indirect 
effects through the linkage to other sectors (Roemer, 1979: 185).
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Further, because of the high capital/labor ratio, labor 
productivity in these industries is higher than in other sectors, hence 
wages tend to be higher. As a result, these industries might increase 
income concentration. However, as I argued earlier in the case of ISI, 
the unequal income distribution is an outcome of certain social 
relations, and not of industrial policy per se.
What is the effect of BI on economic independence? BI has the 
potential to overcome the limitations of ISI. By linking the structure 
of production to domestic consumption, BI has a higher potential for 
supplying wage goods (instead of luxury goods); and by linking the 
production structure to domestic resource use, it has a higher 
potential in the development of an indigenous technology.
The early stages of BI in most Third World countries, like those
of any other strategy, require external economic and technological
assistance. In its intial stages, BI might increase dependence on
foreign technology and management. However, this "dependence" can be
considered as "tactical" or "short-run" (as was argued in Chapter I)
when it is utilized for the development of a technological and
productive base of the economy.
(The) approach is basically one of adaptation and 
selection in order to strengthen the existing 
basis of the machines sector. It soon becomes 
possible for internal technological advances and 
adaptations to take place (Thomas 1974:215).
In addition, because of its domestic orientation, BI has the 
potential of reducing "market dependence" (Roemer, 1981). Emphasis on 
the domestic economy does not mean, however, the absence of foreign 
trade. Foreign trade is conceived as an extension of the internal 
dynamic. As BI succeeds in creating a convergence of domestic resource 
use and domestic demand it creates the "capacity to convert domestic
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savings into investment goods and thereby allows for the potential 
development of an export capacity in industrial goods" (Thomas, 
1974:221). Hence, a better level of equal international exchange can 
be achieved as a result of domestic changes.
Finally, Thomas suggests four other industrial activities to 
complement BI: (1) the development of machinery tools industry which is 
"one of the most important areas of the capital goods sector which has 
to be planned and integrated into the basic materials sector" (Thomas, 
1974:212); (2) the provision of infrastructural and overhead
facilities, particularly power and transportation; (3) the development 
of small scale industry which would help in narrowing rural/urban 
industrial differentiation (reducing regional inequality); (4) the
development of agricultural industries which would increase the dynamic 
interaction between the basic materials sector and all other sectors. 
On one hand, the basic industries provide necessary input for the 
agricultural sector (e.g., fertilizers, machinery). And on the other 
hand, the agriculture sector provides inputs for further manufacturing 
(e.g., textiles, food processing).
Specially when implemented with these complementary industrial
activities, BI has a higher potential than ISI for increasing the
economy's capacity to evolve towards a higher degree of economic 
13independence.
III. Regional Cooperation
The Third World and the advanced capitalist countries differ in 
terms of their motivation for regional cooperation. The Third World 
embraces regional cooperation to reduce its dependence on the
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international market and fostering domestic industrialization. The
advanced capitalist countries' cooperation experiences, however, have
been driven mainly by the political motive of maintaining security and
peace (Mytelka (1979: 10), and Axline (1981: 171)).
Regional cooperation is conceived by its main proponents as mainly
the means to expand the internal market with the consequence of
accelerating industrialization, and strengthening the bargaining power
of the member group.
If economic integratioin results in a larger 
markets and the achievement of scale economies, it 
can be an important catalyst for increased 
production, investment and employment. Such 
economies seem especially important in 
manufacturing processes like steel, machinary and 
chemicals. Since these items are often inputs 
into other production processes, the scale 
economies may have important linkage effects 
(Yeats, 1981:35).
The Third World experiences in economic cooperation have taken 
different forms such as: free trade association (e.g., Latin America 
Free Trade Association - LAFTA), trade preference associations (e.g., 
Latin America Integration Association-LAIA), common markets (e.g., 
Central American Common Market), or other integration units (e.g., 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference - S.A.D.C.C.).
Mytelka (1979) has classified integration efforts into three distinct 
forms:
1. Type I, a laissez faire integrative system (e.g., LAFTA). It 
involves three main issues: freeing trade within the region, the 
application of a certain level of a common external tariff, and 
the mobility of factors of production within the region.
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2. Type II, a modified laissez faire system (e.g., East African 
Community). It includes compensatory and corrective measures and 
policies for regional planning.
3. Type III, a dirigiste integrative system (e.g., The Andean Group). 
It emphasizes both planning and regulatory measures within the 
regional context.
Haskel (1974) has classified the integration efforts as those 
"expansive" in nature and those that are "distributive" in nature. The 
former would correspond to type I (in Mytelka's classification); the 
latter corresponds to type III and the mixture of the two corresponds 
to type II.
Theoretical Assessment of regional cooperation:
Like ISI, regional cooperation has been criticized from varying 
perspectives: the neoclassical, the liberal and the radical writers. 
Neoclassical writers either reject regional cooperation in general as 
an obstacle to free trade, or raise doubts about its suitability to 
the Third world Countries on the ground that it will lead to trade 
diversion instead of trade creation.^ Liberal writers, on the other 
hand, point to cumulative regional inequality experienced by the 
participating countries. As a result of these countries' initially 
unequal levels of economic development, the gains from the integrative 
efforts are likely to be distributed unevenly. In addition, they point 
to the failure of regional cooperation in reducing income inequality at 
the national level. Radicals view regional cooperation that focuses on 
trade liberation without prior policy changes at the national and 
regional levels, as another means to facilitate the pentration of 
foreign capital.
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There exist various possible combinations of 
alliances among domestic and foreign groups 
promoting processes of integration which can 
accentuate external dependency and/or generate 
benefits which accrue basically to transtional 
enterprises (Vaitsos, 1978:721).
External factors have great effect on regional cooperation than on
either of the two previous strategies. The regional cooperation
experiences of the Third World have been affected by other non regional
governments' actions and by the MNCs.
Perhaps no issue has contributed more than that of 
"external penetration"--attempts by extra-regional 
powers to take advantage of the newly created 
regional opportunites and the consequent fear that 
these outside powers would derive more benefit 
from integration than would the intra-regional 
participants (Schmitter, 1972:1).
In many of the established forms of cooperation and integration,
foreign monopoly domination in the regional area has increased,
attracted by improved facilities and market expansion. In his analysis
of the industrial development in the Central American Common Market
(CACM), Herold argues that "the benefits of tariff reductions have
accrued mainly to large foreign firms (...). Local enterprise appears
to have gained very little" ( Herold, 1976:174). Many other studies
have provided examples of different attempts by some of the developed
countries governments' (especially the United States) to influence the
terms of economic integration among the less developed countries (LDCs)
to serve foreign interests and to increase the LDC's dependence
(Schmitter, 1972; Axline, 1977; and Vaitsos, 1978).
Throughout history, government of hegemonic powers 
have shown, in many cases, a marked opposition 
among less developing areas. (..) there have been 
multiple attempts to formally integrate less 
developed economies in customs unions, free trade 
zones (or other trade arrangments) with certain 
hegemonic powers. Such effors had the dual 
objective of both increasing the dependence of the
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former on the latter as well as excluding other 
powers from interfering in established zones of 
influence. Finally, there have been efforts by 
government of developed countries to influence or 
even dictate the terms of economic integration 
among LDCs so that such regional cooperation will 
serve the interess of the non-member yet 
intervening foreign forces (Vaitsos, 1978:727).
The negative social and economic impacts and more important in
our case, the increased level of economic dependence, should not be
attributed to regional cooperation as such. It is necessary to
differentiate among the different types of cooperation efforts, and to
examine the process within a dynamic framework. For this porpose, the
framework presented by Mytelka proves useful. Most of the experienced
negative impacts were a result of integration efforts of type I, and to
a lesser extent of type II. By its own definition and orientation,
type I, a laissez faire system does not include any deliberate
mechanisms that would equalize the distribution of gains among the
participating countries. Its main goal is to enhance industrial
development as a result of market expansion. Such a goal without the
prior attempt to change the existing production structure would limit
the rapid gains, "exaggerate economic asymmetries and produce unequal
gains among the participants" (Mytelka, 1979:12). Assessing this type
of integration within the African context, Green concludes similarly.
Free trade in economic community rules may hamper 
regulation of both production and trade in ways 
which would not serve the interests of the 
community and its members considered individually; 
they may even make impossible steps to ensure net 
gains to all members and thus create stressess 
threatening the community's previous existence - a 
situation which clearly did develop in the 
unregulated pre-Treaty East African Common Market 
(Green, 1973:50).
In addition, the laissez faire attitude of this type of 
integration is extended to dealings with foreign capital. The absence
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of regulatory measures towards foreign capital has led, In many cases, 
to further penetration of MNCs activities into the regional area and 
their increased benefits and generated surplus, as the member countries 
compete with each other to which will provide the most favorable terms 
to foreign investors, "war of incentives" (Vaitsos, 1979:730). 
Examples of such foreign penetration occured in the case of LAFTA 
where a set of reciprocity agreements, initiated by MNCs, dominated the 
Pharmacutical, electronic and machines sectors (Mytelka, 1979:19). 
Some of these limitations are avoided in type II system where the main 
objective is to equalize the distribution of gains among the members. 
It includes compensatory and corrective measures that tend to reduce 
distributional inequality.
Despite its superiority to type I regarding the distributional
impacts, type II integration system does not directly adopt the goal
of increasing the level of economic independence; and as such it lacks
certain essential measures. A regional policy regulating foreign
investment and technology transfer is the most important measure of
reducing external dependency. The lack of such measure, as in the case
of types I and II, lead to the penetration of direct foreign investment
(DFI) into the regional area. DFI implies both the control or strong
influence over decision making and over the generated surplus, hence
the aggravation of the region's dependency.
The starting point for a policy aimed at reduction 
of dependence is the adoption of regional measures 
regulating foreign investment and transfer of 
technology, including the designation of certain 
sectors of the economy in which foreign 
participation will be limited or totally excluded 
(Axline, 1977: 97).
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Considering both economic and political aspects of integration, 
Mytelka argues that type III integration (the dirigiste integrative 
system) is superior to type I and II In reducing both the polarization 
effects and external dependence. In addition to the inclusion of 
compensatory and corrective measures, type III includes direct
measures to control and regulate foreign investment and the transfer of 
technology.
Therefore, when addressing the issue of economic independence, 
both theoretically and practically, only type III should be considered 
since it is the only type that from the outset takes economic 
independence as a goal and advocates specific measures for achieving 
it.
While type III integration is the most effective in reducing 
economic dependence, it is also the most difficult to achieve. Besides 
requiring the establishment of a well-functioning complex system of 
institutions and a high level of coordinated planning, type III 
requires the strong commitment of the member states. The latter, in 
return, requires the support of internal social forces whose interest 
is strongly related to the development of domestic productive capacity.
Besides differentiating between the types of integration systems 
when evaluating the impact of regional cooperation on economic 
independence, one should also adopt a dynamic framework. This 
framework would take into consideration such elements as: the
accumulation of experiences in dealing with MNCs and the increasing 
bargaining power of the Third World Countries (Vaitsos, 1973); the 
increasing efficiency in multinational planning; and the changes in 
the balance of the internal social forces.^
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Regional cooperation, as argued before, Is more affected by 
external elements than the previous strategies; it is confined not 
only by the national social structure and political forces, but also by 
the regional ones. Therefore, despite its importance in strengthening 
national and regional power once successful, regional cooperation 
confronts more practical obstacles than the other strategies.
IV. The New International Economic Order (NIEtn
N1E0 is a demand by Third World nations for a more genuine 
interdependence in the world economy. It stems from the continuing 
frustrations of these nations with the present economic order. Despite 
the growth of manufactured goods exports from the developing 
countries, this growth has been confined to certain products and few 
countries (specifically the newly industrialized countries (NICs)). 
The majority, however, still rely on exporting raw materials and in 
many cases face deteriorating terms of trade, given the repeated 
economic crises of the advanced countries and their increased 
protectionism. In addition, the increasing volume of debt and its 
accumulated interest payments continue as a major problem facing both 
rich and poor developing countries (see inicators in Tables (1), (2), 
and (3)).
The demand for changes in the international economic order by the 
Third World countries goes back to the mid 1950s. ^  The recent 
attention, however, stems from the Declaration and Programme of Action 
of NIE0 which was adopted in a special session of the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly in 1974, and from the Lima Declaration and Plan 
of Action in 1975. The desire for both national independence and
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mutual interdependence was emphasized in the main principles of these
declarations:
Full permanent sovereignty of every state over its 
natural resources. In order to safeguard these 
resources, each state is entitled to exercise 
effective control over them and their exploitation 
with means suitable to its own situation, 
including the right to nationalization or transfer 
of ownership to its nationals, (...). No state 
may be subjected to economic, political or any 
other type of coercion to prevent the free full 
exercise of its inalienable right (The Declaration 
on the Establishment of NIEO, (in: Laszlo, et.
al., 1979: 159).
The Third World demand for a NIEO covers different economic,
18political and social issues. These issues are:
1. Aid and assistance issues: attaining the UN development assistance 
target (0.7% of the advanced countries' GNP); securing technical 
assistance and eliminating brain drain; renegotiating the 
developing countries' debt; undertaking special measures to assist 
the least developed countries among the Third World; and using 
funds from disarmament for development.
2. International and trade issues: Improving the terms of trade of 
the developing countries (through tariff and non-tariff 
negotiations); adjusting the economic policies of the advanced 
countries to facilitate the expansion and diversification of 
exports of the developing ones; strengthening the economic and 
technical cooperation among the developing countries.
3. international financial issues: reforming the international 
monentary system; assuring a fuller participation of the 
developing countries in the World Bank and IMF decision making; 
and increasing the transfer of resources through these financial 
institutions.
76
4. Industrialisation, technology transfer and business practices
issues: negotiating the redeployment of industrial productive
capacities to developing countries; establishing mechanisms for 
transfer of technology; regulating and supervising the activities 
of the MNCs (to prevent their interference in the internal 
affairs and regulate the repatriation of profit).
5. Social issues, which include nationally oriented policies 
providing a more equitable income distribution and raising the 
standards of living.
6. Political and institutional issues, which focus mainly on
policies that would assure economic sovereignty of the Third
world nations, their control over their natural resources and
property, and their choice of economic and social system.
These demands would obviously require major concessions from the
advanced countries, and as such are not acceptable, and in many cases
are opposed by them. In addition, these demands have been also
rejected by the MNCs because they limit and regulate their activities
and hence reduce their potential profit.
(The) large industrial countries need secure 
sources of raw materials so badly that they will 
be willing to pay the price of neutralizing 
economic nationalists who threaten to upset the 
old and dependable system. There is nothing in 
history or logic to suggest that corporate boards 
of directors (...) will simply sit and let the 
price and terms of supply be dictated to them by
outsiders, if they have other options availabe to
them (Moran, 1974:238).
Magdoff notes that such rejection takes one of two forms: "(1)
outright refusal to institute the proposed reforms, and (2) advocacy
of counter proposals that either are mere window-dressing or are
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designed to meet their own needs, such as obtaining more secure flows 
of raw materials from the Third World" (Magdoff, 1978:4).
Theoretical assessmeent of NIEO:
The opposition to NIEO is also stated in some theoretical 
perspectives. Traditional trade theory, which is based on a harmonious 
view of the world (where economic relations are assumed to lead to a 
mutual economic benefits to all parties involved), sees NIEO as an 
intervention in the free play of the market. This position was 
reflected, in more concrete terms, in the Brandt Commision report 
(prepared for the World Bank). The report emphasized the shared 
economic interests between the "North" and the "South" and the need for 
further cooperation, with the consequent implication of undermining the
I Q
need for a NIEO. Liberals, as with other strategies, question NIEO's
ability to reduce income inequality within the developing countries
(Tucker, 1977). Some radicals, on the other hand, raise doubts about
NIEO's proposals ability to sigificantly alter the present order, and
view NIEO as only a reformist movement (Magdoff, 1978; and Amin, 1982).
Therefore, even if NIEO succeeds in affecting the form of the
distribution between the advanced countries and the developing ones,
radicals question its ability to alter the underlying unequal
relationship between them.
The dichotomized distribution of agricultural and 
raw material production, characteristic of the 
colonial and post-colonial periods, is now to be 
replaced by one in which DCs reserve for 
themselves the new technologies while the UDCs 
(under developed countries) specialize in the old, 
low technology industries. The content of the 
dichotomy changes, but the dichotomy remains 
(Baumgartner and Burns, 1981:322).
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If one accepts that the underlying nature of economic relations is 
that of conflict and not of harmony, and that the international market 
structure is of a monopolistic and/or oligopolistic nature and not of 
perfect competition, the neoclassical objection to NIEO becomes 
irrelevant. On the other hand, NIEO should not be expected to change 
the internal income distribution. As with the case of the previous 
strategies, the pattern of income distribution is an outcome of 
specific relations of production and not of a specific strategy per se. 
The gains from NIEO may be reaped only by certain groups when these 
groups are in control of the national economy, while being distributed 
in a more egalitarian manner when the social forces in power are those 
which represent the interests of the majority. Assessing the impact of 
NIEO on the provision of basic needs, Stewart shows that there is no 
support for claims that NIEO leads to a redistibution of income. She 
also argues that NIEO measures will be favorable to basic needs only 
in cases where the government is supportive of basic needs strategy 
(Stewart, 1982:56-7).
The radical critique is the most relevant to the main issue here,
namely economic independence. The argument that NIEO has not succeeded
in altering the existing order is acknowledged even by the strong
proponents of NIEO:
The results of the NIEO programme's first decade 
show that the developing countries have achieved 
very little in changing the international trade 
system, while finding themselves in even greater 
financial dependence on Western monetary and 
credit agencies (Obminsky, 1984: 87).
The main reasons for these limitations are: the continued
resistance of the advanced countries and MNCs; and the heterogeneous 
political and social nature of the participants in the demand for NIEO,
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a hetergeneity which limits their common position and reduces it, in 
many cases, to some redistributional issues (Tarabrin, 1982:25).
The evaluation of the impact of NIEO on economic independence 
should be viewed, however, within a dynamic perspective. Therefore, 
NIEO should be evaluated not as a mere list of demands but rather as a 
dynamic process, and taking into consideration the impact of the 
changing balance of forces in the international arena.
While earlier attempts by the developing countries to reap 
concessions and recognition from the advanced countries were not 
successful, the recent attempts in the 1970s were backed up by certain 
historical factors: the increased power of the oil producing countries 
through their organization OPEC and the increased number of the 
independent Third World countries in the UN. Neerso (1978) has pointed 
out another changing factor: the growing consciousness in the
developing countries that foreign investment became too expensive for 
them and has negative impacts on their economies. This factor 
"reflects that even in the non-socialist developing countries 
governments and local industrialists have become more nationalistic 
because they feel themselves dominated by foreign investors" (Neerso, 
1978:113).
In addition, NIEO should be viewed, despite its associated 
limitations, as a collective means to increase Third World countries' 
economic and political power in the world economy. However, the 
utilization of this power and of the economic gains (e.g., better terms 
of trade, improved terms of the debt, and reduced economic barriers to 
their exports) will differ according to the social context and national 
objectives. These gains can be utilized for example to further develop 
the domestic basic industries where such strategy is nationally
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adopted, and hence facilitate the economy's transition to a higher
degree of economic independence.
Without a capital goods industry, the developing 
countries, if they realize the rates of growth 
corresponding to the Lima objectives cannot escape 
from dependence. The latter will be accentuated 
by industrialisation (Tiberghien, 1979:242).
Such positive impact of NIEO on economic independence requires the
prior national objective and commitment, pursued by the state, toward
increasing the level of economic independence.
In the third world version of NIEO, a strong and 
activist state becomes the gurantee that 
industrial scene will consist of integrated 
manufacturing process rather than a collection of 
partial units without local linkages (Amin,
1982:11).
Therefore, NIEO can be considered as an important complementary 
strategy to national industrialization for achieving a higher degree of 
economic independence. In addition, because of its broad demands that 
would benefit all developing countries and hence its higher potential 
in uniting different social and economic systems, NIEO seems more 
feasible and less restrictive than regional cooperation.
Conclusion and further remarks:
In this chapter I have examined four strategies - ISI, BI,
regional cooperation, and NIEO - in an attempt to assess their impact
on achieving a higher degree of economic independence for the Third
World. The examination of each of these strategies revealed important
relevant policies that should be taken into consideration:
First, developing countries need to regulate foreign investment
and MNCs' activities in the domestic economy. They need to reduce
20the outflows of surplus, and the social and political interference
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21in the domestic economy. The form of regulation and its outcome will 
differ depending on the nature of the economic activity and on the 
bargaining power of both the host country and the foreign investor. 
One of these important forms, which has been adopted in many 
developing countries, is establishing a joint venture (with public or 
private local ownership) instead of a fully owned subsidiary. The host 
countries can also limit the outflow of surplus by limiting the amount 
of money foreign companies are allowed to invest, and by forcing 
foreign investors to reinvest part of their profit in the domestic 
economy (Neerso, 1978:118). In his analysis of the relations between 
the host country and foreign investors, Moran offers an alternative 
dynamic model to the "reactionary alliance" or "mutual advantage" 
models. Instead of adopting the static notion of the "host country", 
his "balance of power" model acknowledges the different outcomes of the 
domestic social interaction and the consequent different outcomes in 
dealing with foreign investors (Moran, 1974: chapter 6). Such dynamic 
perspective takes into consideration the changes in the social power 
within the developing country and its accumulation of experience in 
dealing with foreign investors.
Second, developing countries need to regulate the transfer of
technology and to develop an indigenous technological capacity. This
99need stems from the recognition, by many writers on the subject, that 
technological dependence continues to be the main form of dependency of 
the developing countries. Regulating technology transfer should not 
imply the termination of technology imports nor the advocacy of the use 
of "appropriate technology". Rather it implies adaption and
selection of certain technologies that would strengthen the productive
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sector (e.g., of certain basic industries). These technologies should 
be used in accordance with the planned process of developing an 
indigenous technological capacity which in turn, as argued earlier, 
requires the development of the capital goods sector. "(Probablly) the 
crucial question is thus: how can we mix technologies with distinct 
technological features such that social and political results 
correspond to desired ones (...)?" (O'Brien, 1979:514).
Third. developing countries need a deliberate policy of income 
redistribution. In evaluating each of the strategies it was emphasized 
that these strategies do not in themselves contribute to reducing 
income inequality (and similarly to unemployent and regional 
inequality). However, as was argued in chapter I, income 
redistribution is an important policy in the process of attaining a 
higher degree of economic independence (as a means to increase 
aggregate demand, to reduce the outflow of surplus, and to increase the 
level of productivity and mass support),
Fourth. the three above "necessary" policies call for an 
interventionist role of the state in the economy (instead of relying 
on the market forces). Vithout this "sufficient" condition, the three 
above policies would have little, if any, impact on achieving a higher 
level of economic independence. The strong active role of the state 
will, in turn, depend on three basic factors (White, 1984:98-100):
i) The social nature of the state: the state may embody the interests 
of three different forces: a) the state itself as a matrix of
distinct "autonomous" interests; b) a hegemonic class or class 
coalition; c) the nation vis-a-vis other nations, where the state 
asserts an independent national interest and opposes foreign 
interests.
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li) The state*s politico-admlnstrative capacity which involves three 
dimensions: a) its political capacity to mobilize widespread
support for industrialization programs; b) the existence of 
reasonably efficient administrative institutions; and c) 
technical capacity to analyze problems and formulate feasible 
solutions.
iii) The specific modes of involvement of the state in the 
organizatiion of the social and economic processes to further 
industrialization.
Therefore, the state's active participation is an important 
condition in: regulating foreign investment and MNCs' activities in a 
way that insures a positive contribution to the development of the 
productive capacity of the economy, adapting foreign technology in 
accordance with the national objective of developing the productive and 
technological capacity, and establishing direct measures for income 
redistribution. These regulatory socio-economic factors would increase 
the four strategies' potential for achieving a higher level of economic 
independence.^
In evaluating the four strategies I have argued that national 
industrialization, especially in the form of BI, has the highest 
potential in increasing the economy's level of economic independence. 
Both regional cooperation and NIEO can be considered as long run 
strategies basically because they face more external obstacles, and 
because their outcome, if successful, will be different at each 
national level according to the internal social and economic structure.
While stressing the importance of the internal processes of 
development in leading to a higher level of economic independence, I
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am not downplaying the importance of the international or external 
factors. These Include: the huge accumulated debt and its increasing 
interest payment, the negative social and economic impact of some of 
the MNCs' activities, the continued economic crisis of the advanced 
countries and their increased protectionism and the consequent 
deteriorating terms of trade of the developing countries' exports, and 
the covert and overt political and military intervention in those
countries that attempt establishing a more independent economy (the
2 5examples of Grenada and Nicaragua are still fresh in mind). To argue
that these factors play no role ignores both the historical impact of
colonization in these countries, and the deficiences of the present
economic order that has largely served the interests of the advanced
capitalist countries. However, while these external factors might, in
some cases, shape the internal structure, I believe that the national
factors (e.g., the internal pattern of income distribution, the
production structure and the industrial and technological capacity),
which are defined by the internal social structure and the interests of
the social groups in power, in most cases play the principal role in




World Trade Growth, 1973-82 (percent)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1978 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
World trade 
growth 12.5 4.0 -4.0 11.5 4.5 5.0 6.5 1.5 0.0 -2,0
Source: World Development Report 1983:1
Table 2
Debt Indicators for Developing Countries, 1970-84
1970 1974 1976 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Ratio of debt 
to GNP: 14.1 15.4 18.1 21.0 20.9 22.4 26.3 32.3 33.8
Ratio of debt 
to export: 108.9 80.5 100.2 113.1 89.8 96.8 115.0 130.8 135.4
Total debt (Bilions 
of Dollars): 68 141 204 313 430 488 546 620 686
Source: World Development Report 1985:24
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Table 3
Terms of Trade of Developing Countries 
1973-82 (1978-100)
Developing countries Changes in terms of trade 
(percentage)
Changes in purchasing 
power of export 
(percentage)
1973-76 1979-82 1973-76 1979-82
Low-income
Asia 12.1 -3.2 58.5 15.7
Africa -15.3 -13.8 -18.7 -3.5
Middle- income
oil importers -9.5 -10.7 4.5 2.5
oil exportes 59.9 31.8 71.0 11.5
Source: World Development Report 1983:13
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Notes
1. Gerschenkron has examined early in the 1960s the differences that 
existed between the industrialized countries and backward ones. 
He argued that as a result of specific institutional instruments 
(e.g., the state, the banks) that existed in the backward 
countries, the rate of industrial growth and the productive and 
organizational structures of the industry differed in the advanced 
countries and backward ones (Gerschenkran, 1962: chapter I).
2. For a classification of these definitions see Ahmad (1978) and 
Havnevik (1978).
3. This view is shared by most writers of the dependencia school.
4. Cline has concluded, in his review of literature article, that 
income distribution is insinsitive to the industrial structure or 
industrial policies (Cline, 1975).
5. In evaluating the industrial experiences in Latin America, 
Havenevik concludes that the structural charactereristic of 
underdevelopment (e.g., high income and regional inequality, 
destorted sectoral growth and financial and technological 
dependency) continued in the case of Brazil even after adopting 
EOI. Another study, by Morley and Williamson, testing export-led 
growth and ISI showed that the range of Gini coefficients was only 
0.42 to 0.45 at the end of a 12-year period (Roemer, 1979:187).
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6. For this reason the analysis of this section will depend mostly on
the work of Rweyemamu (1973) and Thomas (1974), the two main
proponents of this strategy.
7. For a critical assessment of these models see Stewart (1976), and 
Aliouche (1987).
8. Thomas cites six technological considerations which allow further 
flexibility in the resources base (e.g., various technological 
processes which allow the physical sustitution of one resource 
input for another in producing the same product; and technological 
development which leads to increasing output per unit of input 
(Thomas, 1974:202-5).
9. In examining the input/output matrices of different industrial
countries, Thomas notices that, despite the multiplicity of final
products, the material content of these products is skewed in
favor of these two elements (Thomas, 1974:195).
10. In his recent assessment of the linkages effects, Hirschman notes
that
during the first phases of export expansion in the 
countries of periphery an important effect, is not 
the creation of new industries to satisfy rising 
consumer demand, but the destruction of 
established handicraft and artisan activities as 
labor is withdrawn from them for staple production 
and as new imports of consumer goods compete 
successfully with them (Hirschman, 1977:72).
11. See for example Stewart (1976), Rosenberg (1976) and the 
different studies in Ernst (1979).
12. For example, sponge iron, which is an essential component in the
steel industry, can be reduced from iron ore using natural gas
instead of cok. This process was first developed in Mexico and 
then adopted by several industrial countries (Roemer, 1979:181).
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13. This conclusion Is also supported by Roemer (1981).
14. See list of references on this position in Axline (1974:84).
Neoclassical writers who argue in favor of regional cooperation 
advocate type I, the laissez-faire system.
15. The form and development of the integration system are defined by
the internal social forces. The declining power of the landed
oligarchy and its replacement by financial, commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisies explains the replacement of LAFTA (type I) 
by the Andean Group (type III).
16. The different social forces in each country affect, for example, 
the adopted measures of regulating foreign investment and transfer 
of technology. Even among the capitalist oriented economies of 
the Andean Group, the differences in the economic and social power 
of the national bourgeoisie have affected the implementation of 
Decision 24 (regulating foreign investment) and eventually its 
replacement with less restrictive measures (Mytelka, 1979:73). 
For an additional analysis of the impact of the domestic social 
forces on the different positions adopted by the Andean countries 
see Mytelka, 1973.
17. In 1959 twenty nine countries met in the Asian-African conference 
in Bandung and called for establishing new measures to eliminate 
the fluctuations in the prices of raw materials exports.
18. The following classification is based on a UNCTAD study by Laszalo 
et. al. , (1978) which offers a valuable detailed presentation of 
all these issues. For another summary of the proposals and 
demands see Edwards (1985:236).
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19. For an excellent critique of the Brandt Report and of the 
underlying assumptions of harmony of economic relations, see 
Navaro (1984).
20. This outflow is reflected in the high profits extracted from: low 
domestic wages, low interest on domestic loans and other 
concessions guaranteed by the local government, and overpricing 
of some inputs practiced by the MNCs.
21. For an excellent acount of such interfernce see Barnet and Muller 
(1974).
22. See collection of studies in Ernst (1979).
23. This term is frequently used in the literature with the 
implication that only "appropriate" forms of technology transfer 
are suitable for the developing countries. However, the 
"appropriateness" is defined differently by different writers 
(e.g., Small scale production, and labor intinsive). As O'Brien 
correctly argues this notion cannot be discussed in isolation from 
the social structure and the objectives pursed by the social and 
political groups in power. Hence, the exact definition of 
"appropriate" will depend on who is defining it and for what 
porpose (O'Brien, 1979:512).
24. In stressing the state's role, however, I do not view the state as 
an autonomous entitiy independent of the rest of the economy; but 
rather as a social institution that perpetuate the dominant 
class's interests through the process of capital accumulation. 
For a critical analysis of the "relative autonomy of the state" 
position see Gulalp (1987).
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25. For an excellent recent assessment of such economic and military
interventionist policies in the Third World by the United States,
see Halliday (1987).
US economic power, as much as or even more than 
its military power, gives it the capacity to exert 
forms of control on third world societies and 
states and to impose its wishes on them, whether 
directly and bilaterally, or through influence on 
the policies of multilateral agencies 
(Halliday, 1987:16).
26. In most cases certain internal social groups facilitate the
expansition of the MNCs' role in the domestic economy. MNCs, for 
example, reap higher profits in these economies where the state 
(pushed by certain powerful groups) guarantee these profits by 
different means such as: extensive tax holidays, suppression of




ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE
"The only wealth and liberty that last and bring 
good are those that are created and won with one's 
own hand”.
(Jose Marti)
"Sovereignty Is the right of a nation to choose 
it's direction and control its destiny. Without 
this basic condition, everything else - state, 
government, culture - lacks national sense; it is 
folly. The paramount objective of the Revolution, 
therefore, is to affirm the full sovereignty of 
Cuba".
(Nuestra Ruzon: Manifesto - Program of the 26 of 
July movement)
"The Pillars of political sovereignty that were 
built on January 1, 1959, can only be consolidated 
when absolute economic independence is achieved".
(Che Guevara)
Introduction
The theoretical investigation of economic independence, its 
concepts and the proposed strategies for achieving it, were the subject 
of the first and second chapters. An empirical investigation, the 
subject of this chapter, entails examining specific cases within the 
Third World.
This chapter examines the Cuban experience in reducing its 
previous heritage of dependency, a legacy of colonial and neocolonial 
domination. I shall examine the actual transformation process that 
took place utilizing the theoretical concepts raised in the first
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chapter, and then compare the actually adopted strategies with those 
discussed in the second chapter.
Two reasons underlie choosing Cuba as a case study for the 
theoretical theme of economic independence:
i) Economic independence is one of Cuba's declared and continuously 
emphas ized obj ectives;
ii) Cuba's economic and social development and the question of its 
independence have been the center of a continuous debate since the 
1960s. While some writers recognize Cuba's profound achievements 
in changing its economic and social structure and hence reducing 
its previous dependency, others argue that Cuba has simply 
replaced one dependency with another, exchanging its previous 
relationship with the United States (U.S.) for its current one 
with the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.). In this chapter I argue against 
the latter position, demonstrating that Cuba has successfully 
altered its economic and social structure towards a higher level 
of economic independence.
In demonstrating this transition I utilize the concept of economic 
independence as a higher level of national integration; this approach 
differs from that of focusing on some external factors (e.g., trade 
ratios and orientation) which has been utilized by other studies which 
also demonstrated Cuba's increased level of independence (e.g., 
LeoGrande (1979), Brundenius (1984)). This study also differ from 
other valuable studies (e.g., Edquist (1985), UNIDO (1986)) by its 
specific focus on the issue of economic independence.
Viewing economic independence as a process necessitates adopting 
an historical perspective in assessing this process. Such a 
perspective allows one to understand the different internal and
94
external social, political and economic factors that shaped the initial 
status of the long process under examination, and hence leads to a 
better understanding of the process itself and its future prospects. 
In assessing the Cuban experience, an historical presentation is 
indispensable in clarifying the nature and extent of dependency that 
characterized the Cuban economy for more than four centuries', and 
hence, in facilitating the understanding of the extent of its success 
in reducing this dependency and achieving a higher level of economic 
independence in a period of less than thirty years. The following 
historical background will highlight the unequal and exploitative 
nature of the pre-revolution Cuban-U.S. relationship.
Historical Background:
2
[A] Cuba under Spanish domination
Cuba was claimed for Spain by Columbus in 1492, and was settled by 
the Spanish starting in the 1510's. Because of its strategic location 
and lack of substantial minerals, Cuba served as a service colony for 
the commercial and military Spanish fleets. The native Indian 
population was mostly employed in minor economic activities and in 
serving the settlers. Due to the brutal treatment, poor health and 
economic conditions, the native population was gradually eliminated. 
They were replaced by black slaves brought onto the island from Africa. 
While engaged basically in tobacco and coffee cultivation, Cuba moved 
in the latter 18th century into sugar cultivation on a large scale.
With the expansion of sugar production, an increasing number of 
black slaves was brought to the island. The sugar expansion also 
brought unprecedented wealth to the island, wealth that was mainly
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appropriated by the Spanish oligarchy which consisted of two white
groups: the Creoles (born in Cuba) and the Feninsulares (born in
Spain). Sharing the sane opposition to abolishing the system of
slavery, the two groups conflicted in their political and economic
aspirations. The pro-Spain peninsulares favored Spanish colonial
control, while the Creoles, politically and economically restricted,
favored independence. However, as Spain accepted the agreement
initiated by England to abolish the system of slavery (in hope of
receiving a loan from England for military needs) Spain's role as the
defendant of white Cubans against the black population was undermined.
Rejecting Spain's new policy on slavery, some of the wealthy Cubans
formed the annexationist movement (Club de Havana) which allied with
the United States. In an proclamation they declared:
Cuba, united to this strong, and respected nation 
[U.S.], whose southern interests could be 
identified with hers, would be assured serenity 
and future prosperity; her riches and her whole 
territory triple its value. Liberty would be 
given to private enterprise and the system of 
hateful and harmful restrictions which paralysed 
commerce would be destroyed (in Hugh Thomas, 1971:
212).
The movement was supported by pro-slavery groups in the United
States and by business groups who recognized the tremendous economic
potential of the island. In a letter sent to the Minister to Spain in
1823, the Secretary of the State John Quincy Adam stated the U.S.
interest in Cuba:
These islands (Cuba and Puerto Rico) from their 
local position are natural appendages to the North 
American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost 
in sight of our shores, from a multitude of 
consideration has become an object of transcedent 
importance to the political and commercial 
interests of our union. (...) (The) nature of its 
productions and its wants, furnishing the supplies 
and needing the return of a commerce immensely
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profitable and mutually beneficial; give it an 
importance in the sum of our national interest 
(...)• (In) looking forward to the probable 
course of event, for the short period of half a 
century it is scarcely possible to resist the 
convention that the annexation of Cuba to our 
federal republic will be indispensable to the 
continuance and integrity of the union itself (in 
Smith, 1963: 27) (emphasis added).
In 1847, the U.S. government made a secret offer to buy Cuba from 
Spain for §100 million, an offer that was strongly rejected by Spain 
(taxes in Cuba already brought Spain §10 million a year).
The annexation schemes ended, however, with the ascending power of 
the anti-slavery groups within the United States and the outbreak of 
the Civil War in the United States in 1861.
Facing internal economic and political difficulties, Spain imposed 
a new tax on the island in 1867. Suffering already from enormous taxes 
and economic depression, the Cubans opposed Spanish control. A 
revolutionary upheaval took place in 1868 involving small coffee 
planters and poor black Cubans. The first independence war against 
Spain continued for ten years without Cuba's liberation.^ Despite the 
unsuccessful outcome of the first independence war, the struggle had
t t
profound national effects. Leaders of this war (e.g. Maximo Gomez and 
Antonio Maceo) were to have a tremendous impact in stimulating the 
nationalist aspirations. In addition, the continued revolutionary 
activities succeeded in firmly eliminating the slavery system, 
providing the ground for the second independence war that started in 
1895.
In the meantime, while Cuba was still a Spanish colony the 
American capitalists began, in the 1880's and 1890's, investing in the 
island, buying mills and land from Cuban owners who had been harmed by 
the drop in sugar prices and who lacked the necessary capital for more
97
efficient production. By 1896 American investment was reported to be 
$50 million of sugar and mining properties (Huberman and Sweezy, 
1961:13).
While the Cuban revolutionary forces, led by Jose Marti, Maximo
r
Gomez and Antonio Maceo, were involved in preparing for the second
independence war, American interest in the island increased and the
calls started again for the annexation of Cuba,"* While the
justification for a U.S. intervention was based on "security" and
"humanitarian" appeals within the United States Congress and the
business community, the economic interest was not a secret. In a
letter to General Draper (congressman from Massachusetts) Edwin Atkin
(a Massachusetts capitalist and businessman who had significant
investment and property in Cuba) wrote in 1896:
 to whom can the American property - holders
look for protection? We could hardly expect that 
Spain would continue to defend our rights; the 
insurgents are not in position to do so, even if 
they were disposed, and in my opinion the only 
alternative would be the landing of United States 
troops. Whether the country would be prepared to 
take such extreme action is a question that should 
be considered, and whether the sentimental feeling 
of sympathy with the Cubans should out weigh the 
property interests amounting to $30,000,000 of 
United States citizens in Cuba (in Smith,
1963:94).
The eventual U.S. intervention took place in 1896. While 
enhancing the Spanish defeat, the American intervention deprived the 
rebels their objective of establishing an independent and sovereign 
republic. As the Treaty of Paris was signed between Spain and the 
United States, Cuba was "liberated” as a Spanish colony to become a 
U.S. protectorate for three years. Shortly after the end of the war 
the Mew York World correctly predicted that, "whatever may be decided
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as to the political future of Cuba, its industrial and commercial 
future will be directed by American enterprise and stimulated with 
American capital" (in Foner, 1972 (v.2):466).
[B] Cuba under United States domination:
In 1900, in an attempt to lay the groundwork for Cuba's
"independence", the American military governor General Wood was
instructed by the U.S. Congress to call for a constitutional convention
in Havana. The constitution was to outline, among other things, the
future relations between Cuba and the United States. In 1901, the
United States submitted to the convention delegates a set of articles
known as the Platt Amendment. The articles dictated terms that
restricted Cuba's sovereignty in order to serve the U.S. interest:^
Article I: That the government of Cuba shall never 
enter into any treaty or other compact with any 
foreign power or power which will impair or tend 
to impair the independence of Cuba (...).
Article III: That the government of Cuba consents
that the United States may exercise the right to 
intervene for the preservation of Cuban 
independence, the maintenance of a government 
adequate for the protection of life, property, and 
individual liberty (...).
Article VII: That to enable the United States to
maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect 
the people there of, as well as for its own 
defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease 
to the United States land necessary for coaling or 
naval stations of certain specific points to be 
agreed upon with the President of the United 
States.
As recognized by Huberman and Sweezy (1961) Cuba had no choice but
to accept. This acceptance in no way reflected the national consensus,
$
as expressed by one of the Cuban delegates, Juan Gomez:
To reserve to the United States the faculty of 
deciding for themselves when independence is
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menaced, and when, therefore, they ought to 
intervene to preserve it, is equivalent to 
delivering up the key to our house, so that they 
can enter it at all hours, when the desire takes 
them (...)■ If it belongs to the United States to 
determine what Cuban government merits the 
qualification "adequate" (...) only those Cuban 
governments will live which count on its support 
and benevolence (Huberman and Sweezy, 1961:17).
9
Gomez's reservations were to prove accurate. Under the treaty 
(though the military occupation was ended in 1902), U.S. troops 
intervened in Cuba in 1906-1909, 1912 and 1917. In addition, all the 
governments that have succeeded since then (with the limited exception 
of Grau's government) were those supported by the United States. 
However, at the same time radical and progressive national movements 
(e.g., Cuban Committee of National and Civil Renovation, the University 
Students Federation and the Communist Party) reviving Jose Marti's 
ideas, opposed U.S. hegemony.
Though formulated in political terms, the Platt Amendment was 
really an expression of the U.S. economic interest in Cuba. In 1903, a 
trade treaty followed the Platt Amendment providing 20-40 percent 
tariff preferences to U.S. goods and allowing U.S. capital further 
penetration. In addition to the flow of U.S. capital, thousands of 
Haitian, Jamaican and Chinese workers were brought to Cuba to insure a 
steady supply of cheap labor (Huberman and Sweezy, 1961:19).
Though mainly dominating the Sugar industry, American investment 
penetrated the electrical, telephone and railway services, the mining 
industry, and real estate (20-30 percent of Cuban territory was owned 
or leased by American companies (Huberman and Sweezy, 1961:19). From 
1906-1924 American investment increased from around $50 million to $500 
million (Benjamin 1977:14). After the collapse of the high sugar 
prices between 1919 and 1920 many Cuban banks, unable to meet their
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obligations, were forced to close. They were replaced by foreign banks 
mostly American. The financial crisis of 1921 further affected the 
Cuban sugar merchants and planters, and increased the foreign banks' 
possession of the Cuban properties.
In 1933, Cuba experienced a major social and political change. As 
a result of the continued frustration with the repressive and corrupt 
government of Machado, different hetrogeneous social and political 
forces forced the government out. The change took place with U.S. 
involvement which advised Machado to take a "leave of absence", and 
prepared for another figure (Cespedes) to succeed him. However, the 
new government was overthrown in a coup led by Batista who handed the 
power to a five-man executive committee headed by Grau. Though 
advocating new reforms, the government was unable to bring about 
structural changes. Facing both domestic and external pressures (from 
the United States) the Grau government resigned in 1934 replaced by 
Batista who remained in power till 1944. Between 1944 and 1952 
different presidents from the Autentico Party (which proposed moderate 
nationalist reforms) governed until the second coup d'etat by Batista 
who seized power and remained president until 1959.
During this period an intensive union of students, workers and
farmers organized, demanding radical reforms. The potential threat of
these groups on foreign and domestic business and commercial interests
was temporarily neutralized by Batista and his reformist attempts.
However, as recognized by O'Connor,
Batista was caught in an enormous contradiction, 
one which he helped to create twenty years 
earlier. Unlike economic growth (...), economic 
development required national autonomy; political 
stability, the precondition for foreign
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investment, required dependence on Washington 
(O'Connor, 1970:30).
During this period and especially after the Second World War, the
Cuban economy became yet more tied to the United States. Perhaps one
of the best indicators of the volume of involvement of the U.S. capital
in Cuba was stated in the U.S. Department of Commerce report on Cuba in
1956 (see Table 1).
The only foreign investments of importance are 
those of the United States. American
participation exceeds 90 percent in the telephone 
and electric service, about 50 percent in public 
service railways, and roughly 40 percent in raw 
sugar production. The Cuban branches of United 
States banks are entrusted with almost one forth 
of all banks deposits (...). Cuba ranked third in 
Latin America in value of United States direct 
investments in 1953, outranked only by Venezuela 
and Brazil.
In his critical assessment of Cuba's history Francisco Segnera 
(1972:148-50)^ pointed out three main characteristics of U.S. 
investment in Cuba:
1) while taking place in Cuba, U.S. investment benefited mostly the 
United States: a) the input supply of equipment, machines and some 
of the raw materials was brought from the United States which did 
not allow the creation of linkages in the Cuban economy; b) the 
high payment of salaries went to American administrative 
employees; c) most of the generated surplus was sent out and/or 
invested in the same sectors, which did not help in diversifying 
the economy.
2) The American investment established an international division of 
labor (characteristic of that era of colonialism) where the Cuban 
economy was basically specialized in sugar, tobacco, and mineral 
exports.
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3) The Cuban economy was gradually denationalized as a result of 
increased U.S. ownership and economic and financial control over 
major sectors. In addition, the different services (banks, 
transportation, electricity... etc.) were not, as in other 
developed economies to serve the industrial development, but were 
artifically created as channels to serve American capital without 
developing the Cuban economy.
As recognized by Boorstein (1968), decisions about investment in 
Cuba were governed by foreign interests. In addition, American 
investors kept significant parts of the land unutilized in order to 
prevent the fall of sugar prices. Moreover, as a result of the total 
sugar production quota determined by the U.S. Congress, each sugar mill 
was confined to a certain maximum production. Furthermore, as Ritter 
notes these "quotas were not conducive to output - increasing 
innovations (...). It is not surprising that grinding techniques
remained relatively stagnant in post war years" (Ritter, 1974:38).
In addition to the economic impact on the Cuban economy, American 
investments significantly impacted the social structure. The economic 
domination of the U.S. capital weakened and in many cases eliminated 
the independent small property owners of agricultural land and sugar 
mills. In addition, thousands of tobacco and sugar planters lost their
farms and became tenants and sharecroppers. In 1927, Ramiro Guerra
wrote:
When all this toil of centuries seemed to be
almost completed and fruits could at last be
enjoyed by their children, the sugar latifundium 
which had ruined the West Indies with its two
informidable instruments, foreign capital and 
imported cheap labor, invaded the island. Its
appearance marked the beginning of the whole 
destruction of our small and medium-sized
properties and the reduction of our land owners
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and independent farmers, backbone of our nation, 
to the lowly condition of a proletariat being 
stifled by that economic asphyxiation which 
afflicts the country today from one end to the 
other (quoted in Foner, 1971 (v,2):480).
In addition, American investment further weakened the already weak 
national bourgeois class. This class, unlike that in other Latin 
American countries (e.g., Mexico, Brazil and Argentina), had been 
almost destroyed in the long war against the Spanish, leading to a 
stronger position of the landed oligarchy who did not oppose Spanish 
domination. The remnant of this weak bourgeois class was either 
further destroyed by American investment, or was incorporated in a 
dependent relation (e.g., importers, bankers, real estate operators and 
retail stores owners). And finally, economic and social conditions 
deteriorated for the largest and poorest section of the Cuban 
population; the economic conditions of the cane fields workers (who 
were unemployed for six to nine months a year) were further depressed 
by the high profits of the sugar industry and the importation of cheap 
labor.
It seems appropriate to end this section with the conclusion of a 
Foreign Policy Association study: in winning political freedom from
Spain "Cuba lost control over its economic resources" (quoted in Foner, 
1972 (v.2):483). In addition, Cuba, in its asymmetric relationship 
with the United States, lost its own decision making, and its political 
and economic independence.
The Cuban Development Experience:
The economic and social program of the movement of 26th of July 
(M26J) that led the revolution in 1959 was inspired by the historical 
national sentiment of the Cuban people as expressed in the writings of
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9Jose Marti. The program was stated before the revolution in Castro's 
speeches at his trial in 1953, in the manifesto - program of M26J 
(Nuestra Ruzon), and in other speeches and declarations. The program 
called for structural change of the economy that would solve the 
"problem of land, the problem of industrialization, the problem of 
housing, the problem of education and the problem of the people's 
health, (...) along with restoration of civil liberties and political 
democracy" (Castro, 1984:24). In more concrete terms, the M26J 
manifesto-program specified different political, economic, education, 
judicial, and international measures. The economic measures included 
the following (in LLerena, 1978:301):
- Government policy aimed at ensuring economic independence of 
Cuba.
Development of new sources of production and employment.
- Agrarian reform.
Creation of production centers (e.g. factories and farms).
- Diversification of agricultural production and measures to 
assure a market for farm products.
- Study and promotion of cooperative system.
- Nationalization of public utilities.
- Encouragement of investment of domestic capital.
- Progressive increase of productivity per worker and per capita 
income.
- Expansion of foreign trade.
The Cuban transformation process passed through different stages 
as a result of changes in both objective and subjective factors: the 
internal and external material reality facing the economy, and the
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evolution in leaders' understanding of these factors and their 
accumulated experiences in dealing with them.
The First Stage (1960-1963) :
Immediately after taking power, the revolutionary government 
embarked on an attempt to implement the M26J program which 
corresponded, to a large extent with ECLA's propositions: emphasis on 
land reform, industrialization (specifically in ISI form), and income 
redistribution. The new government was very keen on diversifying 
agricultural output to achieve food self-sufficiency and to break away 
from the historical dependence on production and export of sugar. 
There was a strong sentiment against sugar production which was viewed 
as the cause and manifestation of Cuba's economic dependency. In 
addition, there was a strong desire to expand and intensify the 
industrial base by installing a wide range of ISI and heavy industry 
(including metallurgy, chemical products, heavy engineering and 
machinery transportation equipment). The goal, as expressed by Boti, 
the minister of the economy, was to "transfer the Cuba economy from an 
agricultural and colonial structure to an industrialized and 
independent structure" (quoted in Ritter, 1974:134).
The expected pace of achieving the ambitious goals was unrealistic 
given mainly the underdevelopment of the economy and lack of 
experience. The ambitious program of simultaneous rapid 
industrialization, agricultural diversification and income 
redistribution soon came into conflict with the hard material reality. 
The initial attempt at agricultural diversification did not bring about 
the expected output; absolute physical output in 1963 was 86 percent of 
the previous general level (Ritter, 1974:146). And as a result of the
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de-emphasis on sugar, foreign exchange earnings from its export
declined. Meanwhile the industrial program of ISI put tremendous
pressure on the economy. Due to the lack of a basic industrial
structure and misidentification of the appropriate industries to
utilize domestic resources, there was a high increase in imports of raw
materials and capital goods. As expressed by Che Guevara, then the
Minister of Industry:
We failed to put the proper emphasis on the 
utilization of our own resources; we worked with 
the fixed purpose of producing substitutes for 
finished imported articles, without clearly seeing 
that these articles are made with raw materials 
(quoted in Ritter, 1974:153).
As a result there was a further pressure on foreign exchange, 
leading ultimately to a balance of payment deficit. The economy was 
further constrained by the underdevelopment of the productive forces. 
In addition to the lack of technical and capital equipment, Cuba lost 
many of its skilled and professional workers who immigrated. "Of the 
300 agronomists working in Cuba in 1959 approximately 270 left the 
country" (Gutelman, in Bonachea and Valdes, 1972:234). In addition, 
the absence of consistent and comprehensive planning due to lack of 
planning experience played a role in the sluggish outcome. Besides 
these internal emerging difficulties, the economy was further 
constrained by U.S. hostility, its cancellation of the sugar quota 
import from Cuba, and its economic embargo.^®
As a result of these difficulties and of the continuous debates 
and evaluation, the Cuban leadership decided by 1963 to change its 
economic policies.
This period should not be viewed, however, as a failure. The 
first four years of the revolution were critical ones in which the new
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political system was established and its stability against internal and 
external political and military pressures was insured. It was also a 
period of radical transformation from a market economy to a centrally 
planned one, with massive nationalization (see Table 2) and the 
external economic orientation shifted from dealing with the 
international capitalist system to the socialist one. More 
importantly, the period was one in which the new revolutionary 
government applied its strong social commitment to a massive income 
redistribution (see Table 3), provision of social services and reducing 
unemployment. In addition, during this stage serious attempts were 
made to develop the mechanical and technical capacity of the economy. 
Early in 1961, the Ministry of Industry established The Commission for 
the Mechanization of the Cane Harvest (Edquist, 1985:34). Early 
prototypes were designed and constructed for the harvest. However, 
most of the machines developed (e.g., the MC-1) did not achieve 
satisfactory results in increasing productivity, and production was 
discontinued while further experiments continued. Before 1959, all 
cane was loaded manually. As the result of shortage in labor, efforts 
were directed to design and produce machines to left sugar cane. In 
the early 1960s, the construction of lifting machines (the "criollas") 
started in Cuba producing between 400 and 500 units. The criollas 
units were used in the 1963 harvest; however, the machines led to less 
than 1.5 percent of mechanized loading at that time (Edquist, 1985:36).
The Second Stage (1964-1970') :
While industrialization and economic diversification continued to 
be the general goals, the Cuban government came to realize that these
108
goals should be carried on as a long-term process given the immediate 
need to increase both the productive capacity of the economy and the 
economic and social conditions of the Cuban people.
The new policy (adopted in the medium range plan of 1964-70)
brought back emphasis on sugar production. The Cuban government
gradually abandoned the previous conception of sugar production as a
mere product of colonial and neocolonial domination, and hence as a
symptom of Cuba's dependency, and came to recognize sugar as the major
national source of capital accumulation needed for any attempt to
increase the country's level of development and independence. This new
realization was expressed by Guevara as:
The entire economic history of Cuba has 
demonstrated that no other agricultural activity 
would give such returns as those yielded by the 
cultivation of sugar cane. At the outset of the 
revolution many of us were not aware of this basic 
economic fact, because a fetishistic idea 
connected sugar with our dependence on imperialism 
and with the misery in the rural areas, without 
analysing the real cause: the relation to the
unequal balance of trade (quoted in Pollitt,
1986:200).
In 1963, Castro announced that increasing debt could not be 
tolerated and that industrialization would be financed by expansion of 
sugar production (Edelstein, 1981:234). Thus the new policy emphasized 
accelerating sugar production for exports, utilizing the high 
comparative advantage of sugar production in Cuba. This new emphasis 
is justified as sugar cane's production cost in Cuba is relatively less 
than world beet sugar production costs, and the relatively low cost of 
import inputs needed for the development of the sugar industry compared 
to import Input costs for other sectors of the Cuban economy. Sugar 
export became the source of primitive capital accumulation, and the 
sugar industry was acting as department I of the economy. As was
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described earlier, the source of primitive capital accumulation in the 
small open economies is mainly generated, not from the labor or 
peasants' surplus, as experienced by larger socialist economies (e.g., 
USSR), but rather from the differential rent earned in the 
international market. Hence, the export sector act as the leading 
sector in these small economies (see Chapter I, section on small open 
economies).
In addition to serving as the major sector for generating the 
needed foreign exchange and hence to finance future heavy 
industrialization, the sugar industry was also a stimulant to other 
economic activities through backward and forward linkages. For 
example, fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery would be developed 
as backward linkages, while forward linkages provide cattle food 
(utilizing molasses), paper production (utilizing bagasse), and other 
chemical and plywood complexes (utilizing sugar derivatives) (Ritter, 
1974:167). Therefore, unlike the first strategy that attempted to 
substitute for all imports (ISI), the new strategy emphasized those 
that would utilize domestic resources.
The emphasis on sugar production, however, was not the only focus 
of the plans in this stage. Other agricultural products (e.g., rice, 
beans, vegetables) were also considered as means of satisfying domestic 
consumption, and as future export possibilities.
In addition to industries geared to the sugar production (e.g., 
milling machinery), emphasis was given to other industries that 
supplied inputs for agriculture sectors and used its output, and those 
that provided some basic materials (e.g., farm machinery, food 
processing, textile, construction materials and cement production).
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Thus, in this stage, industry was strongly linked to the agricultural
sector (see Table 4) , In addition, attention was given to developing 
other non-agricultural industries e.g., the extractive and fishing 
industries.
One of the important features of this stage was the goal of
producing ten million tons of sugar which was the highest to be
achieved yet. By 1970, the target year, the production fell 1.5
million tons short of the target volume. However, the 8.5 million tons
was the highest in the country's history. The failure to produce the
margin difference was not, however, the problem; the mobilization of
the human and capital capacity towards that target had much greater
negative impact. The leadership came to realize that the economy's
productive capacity was not yet ready for the achievement of this goal.
In addressing the first congress in 1975, Castro explained the problems
that hindered the target production:
This endeavour was one of the most noble and 
enthusiastic undertaken by our people in this 
period of the construction of socialism. 
Nevertheless, it could not be achieved.
Industrial investments were not yet yielding 
fruit. Great imbalances in the rest of the
economy were caused by pressing problem of labor 
force required in ever growing quantities for the 
sugar cane harvests, circumstances in which the 
mechanization of the harvest was being delayed for 
technical reasons. There were also shortcoming in 
organization, and inadequate direction and 
economic management methods. Reality proved to be 
more powerful than our intentions. It was 
necessary to rectify this situation and give up 
the achievement of this objective for some years 
(Castro, in Griffiths and Griffiths, 1979:71).
Despite the failure to produce the targeted output of sugar, and 
despite the pressure that this target put on the economy, Cuba was able 
to develop a structural productive capacity. In the agricultural 
sector, Ritter describes the important accomplishments as:
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In attempting to achieve its ambitious 
agricultural objectives, Cuba has laid a solid 
foundation for agricultural expansion in the 
1970s. Though the objectives for 1970 may not 
have been fulfilled, Cuba has irrigated vast 
areas, planted extensive areas under fruit trees, 
trained agronomists, agricultural specialists, and 
established research capabilities in some lines of 
agriculture (Ritter, 1974:198).
The development of human, physical and technical capacity was also
clear in other non-agricultural sectors. In this stage different
mechanical workshops were developed as part of the Ministry of Sugar
Industry and the Ministry of Basic Industry which produced some of the
needed equipment and machinery (see Table 5); however, the import
content of this equipment was still high. While still importing
mechanical harvesters and loaders from Australia and the Soviet Union,
Cuban engineers and technicians continued their experimental work in
both adapting these harvesters to the Cuban condition^ and in
designing new harvesters. As recognized by Edquist, the early
experimental attempts though sometime costly
... created a very important pool of knowledge and 
experience. For example, thousands of workers had 
been educated to operate, maintain and repair 
harvesting machines. There has also been 
considerable "learning by trying" in harvest 
design and production. In addition the attempts 
to mechanize cutting had pointed to the crucial 
importance of preparing the cane fields in such a 
way that they were suited to the use of cane 
harvesters (Edquist, 1985:45).
In addition to the mechanical workshops, different research 
institutions were established in this stage (e.g., the Digital Research 
Center and microelectronic laboratory) to construct and develop some 
prototypes of silicon transistors and minicomputers (Montero, 1987:37).
In general, the high rate of investment in plant and equipment, 
increasing the capital stock by 50-75 percent during this period
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(MacEwan, 1981:158), furthered the expansion of the physical and 
technical capacity of the economy.
While some of the agricultural output, agricultural industries and 
non-agricultural industries expanded, a similar expansion in the light 
consumer industries was not matched at this stage (see Table 6).
One of the strong achievements of this stage was establishing a 
strong link between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the 
economy. This link can be seen in the development of backward and
forward industrial linkages. Contrary to the previous "simultaneous
12battle", the new strategy fitted with what is known in the literature 
as the "unbalanced growth model" or the "turnpike" strategy which 
emphasizes the development of the most efficient sector as the leading 
one and then utilizing the generated surplus to finance the development 
of new industries (Barkin, 1972: ).
Another important accomplishment has been further provision of
basic needs in the form of public services (e.g., health, and
education), reducing income inequality and increasing the employment
level (see Figure 1, 2, and Table 7). Though the total level of
consumption did not significantly increase, regional inequality in
income and consumption was reduced by providing more services (e.g.,
new houses, schools, etc.) to the rural areas than to the urban ones.
While gross national product per capital may well 
have declined in revolutionary Cuba, an average of 
0.5 percent per year in the 1960-76 period 
according to one estimate (World Bank, 1979:20), 
the various equalizing policies might be expected 
to have increased the well-being of the population 
at large (Gugler, 1980:37)
The urban-rural disparity has been greatly reduced by different direct
and indirect measures. These measures include: elimination of
unemployment among agricultural workers, introduction of a rationing
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system, provision of free social services in rural as well as urban 
areas, establishment of a wage scale in 1963 which minimized the rural- 
urban wages differentials and finally the total elimination of this 
differential in 1968 (Gugler, 1980:31).
The Third Stage (1970-80):
As a result of the failure to produce the target output of ten
million tons of sugar in 1970 and the pressures this attempt put on the
economy, a new strategy called for a more balanced development. The
emphasis on sugar production was reduced, though remaining at an
important level. Higher emphasis was put on industrialization as the
top priority without, however, creating a new imbalance. In his report
to the Party Congress, Castro expressed this new direction:
The industrialization process in the country is 
to be significantly accelerated. During the first 
years of the Revolution, there was no other 
alternative but to concentrate on agricultural 
production. At this stage, the closest attention 
is to be given to agriculture, but the main 
emphasis is to be on industrialization (quoted in 
MacEwan, 1981:201).
The main guideline for this stage was establishing and expanding
industrialization especially in export branches (sugar and nickel),
those industries that replace imports, those that supported agriculture
production (e.g., chemical and machine industries), those of consumer
goods (e.g., the food and textile industries), and those related to
the production of construction materials (Montero, 1984:18). In
addition, attention was given to the development of the light industry
that would provide a wider range of consumer goods (e.g., clothing and
furniture); emphasis on the provision of public consumption goods
continued.
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At this stage the government stressed the need to increase the 
economy's efficiency. The emphasis on efficiency was sought in 
increasing labor's productivity (reduction of work absenteeism and 
increasing skills), in more efficient use of resources (especially raw 
materials and fuel) and in intensifying mechanization in the productive 
sectors.
In his report to the Second Congress of the Party, Castro declared
that despite some external and internal problems (the drop in the world
sugar prices and the higher inflation rate of the capitalist world,
causing a drop in the terms of trade by 53 percent; and the damage
done to the agriculture sector by many plant and animal diseases,
reducing the output in some cases by 90 percent), the economy was able
to attain over the last five years (1975-80) an annual increase in the
gross social product of 4 percent at constant prices. He then added:
Not only have we attained this rate of growth, but 
we have also improved our efficiency in various 
ways. Labor productivity has risen at an annual 
rate of 3.4 percent (...), input of materials, the 
chief component in productive consumption, also 
dropped in relative terms, as reflected in greater 
efficiency in use of raw materials, energy and 
fuel - although we are still far from achieving 
the efficiency we should and can obtain (Castro,
1980:9).
During the last five years of this period (1975-1980), the
13country's infrastructure was extended. Investment rose by more than 
13 billion pesos (75 percent more than during the previous stage) and 
with 35 percent of this increase allocated to industry (which is three 
times higher than in the previous stage) . The agriculture sector was 
allocated 19 percent of the total investment as opposed to 40 percent 
in the previous stage. Despite the reduction of the investment share 
in the agriculture sector and the plant and animal diseases that struck
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this sector in this period, agricultural production grew at annual rate 
of 3.5 percent with sugar cane harvest reaching 8 million tons in 1979, 
the second largest in the country's history. This achievement in the 
agricultural sector reflected: continued increasing level of
mechanization leading to a higher level of productivity (see below); 
increased irrigation and use of fertilizers; increased human expertise 
(more than 5,600 university agricultural specialist and 15,000 high 
school agricultural technicians were graduated in the period); the 
completion of more than a thousand agricultural-related projects (e.g., 
dairies, nurseries, poultry farms and feeding facilities).
The growth in other productive sectors continued. The food 
industry grew at 14 percent, the light industry at 23 percent, the 
fishing industry (supplying for both increased domestic consumption and 
exports), at 29 percent. The construction industry continued as one of 
the major industries of the economy supplying: industrial and hydraulic 
projects, roads and highways, transportation facilities, hotels and 
public services projects (e.g., schools, hospitals, day cares centers 
and houses). In the first five years (1970-75) the construction 
industry was involved more in the completion of previous projects than 
in new ones.
Basic industry grew at an annual rate of 5 percent extending 
electric power generation with a reduction in fuel consumption per 
kilowatt hour by more than 10 percent between 1975 and 1980. However, 
the generated electricity was still short of supplying all homes. This 
period also witnessed a continued increasing production of other basic 
materials e.g., chemical products, papers, glass, and rubber. The iron 
and steel and machine industries grew at annual rate of 6.7 percent,
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increasing the production of steel smelting, buses, consumers' durable 
goods (refrigerators, radios and television sets), electric cables, 
batteries, and agricultural equipment (see Tables 8, 9, 10).
The development of the infrastructural and productive structure 
was accompanied by an increase in both the human and technical 
capacity. Besides the growing number of agricultural experts and 
technicians, there has been more advancement of the workers' skills 
through education and technical training in the other sectors of the 
economy. In the technical sphere, efforts continued in the development 
of sugar cane mechanical cutters. Previous efforts to mechanize sugar 
loading led to an 80 percent level of mechanization in the loading 
process by 1970. However, no similar mechanization capacity was 
achieved for the harvesting process, in which level of mechanization 
was only 1 percent (see Table 11). During the early 1970s, however, 
while still importing cane harvesters from Australia (the Massey 
Ferguson harvestors), Cuban technicians were able to improve the 
Libertadora harvester which was designed in the late 1960s. A Cuban 
designed Libertadora was manufactured in West Germany and used in 
Cuba.^
The Cuban contribution was of considerable 
importance in this division of labour, since they 
provided the basic concept. It is therefore an
example of transfer of a technique from a 
developing socialist country to an industrialized 
capitalist country (Gdquist, 1985:129).
In addition, in the same period the KTP-1 harvester was developed 
by joint effort of Cuban and Soviet technicians. After trials, the 
KTP-1 was initially manufactured in the Soviet Union and later with the 
technical assistance of the Soviet Union, a Cuban factory finally began 
operation in 1977. After some difficulties in the initial production
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phase, production increased from 30 units in 1977 to 501 in 1980; 
meanwhile the production of KTP-1 harvesters for Cuba in the Soviet 
Union was reduced and then terminated by 1979 (Edquist, 1985:133). The 
utilization of both imported harvesters (in a gradually decreasing 
number) and the nationally produced ones has increased the percentage 
of sugar-cane harvesting mechanization from 1 percent in the beginning 
of this stage (1970) to a total of 45 percent in 1980, with the 
nationally produced harvesters accounting for an increasing percentage 
(see Table 12). By the end of this stage sugar loading mechanization 
was 98 percent. The gradual ability to produce the Cuban designed 
harvesters reflects the gradual broader development of the Cuban 
mechanical industry and accumulated knowledge and experience.
As a result of the increased level of mechanization in the 
agricultural sector, employment has decreased (by almost 10 percent) in 
relative and absolute terms in this sector at this stage. The released 
workers have been employed in newly created jobs in the industrial 
sector (mining, manufacturing and construction) and in services 
(Brundenius, 1983:66).
One of the significant features of this stage was export expansion 
of a wider range of new products, such as seafood and citrus. From 
1967 to 1980 Cuba introduced 115 new export products (Brundenius, 
1985:40), hence reducing the percentage of the sugar component of its 
exports.
Another important feature of this stage which facilitated Cuba's 
stable economic growth despite the deteriorating terms of trade with 
the capitalist world was Cuba's joining CMEA (The Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) in 1972 (this point will be further elaborated in 
the section on the "Soviet-dependency").
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In brief, the major achievement of this stage was the reduction of 
previous economic imbalances and the establishment of a more balanced 
economy. In addition, despite the reduction in relative investment, 
sugar and agricultural production increased as a result of 
mechanization. The technological success, leading to a higher 
mechanization of the agricultural sector, reflects both the development 
of the mechanical industry and the increased linkage between the two 
sectors. Finally, in this stage the Cuban people’s level of 
consumption of both consumer goods and public services increased 
significantly as a result of the increased production (see Tables 6, 13, 
and Figure 1) . Cuba by this stage had established a structure that 
would lead to achieving the goals foreseen in the early stage, namely a 
higher level of industrialization, agricultural and export 
diversification, and a more egalitarian income distribution.
The Fourth Stage figSO-SS1):
In the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, held in 
1980, the socioeconomic guidelines for the 1981-85 period were 
approved. The main goal of this stage, as reflected in these 
guidelines, was the continued emphasis on industry in various branches 
and parts of the country. In addition, the guideline emphasized the 
continued goal of developing and intensifying those industrial branches 
that would utilize domestic resources (e.g., the food and fishing 
industries) and those with the highest potential exports (e.g., sugar, 
nickel and citrus industries) with a view towards of increasing 
exports, replacing imports and raising the people's consumption levels 
(Socioeconomic Guidelines for the 1981-85 period, 1981:11-12).
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As well as the continued general goals of Industrialization, 
export diversification, import substitution and an increase in the 
standards of living, the guidelines focused on increasing productivity 
and efficiency of the economy in the spheres of labor productivity, raw 
materials and fuel consumption, technological development, and planning 
and managerial organization. This last goal has been pursued mainly by 
introducing greater flexibility and financial responsibility (through 
self-financing and self-management mechanism) in the production units.
The investment priority in this stage was set in accordance with 
the general goals with the main emphasis of the 1980-85 plan remaining 
on industrial investment. Of the total investment in this period, 
17.88 billion pesos, 36 percent was allotted to industry, 23.3 percent 
to agriculture and 11.8 percent to transportation (Castro, 1986:2).
The second five year plan specifically pointed to the development
and construction of different agricultural, mechanical, transport,
electrical and non-electrical machinery and equipment, in addition to
the construction of new sugar refineries. Further, the plan pointed
out the importance of
the creation of a new base of development, 
planning and manufacture of new types and models 
of equipment for automobile transport (both 
freight and passenger) and for railways, including 
technical and feasibility studies, technical 
projects, a greater part of the equipment (60% or 
more) with construction, erection and 
commissioning of the said installations with the
object of continuing to replace imports of those
products which can be manufactured in the country 
and also to create new exportable items (quoted in 
Brundenius, 1987:103).
The actual overall growth of the Gross Social Product (GSP) during
1981-85 was 7.3 percent (above the planned growth rate of 5 percent)
(UNIDO, 1986:1). Material production rose by 8 percent; the industrial
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sector growth accounted for approximately 76 percent of the GSP in 1985 
(Banco Nacional De Cuba, 1986:6). More than 90 percent of the increase 
in the industrial output was generated from the non-sugar industrial 
branches (UNIDO, 1986:6) reflecting a significant development of the 
non-sugar industrial structure of the economy, a major step towards 
economic diversification (see Figure 3).
The high growth of the non-electrical and machinery industry (see 
Tables 14 and 15) increased the domestic supply of needed spare parts. 
In 1984 430 million pesos worth of spare parts were made or repaired in 
Cuba, saving on foreign imports (UNIDO, 1986:6). In addition, the non­
electrical industry has significantly increased the supply of 
agricultural machinery (e.g., harvesters and planting equipment), 
transportation machinery (e.g., buses, railway wagons) (see Table 16). 
The machinery industry has produced 600 KTP-1 mechanical harvesters 
annually since 1981 (about 65 percent of total world annual production) 
(EIU, 1986-87:13). As a result of the increased number of produced 
harvester machines, 62 percent of the 1985 sugar harvest was mechanized 
as opposed to 45 percent at the end of the previous stage. In 
addition, technical experiments continued in this stage leading to the 
development of a new, more powerful cane harvester the KTP-2 (Castro, 
1986:3) .
The electrical machinery industry high growth rate in this period 
of 15.1 percent increased the supply of different consumer appliances 
(e.g., radios, T.V. sets and refrigerators), in addition to other 
intermediate products (e.g., electric wires and cables). Further, the 
breakthrough development of this industry is the exportation, for the 
first time, of computer equipment to the Soviet Union (Montero,
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1988:43). The computer industry output accounted for 2 percent of the
total output of capital goods in Cuba (Brundenius, 1987:106).
The food and light industries continued to grow at an annual
growth of 6.1 and 8.8 percent respectively.*"® Important growth has
also been registered in construction projects; in this period 45
percent were industrial projects (e.g., the construction of a new glass
container factory, a textile complex, a nickel complex, seven sugar
mills, a paper complex, and an oil refinery).*"® In addition to the
industrial projects, the construction sector provided building
materials for different agricultural (e.g., dairy farms and cattle
17farms) and social projects (e.g., public health centers and housing).
As a result of the higher industrial productivity especially in
the manufacture of cane-harvest machines and in grinding capacity,
sugar production increased by 12.2 percent over the previous five year
period, with a stable average annual production of 8 million tons. The
integration of the machine and sugar industry reached a higher level In
this stage. Seven new sugar mills, with Cuban technical design and a
18majority of Cuban-made equipment, were constructed. In addition, the 
vertical integration process was reflected in the formation of the 
agro-industrial complexes in 1980 freeing the Ministry of Agriculture 
from the sugar cane activities which were assigned to the Ministry of 
Sugar Industry (Feuer, 1987:70).
The actual high growth of the different branches of the industrial 
sector, though accompanied by an increasing level of domestic 
production of some capital goods and spare parts, increased the volume 
of imported intermediate and capital goods (see Table 17). However, 
between 1970 and 1983, the percentage of manufactured imports in total
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imports dropped from 58.9 percent to 44.7 percent (see Figure 4). This
reduction in the share of manufactured imports, given the expansion and
high growth rate of the industrial sector, reflects the success of ISI
in both intermediate and capital goods. Another indicator of the
significant domestic replacement is reflected in the Domestic
19Procurement Ratio (DPR) for capital goods which has increased from 
16.9 percent in 1970 to 31.8 in 1984 (Brundenius, 1987:109) (see Table 
18). In addition, Table 17 shows the effective reduction of the 
imports of consumer goods which was achieved by increasing the domestic 
production of these goods. Consumer goods accounted for 63.1 percent 
of total material value added in 1982 (UNIDO, 1986:xii). In addition 
to reflecting the significant replacement of imports, the increase in 
consumer goods production also reflects the state's commitment to the 
satisfaction of basic needs and raising the people's consumption level.
Significant efforts at import substituting are also reflected in 
other fields like medicines, with domestic production satisfying 83 
percent of the domestic needs (Zimbalist, 1987:18), and energy. In 
this stage the use of oil in raw sugar production was totally 
eliminated; the sugar industry instead used the sugar bagasse as a 
fuel, saving 1,709,000 tons of oil. This latter replacement reflects 
the technological development of adapting domestic resources to 
domestic production and of the total energy self-sufficiency of the 
sugar industry. Attempts are being made to increase the energy supply 
from bagasse beyond the sugar industry. Twenty million tons are
produced each year (equivalent to 4.5 million tons of oil) which covers 
30 percent of the national primary energy consumption with a potential 
increase to an equivalent of 7.5 million tons of oil (CubaBusiness, 
1987:5). Partial replacement of imported oil has also been achieved
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through the reduction of its unit consumption in different sectors and 
by increasing the volume of national oil extracting (Crude oil 
production increased from 60,000 tons in 1959 to 938,000 tons in 1986). 
Experiments are also underway to adapt the use of Cuban oil, which has 
a high sulfur content, in power generation and industry to replace 
imported oil (CubaBusiness, 1987:4-5).
The more efficient use of resources has been an important factor
in the actual growth rates in this period. The major factor, however,
stems from the higher labor productivity and the positive ratio between
the growth in productivity (4.3 percent) and the growth in mean wages
(1.16 percent) (Banco Nacional De Cuba, 1986:16). A study of the
70impact of increasing productivity on the mercantile production showed 
that an increase in productivity of 5.1 percent in 1984 was responsible 
for a 72.6 percent increase in the mercantile production of the Cuban 
industry (UNIDO, 1986:19). Labor productivity in the industrial sector 
increased by 5 percent; however, between 1981 and 1984 labor 
productivity increased by 35 percent in the non-electrical machinery 
sector, by 24 percent in the electrical machinery sector, and by 11 
percent in the metal products sector with an average increase in 
salaries of 9 percent (Brundenius, 1987:105), Higher productivity has 
also been registered in the sugar industry where a reduction of 48 
percent of the manual cane-cutters since 1980 took place due to 
increased level of mechanization in this sector (Castro, 1986:3).
The fuller utilization of existing resources, by increasing labor 
and capital productivity and reducing waste, is a strategy that is 
continuously emphasized and pushed by the Cuban leadership. This means 
of surplus generation is socially and politically more palatable than
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sacrificing current consumption (Zimbalist, 1987:8). This increase in 
the productivity of the working force has been achieved through the 
continuous massive effort to increase the level of education and health 
services, in addition to increasing the level of personal consumption 
which grew by 9 percent in 1984 (United Nations, 1986:212). Increased 
productivity has also been facilitated by organizational changes: a
higher degree of decentralization is taking place allowing the 
production units more flexibility in decision-making and more 
responsibility in self-financing (see Table 19).
In addition to the significant accomplishment in import 
substituting, the Cuban economy witnessed some significant changes, 
though to a lesser degree, in its attempts at export diversification. 
The share of sugar in total exports dropped from 86.8 percent during 
the previous stage to 75.7 percent during 1983-84 (Zimbalist, 1987:18). 
Further, exports of non-traditional goods to the convertible currency 
markets increased by an average of 40 percent during the 1981-85 period 
(see Table 20). In addition to the 115 new non-sugar related export 
products introduced in the previous period (1976-80), Cuba introduced 
11 more products. Exports of citrus products, sea products, steel, 
recycled raw materials, oil and its by-products, ferrous and non- 
ferrous metals, and other products increased (Banco Nacional De Cuba, 
1986:8). As a result of the significant savings in oil consumption, 
Cuba has been able, based on an agreement with the Soviet Union, to re­
export oil in the convertible currency market. Cuba earned about $540 
million from selling imported oil (UNIDO, 1986:2). Exports of 
manufactured goods increased in this period, though registering a small 
share (1.3 percent) of total export (see Figure 5). This small share 
includes an increasing volume of different manufactured goods, e.g.,
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different chemical products, wires and cables, appliance, spare parts
and irrigation equipment (CEE, 1986:267). And as mentioned earlier
Cuba exported some computer parts to the Soviet Union during this
stage, though still on a small scale. Efforts are being made to
increase the share of manufactured exports especially by exporting to
91other developing countries. The highest potential non-sugar hard 
currency earning industries at this stage and till the 1990s are the 
nickel industry, fishery industry, citrus industry and tourism.
As a result of the effective efforts at import substituting and 
export diversification the Cuban economy was able to register hard 
currency surpluses in 1981, 1982, and 1983 (see Table 21).
Not enough data is available at this point to assess the third 
five year plan (1985-90), and hence its assessment has to be postponed. 
However, some prior information about the direction of this plan 
indicates no major shift in the strategy adopted in the last two plan 
periods; Cuba will continue to give priority to the industrial sector 
with specific emphasis on import substituting and export-oriented 
industries. Out of the government total investment budget 23.14 
billion pesos (29 percent more than the preceding plan) 45 percent is 
allotted to the industrial sector. Attention is given to expanding the 
sugar cane by-products and derivatives industries, agricultural 
industry, light industry, basic industry, the machine industry, the 
electronic industry, oil extraction, transportation and tourism 
(Castro, 1986:8-9). In addition, the plan highlights the need to 
improve efficiency in the use of raw materials, quality of products and 
services, and productivity through a better organization of work. A 
new emphasis is to be put on intensive rather than extensive measures.
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Measures aimed at conservation and rational use of 
energy, other material resources, labor and 
productive facilities are to be given priority.
Increases in production capacities should be 
achieved through modernization wherever possible 
rather than investment in new facilities (Castro,
1986:9).
While the final assessment of this last period (1985-90) has to 
wait, given the already established productive structure of the economy 
and the outcome of the previous five year plans, it is safe to assume 
that the outcome will be, to a large extent, in accordance with the 
planned objectives. In addition, and as predicted by a recent study: 
"Cuba can be expected to remain among the few of the underdeveloped 
world with a positive growth record over the remainder of the decade" 
(EIU, 1986-87:8).
Critical assessment of the Cuban development process:
Judging from the initial economic and social conditions of the 
Cuban economy before the revolution and the relatively short period of 
transition, Cuba has successfully altered its economic and social 
structure towards a higher level of national integration. Though 
facing many difficulties the economy was able, during its first and 
second stages (1960-70), to lay the economic and social foundation of a 
productive structure that allowed for future development. This
foundation enabled the economy to sustain a relatively high growth rate
27—  as compared to other Latin American countries (see Table 22) —
and to pursue its initial goals especially those of industrialization 
and increasing the standards of living. After the initial extensive 
investment in the most productive sectors of the economy and 
utilization of the surplus in developing other sectors, the economy has
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been able to develop a higher productive capacity and a more effective 
utilization of its human and natural resources.
The strong and planned commitment to industrializing the economy
has increased the level of integration between the different sectors of
the economy, the level of national technological capacity, the level of
domestic economic surplus, and the standards of living (through
increases in both private and public goods and employment). A recent
UNIDO study of the industrial development in Cuba summarizes some of
the indicators of these achievements:
Within the framework of new industrial policy 
followed by the new regime since 1960, new sugar 
factories were built designed by the Cuban 
themselves, using 60 percent of Cuban-made 
equipment. The level of development reached in 
this sector enabled Cuba to begin exporting sugar 
production technology. Modern production 
facilities were erected in chemical industry to 
produce sulphuric and citric acids, varnishes and 
dyes, fertilizers, insecticides, glass, paper, 
etc. Expansion, reconstruction and modernization 
of many enterprises permitted a significant 
increase in the production of steel, a greater 
volume of capital goods, and the setting up of new 
sectors like the production of buses, agricultural 
equipments, household appliances, TV and radio 
sets, computers, etc. (UNIDO, 1986:28).
The Cuban development process, judged in decades and not in years, 
reflects an increasingly stable and consistent orientation of the
economy. Adjusting and postponing the ambitious initial goals, and
through a process of learning, the Cuban leadership has been able to 
pursue the planned goal of constructing a higher level of national 
economic integration and hence a higher degree of economic
independence.
The positive assessment of the Cuban development experience should 
not imply the ease of the transitional process or the absence of
continued difficulties and problems. Perhaps the harshest and most
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consistent criticism and articulation of these problems and
difficulties comes from Castro. In his Third Congress report, after
listing the major accomplishments of the Cuban economy during the 1980-
85 period, he argued
(Nevertheless), we could have made better use of 
our resources and our efforts. Our work has been 
far from its best. Deficiencies and shortcoming 
still persist and we must call them by their names 
and fight against them with all our might (Castro,
1986:6).
He then preceded with a long list of specific problems. Though
increasing the level of national production and technological capacity,
the Cuban economy still depends on importing an important part of its
intermediate and capital goods. Some of the productive sectors, at the
enterprises level, reflect low levels of efficiency, quality of
produced goods and productivity. Shortages and delays of supplies
still exist in the economy affecting both domestic needs and export
commitments. For example,
(Delays) in the development and introduction of 
new more productive disease resistant varieties, 
low quality seed; ill-timed planting weeding and 
cultivation delays, among other factors 
contributed to the low density of many cane fields 
which causes limited agricultural yield (Castro,
1986:6).
The low levels of efficiency, quality and productivity are
attributed mainly to technological and organizational deficiencies.
One of our most serious problems has been the 
absence of comprehensive national planning for 
economic development (...) Our scientific and 
technological work has not been sufficiently 
linked to research topics that will provide 
concrete solutions to our main economic problems, 
nor has it been organized adequately to avoid 
duplication of efforts; and research is still 
scattered. As a result our modest achievements do 
not correspond to the resources allocated (Castro,
1986:6).
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Through the years the Cuban society has been going through an 
intensive public debate on how to better orient the economy; how to 
improve its productivity; what priorities should be followed, and what 
means should be utilized. Debates continue on the degree of 
centralization vs. decentralization, on the extent of economic and 
financial flexibility at the enterprise level, on moral vs. material
incentives as means of increasing productivity, and on different
organizational and technological means to increase economic efficiency. 
The most recent organizational attempt ongoing in the Cuban economy now 
is what is known as the ’rectification' process, a return to the 
earlier revolutionary spirit of higher productivity, a downplaying of 
material incentives, an acceleration of volunteer work, and an attack 
on bureaucratic practices that have evolved. The new process has 
managed to mobilize a large number of minibrigades workers who engage
for a certain period in building houses, clinics, day care centers,
etc., and who are paid by the enterprises they normally work for. The 
minibrigades workers usually work for 10-12 hours per day instead of 5- 
6 hours at a normal work place. (CubaBusiness, 1987:7). The
enterprises, at the same time, utilize the remaining working force to 
accomplish their normal level of productivity. The new process has 
been a major factor in increasing productivity of the Cuban economy 
during the 1980s; it has also been an important factor in increasing 
the level of mass participation in organization and decision making.
A different type of criticism of the Cuban experience comes from 
outside observers. These critiques generally revolve around issues of 
continued "sugar dependency," "export dependency," debt burden and what 
is referred to as "Soviet dependency," These critiques will be 
addressed in the next section.
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Cuba's Dependency:
Three types of dependency are usually attributed to the Cuban 
economy in the literature: "trade dependency", sugar dependency" and
"Soviet dependency". In this section I will be addressing, in some 
detail, both "sugar dependency" and "Soviet dependency"; however, I 
will not address "trade dependency" for two main reasons:
First, on an empirical level, the claim of Cuba's increased trade 
dependency, as has been continuously stated in the literature e.g., by 
Mesa-Lago (1979, 1985), has already been countered on the basis of
errors in measurement. Brundenius (1984:61-64) has pointed out two 
measurement errors which led to Mesa-Lago's biased calculations and 
wrong conclusion: (1) he compared prerevolutionary data series, which 
related exports to GNP, with post revolutionary data which relates 
exports to gross material product (GMF), which is smaller than GNP; and 
(2) he related exports in current prices (which are rising over time) 
to GMP, which is given in constant prices. Adjusting for these two 
errors, Brundenius' estimates show that Cuba's dependency on trade has 
decreased since 1970 (see Table 23). A similar conclusion was also 
reached in an earlier study by LeoGrande (1979).
Second, and more importantly, an economy's dependence on trade 
does not negate, in my opinion, this economy's independence. As was 
argued in the first chapter, such external factors by themselves are 
very misleading indicators of an economy's level of dependency. Those 
who attribute economic dependency to such external factors are 
confusing two different situations which are distinguished as 
"dependency" vs. "dependence" (see chapter I, section on dependency 
school). Rather, the economy's level of dependency or economic
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Independence is a function of its level of productive and structural 
capacity and of its internal degree of integration. In many cases an 
increase in the export level is an indication of the economy's 
increased productive capacity (which is the case for most developed 
economies, e.g., Japan). Measures like export/GNP could be utilized as 
indicators of the degree of an economy's openness. Hence a high ratio 
of export/GNP, for example, indicates a high degree of openness which 
is a characteristic of many small developed and developing countries. 
Cuba has been and will continue to be a small open economy; the major 
issue, however, is the structure of the export sector and its degree of 
integration with the rest of the economy. Examination of the Cuban 
economic and social transformation process reveals a structural change 
of the different sectors of the economy including the export one. The 
export sector in Cuba has served as the leading sector through which 
the primitive capital accumulation has been generated; the latter then 
has been utilized to develop other sectors of the economy. In 
addition, one of the major problems usually associated with trade 
dependency is an economy's external vulnerability; in the Cuban case, 
the economy has been able to reduce its external vulnerability by 
increasing its productive capacity, by diversifying its exports, and by 
securing stable prices and volumes of its major exports through trading 
with the socialist bloc. Hence the Cuban export sector has not been an 
isolated pocket or an enclave sector, but rather it has been acting as 
an important generator of national surplus and has been closely linked 
to the development of the rest of the economy.
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"Sugar Dependency":
Many critics of the Cuban development process argue that Cuba has 
failed to alter its sugar monoculture (e.g., Goure and Weinkle (1972), 
Mesa-Lago (1981)). However, as has been shown earlier, sugar 
production's share in both allotted Investment and total exports has 
fallen. A close look at the sugar cultivation and production process 
in the Cuban economy reveals further major structural changes that have 
taken place in this sector. Such changes, as will be shown, have led 
to a growing level of independence of the sugar industry in terms of 
its inputs and to a higher level of integration with the rest of the 
economy.
First, sugar cultivation and production are no longer an isolated 
pocket in the economy with massive foreign ownership and external 
transfer of surplus. It is no longer merely an agricultural activity, 
but rather an agro-industrial one that has been highly integrated with 
the rest of the economy (see Figure 5). Some of the major mechanisms 
of such integration are reflected in the following:
a. The sugar industry's surplus, generated through the export 
sector, has been utilized to finance the development of other 
productive and nonproductive sectors. The generated surplus 
in the sugar industry has been the major source of national 
capital accumulation that has been utilized since the second 
development stage to finance the development of the whole 
economy.
b. The development of the sugar industry has stimulated a series 
of backward and forward linkages. Backward linkage 
industries include: the chemical industry (fertilizers and 
pesticides), the construction industry and the mechanical
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industry (irrigation equipment, cane sugar harvesters). The 
development of the latter industry has, beside increasing the 
mechanization level of the sugar production process, 
increased the economy's technical capacity and hence its 
productivity by freeing an increasing number of workers from 
sugar activities. In addition, the development of the 
national production of cane harvest equipment has increased 
the economy's know-how technology in this field and allowed 
Cuba to export it to other countries. Forward linkages 
industries include different industri.es, that process sugar 
by-products. There are in Cuba now more than 10 plants that 
produce paper, newsprint, cardboard and particle board from 
bagasse; and 11 plants that produce torula yeast from sugar, 
molasses and animal feed. Now the newly developed sugar 
mills have a Cuban-developed system producing fertilizers 
from recycled factory waste (Feuer, 1987:80). Cuba now 
produces more than twenty sugar by-products; in addition to 
fuel and paper making some of these by-products have been 
used in medicine and construction (CubaBusiness, 1987:6).
Further, the sugar Industry has been a supplier of fuel to 
other economic activities. Energy from bagasse is a major 
national source of energy representing 30 percent of primary 
national consumption (CubaBusiness, 1987:7). The sugar 
industry, hence, has been a major contributor to the adopted 
strategies of import substitution and export diversification.
Second, the productivity of the sugar industry has significantly 
increased despite the gradual reduction of its investment share. This
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increasing productivity has been achieved through major improvement in 
the land irrigation system, the cultivation process (improved use of 
fertilizers and pesticides), the level of education and training of the 
employed labor force, and the level of mechanization. As a result of 
this latter effort Cuba today has as many sugar combines as all other 
sugar producing countries together. Today 100 percent of sugar loading 
is mechanized, and more than two-thirds of the cutting activities are 
mechanized (with some places reaching more than 80 percent) (Juan 
Perez, 1986:3). Along side at this process of mechanization there has 
been a reduction of the employed manual cane cutters. In the 1960s, 
mechanical loaders freed about 50,000 workers from sugar activities, 
and the cutting machines freed between 120,000-16,000 workers in the 
1970s (Edquist, 1985:167). The present mechanization level has reduced 
the number of workers from 350,000 in 1970 to 72,000 in 1985 (Castro, 
1986:3).
Third, despite the gradual fall in its share of investment and its 
increased productivity, the sugar industry has witnessed a gradual 
significant reduction of its costs. In addition to decreasing the 
number of workers it needs, the sugar industry has totally eliminated 
its consumption of imported oil, replacing it with energy from bagasse. 
The sugar agro-industrial complexes now are totally energy self- 
sufficient. Further, national technological development has increased 
the share of equipment and machines produced nationally. The newly 
constructed sugar mill centers are Cuban designed with the majority of 
the equipment nationally produced. In 1985 Cuba was reported to 
produce 77 percent of the total value of its milling equipment, with 
the rest imported from CMEA (15 percent) and capitalist economies (7
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percent), significantly reducing the cost of earlier hard currency 
imports (Pollitt, 1986:210).
Fourth, since 1979 (with the exception of the 1986 harvest, the 
year of hurricane Kate) sugar production has been stable, averaging 8 
million tons, a level which is close to the 1970 sugar output, without 
however, the economic and social pressures and imbalances that 
accompanied that harvest. This stable production, together with the 
stable and guaranteed purchases by the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries, has significantly reduced the economy's previous level of 
vulnerability to fluctuations of both production and world market 
prices. This increased stability has facilitated planning and the 
fulfillment of major social and economic projects.
Fifth, the social organization of sugar production has also 
structurally changed. With foreign ownership totally eliminated since 
the beginning of the revolution, state farms produced most sugar cane 
while independent farmers accounted for the rest. Through the mid 
1970s, and as a result of conscious decisions, the cooperative form of 
production gradually increased. By 1985 there were about 430 cane 
cooperatives encompassing 31,000 farmers and producing two thirds of 
all cane produced in the private sector (Feuer, 1987:71). Labor 
employment in sugar production (which constitutes about one-sixth of 
the Cuban population) is no longer subject to seasonal fluctuations. 
In addition, the sugar cane labor force is no longer dominated by low 
paid and technically low equipped farmers. Sugar workers include those 
involved in sugar cultivation (weeding, fertilizing, irrigating, etc.), 
and a large number of qualified engineers, agronomists and technicians. 
Today, a single sugar agro-industry complex has more qualified 
engineers and technicians than an entire province had before the
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revolution (Juan Perez, 1986:3). This increase in the level of skills 
and training has been accompanied by an increase in the standards of 
living of these workers. In addition to employment security, increased 
social services (housing, health, education), sugar workers receive 
higher wages (15 percent higher) than those with comparable work in 
other sectors. Further, work organization has changed, introducing a 
fourth shift in the factories, allowing the workers for the first time 
to take a weekly day off during the harvest (Feuer, 1987:78).
These significant social, economic and technical changes in sugar 
production structure indicate the development of this sector towards a 
higher level of productivity and integration with the rest of the 
economy. The development of this sector has been the major factor in 
the development of the whole economy. However, despite the attained 
stability in production and the increased level of productivity, the 
Cuban economy is still affected by the fluctuations of world sugar 
prices.
The bulk of the Cuban sugar output is sold to the socialist 
countries at high stable prices; however, because of its need for hard 
currency, Cuba attempts to sell some of its output to other countries. 
Due to the drastic fall in sugar prices (falling below the minimum 
price established in the international sugar agreement i.e., below 
$0.13 per pound) Cuba lost $500 million in the early 1980s (UNIDO, 
1986:1). In addition, sugar cane harvests are affected by certain 
disease and weather conditions as are other agricultural activities. 
The 1986 harvest was affected by a severe drought and by Hurricane 
Kate, reducing planned output and forcing Cuba to purchase half a 
million tons of sugar in the world market to fulfill its export
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commitment to the USSR (Feuer, 1987:74). However, while these problems 
of low international prices and fluctuations in weather conditions 
harshly affect all sugar exporting economies, the effect on the Cuban 
economy has been minimized by its stable selling to the CMEA, by its 
continuous effort at improving the use of fertilizers and pesticides 
and increasing the level of mechanization, and by its significant 
achievement at export diversification. Further, a comparative look at 
the effect of the severe drop of the international sugar prices on the 
Cuban economy before and after the revolution reveals significant 
change. While today Cuba's loss of foreign exchange forces it to 
adjust its plans postponing some of its development projects and 
cutting down some of its imports from the capitalist economies, the 
pre-revolution impact of such fall in prices (e.g., the 1920 fall in 
sugar prices) caused a further loss of national ownership of sugar and 
land property, collapse of the financial system and severe unemployment 
leading to different social problems.
Therefore, while sugar production continues to play a major role 
in the Cuban economy, it is very misleading to equate the pre­
revolutionary social and economic structure of the sugar sector with 
the current one. The higher level of productive and technical capacity 
of the agro-industrial sugar complexes in Cuba today and their higher 
level of integration with the rest of the economy definitely indicate a 
higher level of independence. As Pollitt concludes in his important 
study:
The growing 'independence' of the sugar industry 
for its inputs of machinery and equipment in 
particular contrasted sharply with its pre- 
Revolutionary condition and should have modified 
its common depiction as the post-Revolutionary 




All through the previous presentation in this chapter I have 
examined the development of the Cuban economy by focusing mainly on 
changes in internal dynamics (e.g., decision-making, productive and 
technical capacity... etc.). This story remains partial without 
reflecting on the role of the Soviet assistance in the Cuban case. 
Such assistance, as has been continually expressed by the Cuban 
leadership, has been of extreme importance in facilitating the Cuban 
transition.
Without the decisive, steady, and generous aid of 
the Soviet people, our country could not have 
survived the confrontation with imperialism. They 
bought our sugar when our market was brutally 
suppressed by the United States; they supplied us 
with raw materials and fuel which we could not 
have acquired in any other part of the world; they 
caused to arrive free arms with which we opposed 
the mercenaries at the Bay of Pigs and equipped our 
forces in order to impose the high price on any 
direct aggression by the United States; they 
supported our economy in extraordinary fashion in 
the critical years of the blockade (Castro, quoted 
in Blaster, 1979:229).
It is the volume and consistency of this assistance that has led
many critics (e.g., Goure and Weinkle (1972), and Mesa-Lago (1974,
1981)) to the claim that Cuba has simply replaced one dependency with
another, Cuba's previous relationship with the United States with its
current one with the USSR. This claim is known in the literature as
the "Sovietization of Cuba" thesis. Further, even some sympathetic
writers (e.g., Fagen (1978), Edelstein (1981) and MacEwan (1981)), who
recognize the positive social and economic effects of the Cuban-Soviet
relationship, argue that such achievements have been at the expense of
Cuba's loss of its independence in political decision making especially
in Cuba's foreign policy in Africa. *
139
The claim of the 'new dependency' in the literature is usually 
substantiated with estimates of the volume of the Soviet subsidies and 
assistance to Cuba. One of the most quoted estimates is that provided 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA's estimate is given 
as $3.1 billion per year (or over $8 million a day). Different 
analysts, however, have pointed out many distorted factors that have 
been assumed in reaching this estimate (e.g., Zimbalist (1983), Radell 
(1983), and Turits (1987)). This estimate, and other Western 
calculations, reach over-valued figures by comparing the price Soviets 
paid for sugar with official world market prices, rather than with the 
subsidized prices at which actual exchange takes place (Radell, 1983). 
In addition, the CIA estimate was derived from a year when the Soviet 
price subsidy was unrepresentive (Zimbalist, 1983). Furthermore, the 
calculation underestimates the cost of the tied nature of the Soviet 
aid e.g., non convertible currency^ (Turits, 1987). Just by adjusting 
for one of the distorted factors, the CIA figure drops by more than 
half (Zimbalist, 1983:145). To reach an exact estimate of the Soviet 
subsidy is impossible given the absence of official data of the actual 
debt owed to the USSR and the different implicit forms of assistance. 
However, in my opinion, the nature and consequences of this assistance 
are what pose an important issue rather than its volume.
While the volume of the Soviet assistance to Cuba has been 
overestimated, the nature of this assistance has been also obscured in 
the literature. Many critics of the Cuban development process argue 
that Cuban-Soviet relationship has hindered the development of the 
economy towards an independent status. They view Cuba's change of its 
initial ambitious strategy (after 1963) of rapid industrialization and
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economic diversification and its returned emphasis on sugar as an move
imposed by the Soviets.
Faced with the realization that its Cuban rescue 
operation was developing into a costly long-term 
economic undertaking, Moscow apparently persuaded 
or forced Cuba to rethink its development policy 
and return to traditional concentration on sugar 
production (Goure and Weinkle, 1972:72) (emphasis 
is added).
As Fitzgerald correctly argues in a recent article, the 
Sovietization of Cuba thesis assumes rather than shows Soviet pressure 
(Fitzgerald, 1987-88:447). In addition, this claim lacks the 
understanding of the actual material conditions (e.g., the initial 
underdeveloped productive capacity, shortage of foreign exchange, lack 
of experience and the U.S. blockade) that had the major role in shaping 
the policies adopted. Furthermore, the advocates of this thesis try to 
undermine important favorable aspects of the Cuban-Soviet relationship 
that stand in contrast with the Cuban-U.S. relationship; hence an 
examination of these favorable aspects will show the fallacy of 
equating the two relations.
Some favorable aspects of the Cuban-Soviet relationship include:
first, Cuba's relationship with the USSR and other socialist countries
since the 1960s has meant a guaranteed market for Cuba's sugar exports,
allowing it to sell higher volumes of sugar than its total export
before the revolution. As pointed out by Castro in 1970, Cuba's sugar
production is no longer limited by an externally determined quota or by
available markets, but rather by Cuba's own production capacity:
The problem facing our country ever since it began 
large-scale trade relations with the socialist 
camp (...) has been one of production, not 
markets. Our economy has enough markets for any 
amount of sugar it can produce (Castro, 1970:264).
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This guaranteed market has an important role in facilitating the 
development of the technical and productive capacity of the Cuban sugar 
industry. This role contrasts with the pre-revolutionary conditions in 
which the imposed quota by the United States hindered the economic 
justification for increasing production and technical innovations.
In addition to the guaranteed markets, the Cuban-Soviet trade
relationship has provided Cuba with high and stable prices as compared
to the highly fluctuating world market prices (see Table 24) . Due to
the decline in world prices Cuba redirected 1.7 million tons of sugar
in 1983-84 to the socialist countries. This redirection earned Cuba
1656 million pesos as opposed to 219 million pesos had this amount been
sold at the prevailing world prices (United Nations, 1986:226). The
opposite trend has also taken place; when sugar prices in the world
market increase, Cuba's proportion of sugar exports to the socialist
countries decreases. "Therefore, it seems that export of sugar to the
Soviet block has followed a counter-cyclical policy which seeks to
cushion the negative consequences of variations in the world market"
(Carciofi, 1983:217). The predictable stable income from sugar exports
has eased Cuba's planning process especially after 1972 the year of
Cuba* joint membership in CMEA and of an increase the prices the Soviet
paid for sugar.
After the congress, our country will have five- 
year plan for economic development for the first 
time. As the basis of this plan, we know exactly 
how much sugar we will be sending to the USSR in 
this five-year period, at what prices, and which 
consumer goods, raw materials and producer goods 
will be coming in from that country. In more or 
less similar terms we also know how much sugar 
will be exported to other socialist countries, the 
goods to be received in return and their prices.
However, the prices of sugar exports and those of 
the goods that we must buy in the capitalist 
countries remain unknown (Castro, 1979:74).
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In addition to the favorable prices paid for sugar exports, Cuba's 
terms of trade with the USSR in general are far superior (in magnitude 
and stability) to those of Cuba with the market economies (see Figure 
6). Such favorable terms have been achieved by applying an index 
mechanism that relates the prices of Cuba's exports (sugar and non 
sugar) to those of Cuba's imports from these countries.
Given the international conditions facing most developing 
countries, and especially the sugar exporting ones (e.g., deteriorating 
sugar prices and reduction in demand due to an increasing use of 
artificial sweeteners), Cuba's trade relation with the USSR and other 
socialist economies has strengthened the Cuban economy.
Second, Soviet economic assistance to Cuba has been utilized 
mostly in the development of the productive and technical capacity of 
the economy. Data for the period from 1960 to 1973 show that more than 
90 percent of the Soviet economic assistance was directed to the 
productive sectors with the industrial sector accounting for more than 
three-fourths of total assistance (see Table 25). Since then, 
socialist economic and technical assistance has been coordinated 
through different technical and scientific commissions within the CMEA. 
The socialist countries and specifically the USSR have financed 
different productive projects in Cuba in different sectors of the 
economy. The socialist assistance has played a major role in the 
development of the sugar industry; it has been utilized to build and 
renovate more than 100 sugar mills. In addition, the socialist 
technical and scientific cooperation has been directed to increasing 
the agricultural productive capacity by improving the quality of 
fertilizers and pesticides and by helping to increase the level of
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mechanization. First the Soviet Union provided some harvesters; and 
then it produced the Cuban designed harvesters; and finally, it helped 
finance the construction of a harvester factory that started operation 
in Cuba in 1978. In addition to facilitating increases in agricultural 
productivity, socialist and particularly Soviet assistance has enhanced 
Cuba's industrial productivity. The assistance has been directed 
towards the development of the nickel, citrus, fishery, transportation, 
electrical, and non-electrical industries. In all these industries, 
and others, socialist assistance has been provided in the form of 
finance, equipment, raw materials and technical specialists.
Therefore, contrary to the claim made by some writers (Eckstein,
1982:112) that Cuba's integration into the socialist block has
restricted its capacity to produce marketable exports, socialist
assistance has been a major support to those sectors that led to the
increase in export diversification (e.g., nickel, sea products, citrus,
sugar by-products). In addition, Cuba's increased efficiency and
technical capacity, especially in the sugar Industry have reduced its
consumption of Soviet oil and allowed it to reexport the surplus
earning a major source of hard currency. As noted in a recent study on
import substituting efforts in Cuba:
The drive to substitute domestic sources for 
imports - strongly encouraged by the Soviet Union 
which is cutting back petroleum deliveries to all 
its CMEA members - is gathering pace (Cuba 
Business, 1987:6).
Such recent developments counter the claim of Cuba's increased
9
dependency on Soviet deliveries (Goure and Weinkel, 1972:73).
Hence Soviet and socialist assistance has been directed to the 
development of those sectors that contribute most to the economy's
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strategic goal of industrialization with emphasis on ISI and export 
diversification.
Third, the Cuban-Soviet relationship involves neither an outflow 
of surplus from the Cuban economy nor any control over decision making. 
Though Cuba's new law of investment allows joint ventures with foreign 
capital, it does not allow any form of direct foreign investment, one 
of the major mechanisms of the previous U.S. control.
As the second chapter suggests, direct foreign investment involves 
mechanisms of control over the productive sectors of the economy and 
grants foreign investors both control over decision making and surplus 
appropriation. Hence the elimination of any form of foreign control in 
Cuba is a reflection of Cuba's increased control over its economic and 
social decision making. Unlike the United States in pre-revolutionary 
times, the USSR does not control or own any property or productive 
resources in Cuba. In addition, Cuba's relationship with the socialist 
countries has not prevented its economic relations with other 
countries. In fact, Cuba's position within CMEA, especially with 
Soviet backing , has facilitated its acquisition of hard currency loans 
from different capitalist financial institutions and governments.
The increasing level of integration with the Soviet Union and the 
socialist countries is not a result of an imposed relation or 
dependency but rather of the better terms offered by the socialist 
countries and of a rejection of Cuban trade by many capitalist 
countries. The Cuban leadership has continually expressed the desire 
to establish economic relations equally with the socialist countries, 
the capitalist countries and the developing ones. However, Cuba's 
initial desire of to diversify trade partners has been curtailed by the 
U.S. economic blockade which has imposed severe restrictions not only
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on U.S.-Cuban economic relations but also on Cuba's relations with 
other capitalist economies. However, with the easing of the economic 
blockade by some of these countries, Cuba has increased its trade and 
economic relations with the West especially when it offers better 
terms (trade with Western countries - excluding the United States - 
accounted for more than 40 percent of total trade in 1975 as a result 
of increases in sugar prices). In an effort to expand trade relations 
with the West, Cuba signed in 1985 a series of bilateral trade 
agreements (UNIDO, 1986:xii).
These favorable aspects of the Cuban-Soviet relationship - and of 
Cuba's relationship to the socialist countries in general - show that 
the simple comparison of volumes or percentages of trade as indicators 
of continued dependency is very misleading. This type of comparison is 
continually reported by advocates of the "Sovietization of Cuba" 
thesis. For example, Mesa-Lago (1974) argued that Cuba is still 
dependent by showing that Cuba has always relied on one country for 70 
percent of its trade - the United States before the revolution and the 
USSR since then. As has been argued in the first chapter, attempts by 
some writers to analyze dependency situations in quantitative terms, 
focusing mainly on external factors (e.g., imports, exports) has led to 
a misleading confusion of equalizing "dependency" with "dependence." 
While Cuba continues to depend on Soviet assistance in its development 
process towards structuring an integrated productive economy, this 
dependence takes a fundamentally different form from the previous Cuba- 
U.S. relationship within which the Cuban economy was subjected to a 
process of denationalization, external decision making and transfer of 
surplus. Hence, while Cuba's previous relationship with the United
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States can be characterized as one of dependency (as the term has been 
utilized by the dependency school), Cuba's current relationship with 
the USSR can be characterized as one of dependence (in the sense of 
external reliance). Such dependence used to accelerate the development 
of the economy's productive capacity and its internal integration, can 
be viewed as a "short-run" or "tactical" dependence (see Chapter I).
In addition, Cuba's utilization of the socialist assistance to
facilitate the economy's productivity and growth has not been achieved
at the expense of any sacrifices of the people's standards of living.
To the contrary, the Soviet and socialist assistance has eased the
26the Cuban government's social commitments.
Finally, the importance of the socialist - and particularly Soviet
- assistance in the Cuban development process should not deny the
Cubans' own efforts in this process. The major dynamics of Cuban
development have been determined by Cuba's internal elements e.g., the
choice of strategy and decision making of the revolutionary government,
the committed efforts at increasing the standards of living which in
turn facilitated both the development of human resources and the social
stability of the country, the increasingly efficient utilization of
resources and the encouragement of scientific and technological
innovations. Further, the role of socialist assistance in the Cuban
development process should be assessed within the context of the
exceptional economic and political pressure of the continued U.S.
blockade. As HacEwan and Zimbalist have observed:
If we are to deny the Cubans and their social 
system credit for the economic accomplishments 
because of this (Soviet) aid, then we must also 
give them tremendous credit for those same 
accomplishments in light of the U.S. blockade. It 
is probably impossible to quantify accurately 
either the benefits of the aid or the costs of the
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blockade. Crude estimates, however, suggest that 
both figures are in same order of magnitude; the 
roughly $10 billion plus that the Cubans are said 
to owe the Soviets is approximately balanced by 
the burdens of the blockade over the years 
(HacEwan and Zimbalist, 1984;5).
Cuba's Debt:
Despite the high sustained growth of the economy and the increased
productivity, Cuba's foreign debt has been increasing. High
international liquidity and the increased level of sugar prices have
resulted in increases in funds made available to Cuba by Western
private banks and governments, especially after the mid 1970s.
However, in the early 1980s and as a result of a discriminatory
international financial policy towards Cuba, many of the Western banks
tightened their lending to Cuba.^ As Turits (1987) showed in a recent
study, the Cuban liquidity crisis in 1982 (the Cuban National Bank
announced its inability to meet the payment and requested a
rescheduling) was largely an outcome of restrictive financial treatment
by Western banks despite Cuba's strong position relative to most other
Latin American countries. This observation has been shared by UNCTAD:
The percentage reduction in current Cuban debt 
was particularly large, and amounted to 25 
percent, or three times the median reduction on 
the group of 28 countries whose debt fell in the 
last years. This seems almost paradoxical in light 
of the fact that ten of the other 27 countries 
were already behind on their payments at the end 
of 1981, while Cuba experienced no such problem 
until the withdrawals of short-term credit in 1982 
(quoted in Turits, 1987:172).
Cuba managed to reschedule its debt in 1982, and again in 1986. 
In 1986, for the first time, Cuba fell behind in payments on its short 
term commercial debt. As a result of further negotiation, Western 
government creditors of the Paris Club agreed to reschedule Cuba's debt
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of $75 million falling due in 1986 over ten years with six years grace; 
and they offered additional credit (CubaBusiness, 1987:1). Cuba
currently owes $3.4 billion to Western banks and governments. As a 
result of the changes in international financial policies, Cuba's 
short term loans and trade credit now constitute a higher portion of 
its overall debt (see Table 26) because these are costly and in 
flexible sources of funds, they have led to a higher transfer of 
resources especially in the last few years.
Despite the increase in the debt burden (total debt 
service/exports averaged about 42 percent in 1980-84 (see Table 27)), 
Cuba's GSP has sustained a high growth rate (more than 7 percent) 
during the 1980s with industrial growth scoring even higher. In 
addition, during this same period Cuba's management of the debt 
rescheduling negotiations did not lead to an adoption of the 
traditional austerity measures taken in other countries. As has been 
shown earlier, Cuba's strong commitment to increasing standards of 
living has continued all through its different stages of development, 
with a higher emphasis in the recent years on increasing the 
availability of private and public goods; in addition, wages have 
increased. The austerity measures, hence, have not been taken in 
spheres affecting social consumption and standards of living, but 
rather in organization and production. Cuban leadership has strongly 
emphasized efforts to accelerate the economy's productivity and 
efficiency. In addition, investment priority has been directed towards 
those sectors with the highest export potentials (sugar, nickel, 
fishery, and citrus industries), to import substituting (light and 
heavy industries), and other foreign exchange earning sectors
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(tourism). Both personal savings (a new people's Saving Bank was 
established offering 2 percent interest) and joint ventures have been 
encouraged. Finally, Cuba's austerity measures have affected the 
volume of its imports of capital and Intermediate goods (e.g., 
machinery, transport equipment, and chemical products) from the 
capitalist countries, which despite their small share in Cuba's total 
imports, still play an essential part in the economy's productive 
capacity.
Cuba's debt with the USSR and other socialist economies is 
unknown. However, though larger than Cuba's other debt, its burden is 
significantly smaller. In addition to trade credits from the USSR - 
which require no cash payments - the financial credits are offered at 
long repayment period (over 25 years) and low interest rate (2 percent 
per annum).
Perhaps the most important issue in assessing the national debt
for any economy is the way this debt is utilized internally. Cuba's
leadership has long recognized foreign capital as an important means to
accelerate the economy's productive capacity and hence its long-run
goal of increased independence.
As an underdeveloped country embarked on an 
accelerated program of socioeconomic development,
Cuba needs foreign funding to increase production 
of those branches that will - in the long run - 
guarantee a self-sustained economic development.
It is therefore essential to concentrate 
investments and products imported with foreign 
credit in those lines of production and services 
that will help integrate and develop our economy, 
raise our peoples' standards of living, increase 
the amount and value of exports and reduce imports 
(Socioeconomic Guidelines for the 1981-85 Period,
1986:21).
Unlike many other countries where foreign funding is sometimes 
channeled outward through imports of luxury goods, or deposits in
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foreign banks, or spent on unproductive investment, Cuba has utilized 
its foreign funding in accordance with its strategic goals. Such 
planned and controlled utilization of foreign finance in increasing the 
productive capacity of the economy reflects a "short-run" form of 
dependence as opposed to a "long-run" one.
Conclusion and further remarks:
If economic independence is viewed as a function of the internal 
level of productive and technical capacity and of the degree of 
internal integration, then the Cuban economy undoubtedly has become 
more independent since the revolution and especially since the 1970s.
Other studies reached a similar conclusion about Cuba's reduced 
level of dependency e.g., LeoGrande (1979), and Brundenius (1984:62- 
68); however, these studies adopted a different conception of 
independence. They focus mainly on some external factors e.g., 
volumes, percentages and direction of trade. While such indicators are 
important they remain partial; and any short run quantitative change of 
the variables may misleadingly indicate the reversal of the process.
One of the definitions of economic independence adopted by the 
different essays in a volume edited by Ghai is the ability of a country 
to effectively formulate and execute its own economic and social 
policies without coercive external pressures (Ghai, 1973:xi). Cuba's 
previous relationship with the United States reflected the lack of such 
independence, with U.S. investors dominating the Cuban economy and 
hence controlling its economic decision making, and the U.S. Congress 
dictating Cuba's political terms. Cuba's current relationship with the 
USSR, on the other hand, reflects no such control; to the contrary this
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relationship has facilitated the development of the Cuban economy 
towards a higher level of economic independence. Though Cuba still 
depends on the USSR, this dependence structurally differs in its form 
and consequences from Cuba's previous dependency on the United States. 
Cuba's dependence on Soviet assistance and on some capital and 
intermediate goods, imports, and financial loans from capitalist 
economies can be characterized as a short-run dependence which is 
essential for building up the economy's productive capacity and to 
further its level of independence.
Cuba's increased level of productive and technical capacity and of
national integration has been achieved mainly through a planned effort
of industrialization. The revolutionary leadership recognized long
before the revolution the immense need for industrialization. Castro
expressed the importance of industrialization when outlining the
program of the 26 of July Movement in his defense trial in 1953:
Except for a few food, lumber and textile 
industries, Cuba continues to be primarily a 
producer of raw materials. We export sugar to 
import candy, we export hides to import shoes, we 
export iron to import plows... Every one agrees 
with the urgent need to industrialize the nation, 
that we need steel industries, paper and chemical 
industries, that we must improve our cattle and 
grain production, the techniques and the 
processing in our food industry in order to 
protect ourselves (Castro, 1984:25).
Since the revolution, Cuba has been able to develop an industrial 
structure that has allowed it to substitute for previously imported 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods. A non selective program of 
ISI was adopted in the beginning of the revolution, which did not 
recognize the underdevelopment of the productive structure and the 
available domestic resources. As a result the program increased the. 
imports of raw materials, intermediate and capital goods. Recognizing
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these emerging problems, the leadership soon adjusted its ambitious 
programs, concentrating on those industries that utilized domestic 
resources and those with the highest potential output to generate 
needed surplus. In addition, the emphasis on the sugar industry was 
accompanied by the development of other industries with backward and 
forward linkages. Meanwhile special attention was given to developing 
a basic industrial and technological capacity. ISI took place also in 
the food and light industries. Within a transitional period of less 
than thirty years, Cuba has been able to expand its basic and heavy 
industries. The adopted industrial strategy, hence, took the forms of 
both ISI and basic industrialization. In addition, Cuban planners put 
strong emphasis on export diversification (with the goal of increasing 
export of manufactures), which increased the economy's sources of 
foreign exchange and reduced its external vulnerability. Emphasis on 
industrialization, which gained momentum in the 1970s, continues as the 
main goal for the future. In reflecting on the development strategy up 
to the year 2000, Castro emphasized industrialization and other major 
obj ectives.
The strategy's main economic objective is to speed 
up the country's industrialization process. The 
determining factors of future economic development 
and industrialization process demand increasing 
and diversifying exports; substituting imports 
(particularly from the capitalist area); further 
integrating the national economy; using natural 
resources rationally; increasing efficiency in 
social production while economizing on resources 
(especially imports) (Castro, 1986:9).
In another sphere, Cuba has adopted the long run goal of enhancing 
economic cooperation efforts with other Third World countries and 
especially with those in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
Despite the successful internal efforts at developing the Cuban
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economy, Cuban leadership recognized that future development cannot be
achieved in isolation. As Castro said in 1974: "A small, isolated
Latin American country can do absolutely nothing. .. In the future only
large communities will be in a position to face the great problems of
humanity" (quote in F. Fitzgerald, 1987-88:443). Economic cooperation
among developing countries is viewed as a very important strategy
toward increasing their level of independence:
There are several reasons why cooperation among 
Third World countries is necessary. The first and 
more general reason is the fact that it is a 
fighting instrument against neo-colonial 
dependence stemming from old historical links with 
former metropolis, embodied in relations of deep 
subordination in production, trade, finance, 
technology, and intellectual and cultural fields.
If anything shows with absolute clarity the 
historical path our countries have followed, it is 
the noxious effect of dependence on market-economy 
developed countries (Castro, 1983:158).
Cuba gave very special attention to improve bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Cuba now has diplomatic and trade relations with many Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, while in 1960 such relations were 
limited only to Mexico (as a result of isolating and boycotting 
measures by the rest of the regional countries). In addition, Cuba 
became an active member in different Latin American and Caribbean 
cooperative organizations that have adopted the goal of economic 
development and independence. Cuba's affiliations can be categorized 
into two types: broad regional cooperative organizations and specific 
purpose centered groups (Reed, 1979:229). The first type includes the 
Latin American Economic System (SELA), and the Caribbean Committee of 
Development and Cooperation (CCDC) which was formed by ECLA. Both 
organizations seek to promote regional integration through different
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common production and marketing activities. The second type includes
the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) , the Latin American and
Caribbean Sugar Exporting Group (GEPLACEA), and the Caribbean
Multinational Shipping Company (NAMACUR) (Reed, 1979:300). Cuba has
taken an active role In all these organizations in addition to engaging
in other bilateral economic and technical agreements with some of the
Latin American countries. As recognized by Reed (1979), though Cuba
has long-run economic interests in these organizational efforts, Cuba's
immediate benefits, are mostly symbolic. The form of cooperation which
the Cuban leadership considers appropriate corresponds to the dirigiste
form of cooperation, the hardest to achieve (see Chapter II, section on
regional cooperation):
Cooperation among underdeveloped countries must be 
based on the coordination of internal efforts and 
include, as an important component, actual and 
effective forms of control over transnational 
activities, coupled with full sovereignty over our 
natural resources and economic activities, to 
prevent the so called South-South cooperation from 
becoming another mechanism aimed at increasing the 
profits of such conglomerates (Castro, 1983:160).
Cuba has pursued a similar active role in the developing
countries' demands contained in the New International Economic Order
(NIE0). It has been taken this role within different United Nation
organizations and through the Non-Aligned Movement. Castro
continuously stresses this demand as an important means to facilitate
Third World development.
Now for us to develop, canceling the debt would 
not be enough. It would also be necessary to 
implement the new international economic order 
approved by UN ten years ago and which was 
promoted and defended by Mexico, Algeria, and 
several other countries, Cuba among them. All 
this was agreed upon at the UN ten years ago by
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the immense majority of member countries, yet it 
has not been implemented (Castro, 1985:6).
As in the case of regional cooperation, Cuba's active role in
promoting the NIEO does not stem from immediate economic need
especially with the more equal terms of trade Cuba has with the
socialist countries.
None of what we are doing is being done in the 
interest of our country, because we are the least 
affected by the dramatic crisis and have no 
economic stagnation, no downturn. We are in fact 
advancing at a fine pace, our hard currency debt 
is small, our economic relations with socialist 
countries are excellent, the prices for our goods 
are satisfactory, and non of what we are doing is 
out of national economic interest or of political 
interest of overcoming isolation. We are fighting
for more far-reaching objectives (...) for the
interest of Latin America and the Third World 
(Castro, 1985:17).
Therefore, while Cuba has embarked on the national strategy of 
ISI, basic industrialization and export diversification with successful 
outcomes, the long run results of its efforts in regional cooperation 
and NIEO are, to a large extent, dependent also on other countries' 
committed efforts and their long run collective struggle for economic 
independence. Hence the latter two strategies are currently restricted 
by external obstacles related to differences in political and economic 
interests of the different involved countries.
Cuba's successful national efforts at increasing the productive
and technical capacity have enabled it to expand and improve the
standards of living of the Cuban population with an impressive
provision of basic needs, significant reduction of income and regional
28inequality and an elimination of unemployment. The outgrowth of the 
Cuban development has also been extended beyond the national 
boundaries. Cuba has provided financial, technological, educational
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and military assistance to other developing countries. Hundreds of 
Cuban teachers, doctors and technicians have provided different social 
services in other countries (e.g., Nicaragua, Jamaica, Angola). 
Further, Cuba has provided technical and educational assistance by 
accepting thousands of students from other developing countries in its 
schools and educational and technical institutions. This assistance 
reflects both Cuba's strong solidarity with other developing countries 
and its increased level of productivity and development.
Cuba's higher level of economic independence can also be judged by
applying its own definition of economic independence. As was stated in
the 26 of July movement program (Nuestra Razon) in 1956:
The principle of economic independence requires 
that the greatest possible percentage of the 
profits of national production remain within the 
country. When for whatever reason the bulk of 
these profits flows abroad, the balance of 
payments is disturbed and the country consequently 
becomes increasingly subservient and impoverished; 
the means of production and development in the
interests of the country but for the benefit of
the private interest that control them. Once that
pattern is established, the country loses its
economic sovereignty and becomes for all practical 
purposes a commercial colony (Nuestra Razon, in 
Llerena, 1978:293).
Cuba's increased level of productive and technical capacity and 
national integration, its ability to formulate and execute economic and 
social policies without external pressures, and its control over the 
national surplus demonstrate that Cuba has undoubtedly succeeded in 
increasing its level of economic independence. Cuba has laid a solid 
foundation for the dynamic mechanism that can bring about higher future 
productivity, economic diversification and national integration, and 
hence a higher future level of economic independence. This trend, 
based mainly on changes of internal dynamics, will gain momentum with
157
the gradual easing of the economic blockade and Cuba' 




U.S. Direct Investments In Cuba, 1929-1958 (Million Dollars)
1929 1936 1940 1046 1950 1953 1958
Agriculture* 575 265 241 227 263 265 265
Petroleum 9 6 10 15 20 24 90
Mining ** ** ** 15 15 70 180
Manufacturing 45 27 40 54 58 80
Public utilities 215 315 233 251 271 297 344
Commerce 15 15 12 21 24 35
Other 60 38 76 8 13 18 7
Total 919 666 560 568 657 756 1,001
* - includes sugar mills; ** - included in "Other" category 
Source: Brundenius, 1984:17
Table 2
Nationalization of Means of Production 
(in % Production)
Sector 1961 1963 1968
Agriculture 37 70 70
Industry 85 95 100
Construction 80 98 100
Transportation 92 95 100
Retail trade 52 75 100
Wholesale and export trade 100 100 100
Banking 100 100 100




Estimated Income Distribution in Cuba 1953, 1962 and 1973 
(IS, Income Shares: CS, Cumulative Shares)
1953 1962 1973
Deciles IS CS IS CS IS CS
0-10 0.6 0.6 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9
10-20 1.5 2.1 3.7 6.2 4.9 7.8
20-30 1.9 4.0 4.8 11.0 5.4 13.2
30-40 2.2 6.2 6.2 17.2 7.1 20.3
40-50 4.6 10.8 6.8 24.0 8,7 29.0
50-60 6.4 17.2 9.5 33.5 10.5 39.5
60-70 10.8 28.0 12.0 45.5 12.5 51.5
70-80 12.0 40.0 13.1 58.6 13.5 65.0
80-90 21.5 61.5 18.4 77.0 15.1 80.1
90-100 38.5 100.0 23.0 100,0 19.9 100.0
(Top 5%) (28.0) (12.7) (9.5)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Gini coefficients 0.56 0.35 0.2!
Source: Brundenius, 1981: 1089
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Table 4
Acquisition of Farm Machinery, 1966-70
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Bulldozers 128 678 (230)a n.a n.a
Tractors (tracked) 930 1,428 1,098 1,208 (325)
Tractors (rubber tires) 2,861 4,268 5,608 7,774 (8,370)
Lifters 1,123 1,001 1,500 1,500 (1,500)
Tractocareodores 67 232 (102) n.a n.a
Graders 145 115 (105) n.a n.a
Ploughs 3,259 29 11,468 7,567 (11,300)
Cultivators 52 1,115 _ _b 8,200d (6,400)
Planters, sowers 31 3 (150) n.a. n.a
Fumlgators 16 271 7,191 (24,445)
Reapers, harvesters 1,321 1,303 (485) n.a n.a
Combines n.a n.a. 325 423 (705)
Chaoeadores 1,000 293c 257°
Harrows 10 2,120 1,629c 1,439c (2,360)
Motors of all kinds 5,367 (1,050) n.a n.a
Airplanes 15 5 -- n.a n.a
Wagons, carts, wheel­
barrows 2,791 2,273 4,550 13,184 (5,866)
Excavators 6 43 (115) n.a n.a
Mechanical workshops -- 20 9 45 (841)
Electrical plants 414 (339) n.a n.a
Silocosechadores 457 382 522 600
na - not available
aFigures in parentheses indicate planned, not realized, acquisitions, 
k--indicates a probably figure of zero 




Fabrication of Sugar Milling Equipment, 1965-69
(Units)
Equipment Type 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Total
Calentadores 42 39 100 82 37 500
Cristalizadores 2 12 17 22 58 111
Condensadore s 23 60 88 64 44 279
Evaporadores 3 5 19 14 7 48
Tachos 17 29 47 36 26 155
Vapor-Cellis 5 5 8 12 11 41
Clarificadores 5 11 35 20 17 88
Vasos 10 4 2 12 28
Tanque Aqua Returno 2 13 9 10 11 45
Tanque Miel Final 1 1 10 12
Cuchellas Picar Cana 38 21 23 34 116
Enfriamlento Blanchard 45 124 144 102 12 427
Calendrias 8 12 10 2 32
Eyectores 44 57 69 170
Romanes 4 19 26 6 22 77




















Output of Durable Consumer Goods, 1963-80
Refriger- Kerosene
ators Gas Stoves Stoves Radio Rec. TV Sets








5,841 6,009 2,150 19,135
20,168 30,010 25,381 12,706
30,097 30,000 50,800 31,283
40,220 40,112 72,250 23,928
42,001 45,079 100,000 42,223
50,012 53,627 104,000 112,635 25,600
43,687 49,327 79,000 92,325 28,000
46,274 51,717 102,465 120,005 33,000
45,573 51,233 73,272 120,628 51,166
55,622 35,652 107,127 143,272 52,414
















Output of Transport Equipment and Machinery (Except Electrical)




















1970 300 36 24 52 1,497 28.2 102.2
1971 800 53 1,606 105 4,256 59.8 225.9
1972 575 87 1,650 105 5,742 28.7 40.5
1973 1,137 105 3,906 50 8,812 40.4 25.1
1974 1,255 131 3,000 50 14,130 73.5 10.0
1975 1,718 137 3,600 90 14,851 97.0 9.8
1976 1,266 156 3,600 283 3,672 81.3
1977 1,970 152 3,000 30 1,201 94.3
1978 1,805 139 3,000 100 165 511 860.9
1979 2,440 93 3,900 140 360 585 608.0
1980 1,846 120 3,410 n.a 501 3,415 na
♦agricultural distribution centers run by the state; na = not available
Source: Brundenius, 1984:154
Table 9


























1970 13,122 4,631 95.2 825 4,888 0.4 36.8 22.8
1971 19,894 7,923 90.4 1,144 5,021 — 36.5 13.9
1972 19,174 5,192 108.3 1,330 5,265 1.8 36.8 37.1
1973 32,869 4,060 111.6 1,002 5,703 2.1 35.2 37.2
1974 28,951 4,767 126.4 1,164 6,018 2.9 33.9 37.7
1975 27,287 4,635 139.4 1,332 6,583 2.8 37.3 36.1
1976 30,273 2,780 98.8 975 7,191 2.9 37.0 19.1
1977 21,356 3,658 97.4 657 7,707 2.6 36.8 20.4
1978 26,313 3,108 136.6 1,388 8,481 2.8 34.8 28.8
1979 42,046 3,753 177.9 2,362 9,401 2.8 32.3 28.2
1980 38,000 6,667 301.9 2,547 9,896 3.3 38.2 28.5
na = not available; * = metal content; ** = excluding autogeneration in sugar industry 
Source: Brundenius, 1984:155
Table 10
Output of Sulphuric Acid, Rayon Tire Cords, Fertilizers, Insecticides, Herbicides,

























1970 322 1,131 577 1,414 2,203 33.7 18.9 301.9 370.7
1971 368 1,425 565 2,988 2,594 36.0 22.0 751.2 428.2
1972 400 1,521 620 3,416 2,738 35.0 24.7 381.1 457.2
1973 385 1,268 663 4,424 2,715 43.0 26.9 371.5 439.6
1974 384 1,674 728 5,200 2,766 42.6 28.5 390.8 414.3
1975 418 2,154 749 5,426 3,102 36.3 32.0 367.8 424.4
1976 392 1,637 798 3,591 3,118 40.9 32.3 266.4 425.1
1977 375 440 863 2,660 na 37.5 31.1 171.9 430.8
1978 347 1,415 945 3,013 na 33.9 35.6 294.5 414.1
1979 297 1,586 873 4,414 na 29.5 34.9 302.0 370.5
1980 401 1,648 1,059 na na 29.9 36.7 386.6 383.4
* = 1975; na = not available 
Source: Brundenius, 1984:157
Table 11
Mechanization of Cane-Cutting and Loading in Cuba, 1963-81
% of cane harvested 
by combine harvester





























Ferguson KTP-1 Others Total
1971 1 2 3
1972 1 4 - 2 7
1973 3 7 1 - 11
1974 4 10 4 - 18
1975 4 12 9 - 25
1976 5 13 14 - 32
1977 4 13 19 - 36
1978 4 10 24 - 38
1979 4 10 28 - 42























1969 13,261 91.3 4.4 87.9 147.9 104.5 2.6 69.2
1970 12,052 75.7 2.2 182.8 159.7 104.9 7.6 68.1
1971 14,217 87.1 8.1 134.4 175.3 100.8 10.0 77.9
1972 14,390 98.0 7.4 184.7 177.6 99.0 11.4 49.4
1973 14,760 117.1 6.8 139.5 178.4 84.6 12.9 58.6
1974 13,512 127.9 3.8 206.5 184.3 69.8 19.0 57.3
1975 15,513 137.6 6.3 222.8 176.1 67.7 24.2 62.1
1976 14,979 134.1 5.1 210.9 165.4 80.5 29.1 62.1
1977 13,449 148.9 2.7 241.4 176.4 87.5 33.7 63.2
1978 14,685 154.4 1.5 238.4 174.9 83.4 34.9 63.0
1979 13,759 148.4 1.5 202.6 160.5 78.8 34.0 65.2
1980 12,927 157.4 na 225.2 271.0 80.3 34.2 66.3
Source: Brundenius, 1984:159.
Table 14
Gross Value of Production of Engineering Goods Industries, 1975-85
(Million Pesos, 1981 Prices)
Non-electrical Electrical 
machinery* machinery Metal products Total
(1SIC 382 & 384) (ISIC 383) (ISIC 381) (ISIC 38)
Value Index Value Index Value Index Value Index
1975 253.7 100.0 50.7 100.0 89.4 100.0 393.8 100.0
1976 275.0 108.4 52.4 103.4 93.0 104.0 420.4 106.8
1977 292.4 115.3 55.9 110.3 97.2 108.7 445.5 113.1
1978 359.2 141.6 64.0 126.2 112.1 125.4 535.3 135.9
1979 420.1 165.6 78.3 154.4 118.5 132.6 616.9 156.9
1980 434.4 171.2 75.4 148.7 123.2 137.8 642.0 163.0
1981 553.4 218.1 100.6 198.4 141.4 158.2 795.4 202.0
1982 642.7 253.3 88.5 174.6 158.4 177.2 889.6 225.9
1983 746.0 294.0 119.4 235.5 186.0 208.0 1,051.4 267.0
1984 876.2 345.4 144.5 285.0 203.9 228.1 1,224.6 311.0
1985+ 866.4 380.9 152.0 299.8 203.5 227.6 1,321.9 335.7
*Including transport equipment 




Growth Rates of Various Cuban Industries
Growth, compared to 
previous year (%)
- Metal products 15
- Mining and ferrous metallurgy 15
- Non-electric machinery building industry 10
- Electrotechnical and electronics 12
- Chemical industry 13
- Paper and cellulose industry 22
- Textile industry 24
- Alcoholic beveral and tobacco industry 17
- Graphics industry 13
Source: Banco Nacional De Cuba, 1986:17
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Table 16
Industrial Output, Selected Products, 1965-1984 (Selected Years)
Product Unit 1965 1970 1980 1984
Profifled steel thousands tones 36.0 140.0 303.8 338.2
Corrugated steel bars thousand tons 26.3 85.0 260.2 270.5
Sugar cane harvesters units - - 501 631
Vessels units - 36 120 , . t
Buses units - 300 1,846 2,219
Lorries thousands • * , • • • 0.6 0.5
Tires thousands • • • 202 387 450
Mineral fertilizers thousand tons * • • 591 1,405 1,446
Man-made fibres thousand tons 2.4 4.9 3.8
Textiles million sq. m. * • 78 159 172
Wearing apparel millions * • 22.2 25.5 31.7
Cement
Carts for sugar
thousand tons 742 2,831 3,347
transportation thousands 2.0 • 3.4 ...
Household refrigerators thousands 11.9 5.8 25.0 22.4
Radio sets thousands 81.9 19.1 200.0 253.4
TV sets thousands - - 40.3 91.6
Household gas stoves thousands 10.2 6.0 6.9 ♦ ♦ 4
Storage batteries 
Electric wires and cable
thousands
thousands
102.1 95.2 301.9 335.1
(up to 1 KV) kilometres 23.6 13.1 38.0 • • •
Wire thousand tons 7.3 0.5 8.2 • • •
Computers thousands - - 13.8
Mini computers units 38
Source: UNIDO, 1986:17
Table 17




1980 1982 1983 1984* 1975 1983 1984* 1981 1982 1983 1984*
Total 4,617 5,531 6,218 7,207 100.0 100.0 100.0 10.5 8.3 12.4 15.9
According to use and economic purpose
Consumer goods 535 763 757 787 13.3 12.2 10.9 25.6 13.5 -0.8 4.0
Intermediate goods 2,823 3,501 4,082 4,833 63.1 65.6 67.1 13.5 9.3 16.6 18.4
Petroleum and petroleum products 898 1,481 1,831 — 9.9 29.4 — 27.8 28.3 23.6 --
Fertilizers 81 112 121 -- 2.9 1.9 — 25.4 9.7 8.1 --
Herbicides and pesticides 60 76 110 -- 1.7 1.8 -- 19.8 5.0 45.2 --
Rolled steel 114 139 178 3.9 2.9 -- 24.1 -1.7 27.8 —
Accessories and spare parts 86 105 129 -- 3.0 2.1 -- 17.4 4.0 22.9 —
Remainder 1,584 1,588 1,713 41.8 27.5 3.5 -3.1 7.9 --
Capital goods 1,269 1,266 1,379 1,587 23.6 22.2 22.0 -2.3 2.2 8.9 15.1
Complete piantb 535 535 589 -- 6.1 9.5 — 11.3 -10.3 10.2 —
Tractors 37 73 61 — ' 0.4 1.0 — 33.5 49.6 -17.3 —
Buses and lorries 115 161 163 -- 2.4 2.6 -- 12.2 24.8 1.2 --
Remainder 582 ■ 497 566 — 14.7 9.1 -- -20.1 6.9 13.9 —
On the basic of ISIC categories
Food and live animals 746 811 788 — 19.1 12.7 -- 2.8 5.7 - 2.7 —
Beverages and tobacco 16 10 9 -- - 0.1 — -29.7 -11.5 -5.3 —
Inedible raw materials, except fuels 188 185 202 -- 5.9 3.2 — 14.3 -15.9 9.2 --
Fuels and lubricants, minerals
and related products 912 1,498 1,845 -- 10.3 29.7 __ 27.9 28.4 23.2 —
Animal and vegetable oils and fats 57 48 65 -- 1.3 1.0 — -0.7 -16.6 36.2 —
Chemical products 291 358 421 -- 7.9 6.8 -- 7.8 14.0 17.7 —
Manufactured goods, classified
chiefly by material 679 717 763 -- 18,4 12.3 -- 11.1 -4.9 6.4 —
Machinery and transport equipment 1,639 1,712 1,895 — 31.2 30.5 — 4.9 -0.4 10.6 —
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 99 193 229
" "
5.8 3.7 11.1 74.5 19.0
Source: UN, 1986:229
Table 18
Production, Imports and Apparent Consumption of Machinery 












1963 48.2 110.0 158.2 30.5
1964 49.4 127.7 177.1 27.9
1965 44.0 123.4 167.4 26.3
1966 46.5 123.6 170.1 27.3
1967 49.4 238.7 288.1 17.1
1968 60.8 282.4 343.2 17.7
1969 56.4 360.3 416.6 13.5
1970 84.9 419.0 502.9 16.9
1971 103.2 378.5 481.7 21.4
1972 119.6 216.9 336.5 35.5
1973 161.0 291.8 452.8 35.6
1974 200.1 436.7 636.8 31.4
1975 253.7 852.4 1,106.1 22.9
1976 275.0 964.3 1,239.3 22.0
1977 292.4 1,324.3 1,616.7 18.1
1978 359.2 1,151.7 1,510.9 23.8
1979 420.1 1,133.7 1,553.8 27.0
1980 434.4 1,427.6 1,826.0 23.3
1981 553.4 1,502.0 2,055.4 26.9
1982 642.7 1,447.7 2,090.4 30.7
1983 746.0 1,610.7 2,356.7 31.7
1984 876.2 1,878.1 2,754.3 31.8





Origin of the Resources for Financing 
for the Investment Program 
(in Percent)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Budget 99 87 84 72 70
Enterprises' own sources: 
profits, depreciation
funds and fixed assets 1 13 16 28 30
Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1986:6
Table 20
Growth Rate of Non-Traditional Exports, 1981-85
Average annual
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Growth rate (%)
Non-traditional
exports 47.0 93.2 123.1 144.7 177.2 40.0%
Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1986:10
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Table 21
Cuba's Balance of Payment In Freely Convertible Currency
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984




-136 99 367 285 606 441 
595 680 1,248 1,406 1,356 1,234 1, 















Cuba 8.7 6.0 3.2 15.1 3.1 3.8 7.4 32.4
Latin America 7.0 4.8 6.1 1.7 -1.0 -3.1 3.2 0.6
Source: UN, 1986:15 (See Footnote 21)
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Table 23
Cuba's Trade Dependency, 1946-1980
Exports as % of GMP 
(constant prices)










Sugar: Production, Exports and Export Prices
Thousands of tons US$ per pound
Prices paid Prices paid
Sugar Sugar by the by the
Year production exports USSR world market
1961 6,876 6,413 4.09 2.75
1962 4,882 5,132 4.09 2.83
1963 3,883 3,520 6.11 8.34
1964 4,475 4,176 6.11 5.77
1965 6,156 5,316 6.11 2.08
1966 4,537 4,435 6.11 1.81
1967 6,236 5,683 6.11 1.92
1968 5,165 4,612 6.11 1.90
1969 4,459 4,799 6.11 3.20
1970 8,538 6,906 6.11 3.68
1971 5,925 5,511 6.11 4.50
1972 4,325 4,140 6.11 7.27
1973 5,383 4,797 11.82 9.45
1974 5,926 5,491 19.30 29.66
1975 6,427 5,744 26.36 20.37
1976 6,151 5,764 27.43 11.51
1977 6,953 6,238 26.94 8.10
1978 7,662 7,197 36.71 7.82
1979 7,800 7,199 37.17 9.65
1980 6,805 6,170 47.39 28.15
1981 7,926 7,055 35.10 16.88
1982 8,039 7,727 39.00 8.38
1983 7,460 7,011 46.00 8.56
1984 7,783 7,017 44.00 5.18
Source: Carciofi, 1983:207 and UN, 1986:226
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Table 25
Percentage Allocation of Soviet Assistance to 
Various Sectors
Industry 76.1%
Agriculture (irrigation and drainage) 5.2
Geological surveys 8.3
Transportation and communication 8.2
Education and health 1.9
Other sectors 0.3
Source: Cole Blasier, 1979:230
Table 26
Structure and Evolution of the External Debt 
(in Millions of Pesos)
1984 % 1985 % Variation
Total 2,988.8 100 3,258.9 100 270.1
Official debt 1,595.9 53 1,691.2 52 95.3
Private debt 1,392.9 47 1,567.7 48 174.8
Medium term 460.1 16 502.7 15 42.6
Short term 932.8 31 1,065.0 33 132.2
Source: Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1986:38
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Table 27
Cuba's Indicators of External Indeptness in 
Freely Convertible Currency
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984b
Total disbursed debt 3,227 3,170 2,669 2,790 3,032
Bilateral official debt 1,354 1,294 1,276 1,333 1,527
Multilateral official debt 8 15 18 25 20
Suppliers 27 33 47 97 221
Financial institutions 1,837 1,826 1,327 1,335 1,264
Medium-term bilateral loans 
and loans from consortia 563 505 417 495 480
Short-term deposits 1,238 1,282 860 789 699
Credits for current imports 36 39 50 50 86
Other credits 1 1 1 1 -
Disbursements0 214 229 148 351 522
Service4* 417 619 1,029 673 661
Interest paid 263 338 341 248 241
Amortization payment on 
long-term debts 96 142 166 160 156
Amortization payments on 
short-term debts 58 139 522 265 264
Ratios
Total disbursed debt/global 
social product
PERCENTAGES
18.5 14.3 11.6 11.5 11.7
Total debt service/exports of 
goods and services 20.1 35.4 63.4 42.7 46.8
Total debt service/disbursements 194.9 270.3 693.3 191.7 126.6
Total debt service/global 
social product 2.4 2.8 4.5 2.8 2.5
^Includes commitments falling due one year or less after date of issue.
Preliminary figures. 
cIncludes long- and short-term loans received, according to the balance of 
payments.





Composite Basic Needs (Includes: Food, Clothing, Housing, 












Estimated Income Distribution in Cuba in 1953, 























Index of Sugar and Non-Sugar Production, 1982, 1983 and 1984 
(Preceding Year Industrial Production Index — 100)
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The attempt here is a brief one; a comprehensive presentation of 
Cuban history is impossible here. For detailed historical 
presentation of the period between 1895-1902 see Foner (1972); for 
an account of the period between 1902-1933 see Luis Aguilar 
(1972); for an extensive detailed presentation for the period 
between 1762-1959 see Hugh Thomas. Also see the collection of 
different important documents covering the period from 1783-1962 
in Smith (1963). Finally, for a critical historical assessment of 
the period 1510-1959 (in Spanish language) see Segrera (1981). 
The historical background in this chapter is based on these 
sources and others which will be mentioned.
Though titled "Cuba under Spanish domination", this section will 
reveal that while being a Spanish colony, Cuba came under the U.S. 
nomination.
Different external factors, together with the suitable land and 
climate, influenced Cuba's transition to large scale sugar 
production: (1) the short duration of the British occupation of
Havana (1762-1763) which brought a large number of slaves and a 
large amount of equipment (especially the recently developed steam 
engine) and opened up the markets of 13 American colonies; (2) the 
destruction of the sugar industry in St. Dominique (Haiti) in the 
1790s as a consequence of the successful slave revolt; and (3) the 
Spanish trade liberation decree of 1818.
Different factors had constrained the success of the struggle: the 
lack of organization among the rebel forces; the shortage of 
supplies and ammunition; the failure to confront the problem of 
slavery and the role of the blacks; the opposition of the wealthy 
planters who supported Spain; and the refusal of the U.S. to sell 
arms to the rebels (while supplying them to Spain hoping to be 
able to buy the Island). (Foner, 1972(v-l):xviii).
In 1895, the American Magazine of Civics featured a symposium on 
the topic "Ought We Annex Cuba?" A leading Wall Street figure 
wrote: "It makes the water come to my mouth when I think of the 
State of Cuba as one in our family". Another spokesman of Wall 
Street wrote: "Canada will come in time; Mexico will follow Texas 
and California, and drop into her niche under the Stars and 
Stripes, when we are ready. But we want Cuba now". (In Foner, 
1972(v.I):xxxii).
For the complete presentation of all the articles see Smith 
(1963:125).
As an implementation of article VII Cuba leased Guantanomo to the 
United States at $2,000 per year.
U.S. investment had also penetrated other fields, a U.S.-Cuban 
family of New York owned four major Havana dailies: El Mundo, La 
Frensa, the Havana Post and the evening Telegram (Benjamin, 
1977:19).
The following points are my translation of the original text in 
Spanish.
One example of the extent of the impact of the U.S. embargo on 
Cuba is its oil imports. Prior to the revolution Cuba produced 
only 10 percent of its oil consumption, the other 90 percent came
from the United States, a percentage that was totally cut after 
the embargo (Gultelman, in Bonachea and Valdes, 1972: 232).
11. The imported Soviet harvesters KCT-1 and KT-1 had limitations. 
They could only cut erect cane or cane with maximum inclination of 
30°; in addition, they required fields with a maximum inclination 
of 5°. It was estimated that they could be used only in 30 
percent of the Cuban cane fields in 1966 (Edquist, 1985:41).
12. The term was used by Castro in his report to the First Party 
Congress.
13. The information of this part is derived from Castro's report 
(1980) unless otherwise specified.
14. Some small-scale production of libratadora was produced in Cuba 
and used in the 1969 sugar harvest (Edquist, 1985:48). However, 
lacking the technical capacity for large-scale production, Cuba 
gave a West German company the patent right for libratadora 
production in exchange for a low price for certain quantity of the 
machine. Since 1972 the West German company has exported the 
libratadora to 44 countries including Argentina, United States, 
Mexico and Venezuela (Edquist, 1985:129).
15. These data and the following are derived from Castro's report to 
the 3rd congress (1986) unless otherwise mentioned.
16. All the mentioned industrial projects have been located in 
different provinces of Cuba and mostly outside the Capital City, 
in an effort to distribute the industrial centers in the country. 
This effort increases both the economic integration of the 
different parts of the country and the level of regional equality; 
in addition, it reduces the chances of certain social and economic
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problems of rural migration to the cities as witnessed in most 
developing societies.
17. One of the major efforts to counter the shortage of social 
construction projects has been through the volunteer work of 
different workers and associates of a wide range of 
organizations. More construction projects have been recently 
accomplished through the efforts of the minibrigades.
18. During my first trip to Cuba in April 1986, we visited one of the 
newly constructed sugar mills located in Camaguay, built in 1981. 
About 70 percent of the equipment was Cuban made; the machines 
allowed for more than 60 percent of the harvest to be mechanized 
with potential increases up to 80 percent. The mill utilized 20 
percent fewer workers as compared to other, older mills. In 
addition, the mill's use of oil was limited only to the first year 
of production; thereafter, all energy came from bagasse. In 
addition to crude sugar and bagasse, the mill produced molasses, 
sugar derivates used for animal feeding and fertilizers.
19. DPR is the ratio of apparent consumption of capital goods produced 
by domestic industry.
20. Mercantile production is the sum of all goods and services of the 
productive sectors (excluding trade) destined for sale.
21. In 1985 Cuba concluded bilateral trade agreements with many Third 
Vorld and socialist countries. In one of these agreement (with 
Ecuador) Cuba would export spare parts for the sugar industry and 
animal feeding technology (UNIDO, 1986:24).
22. The difference in growth rates reflected in Table 19 is even 
higher since the average growth rates of Latin American countries 
are for total gross domestic product while for Cuba the average
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growth rate is the total gross social product which excludes 
public services.
23. While in the rest of this section I will argue against the first 
group's claim in some detail, 1 will not pursue a counter argument 
of the second claim. It is sufficient to say, however, that the 
claim that the USSR has dictated the terms of Cuba's involvement 
in Africa, beside denying the possibility of political and 
ideological non coercive convergence of two countries, neglects 
some historical aspects. The claim reflects a neglect of the 
historical ties that existed between Cuba and Africa long before 
the Cuban-Soviet relationship (e.g., Cuba's solidarity support of 
the Algerian revolution), and of the differences between the 
Soviet and Cuban policies in Africa. On more than one occasion, 
Cuba supported different revolutionary groups than those supported 
by the USSR e.g., in Angola and Ethiopia (for a detailed account 
see F. Fitzgerald 1987:451-53. And for an interesting account of
f
the Cuban involvement in Africa see Garcia Marquiz 1981).
24. Turits notes that according to the CIA's calculations Cuba's 
received aid would compete even with Israel; however, a closer 
look would reveal a major difference. Assuming that Cuba does 
receive an estimated $2 billion, it is a tied aid per year through 
implicit subsidies. Israel's received aid of $2 billion, however, 
is outright hard currency cash transfer from the United States. 
Further, on per capital basis Israel receives 2.5 times the 
estimated average yearly trade subsidies received by Cuba (Turits, 
1987:177).
25. Reference is to the first Congress of the Cuban Communist Party.
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26. In a comparison exercise of the different impact of foreign
assistance utilization, Turits shows that while Puerto Rico
receives from the United States about six times the per capital
aid than Cuba receives from the USSR, yet
Puerto Rico is hardly an analogous paradigm of 
growth with equity, and still depends on a 
conclusive dynamic of incessant circular migration 
(...). Since the 1950s, almost a third of the 
population has migrated to the United States, 
while a quarter of those seeking work in Puerto 
Rico remain unemployed and half the people live on 
food stamps and public assistance (Turits,
1987:178).
27. In addition to the general reduction in international liquidity, 
the change in these banks' financial policy towards Cuba has been 
the result of worsening Cuban-U.S. relations especially after 
Reagan's Presidency.
28. For an excellent account of these aspects see Brundenius (1981, 
1984); and different studies in Griffiths and Griffiths (1979).
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CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to find any country, regardless of its level of 
development or its social and political orientation, that does not 
consider economic independence as one of its major goals. Despite this 
common goal, however, there exists no commonly accepted definition of 
economic independence and, as a consequence, no general agreement on 
the conditions and strategies necessary for achieving it.
An examination of five theoretical perspectives on the issue of 
economic independence reveals, either explicitly or implicitly, two 
definitions of such independence: (1) delinking from the world
capitalist system and pursuing an anti-capitalist path i.e. , socialist 
development; (2) transforming the economic structure into one with a 
higher productive and technical capacity as well as a higher level of 
national integration. This dissertation adopts the second definition 
of economic independence. This definition as opposed to the first one 
has two main implications:
(1) It implies the theoretical possibility of achieving a higher level 
of economic independence in capitalist-oriented economies as well 
as in socialist-oriented ones. In a capitalist-oriented economy, 
the ability to pursue successfully the strategies of economic 
independent-, depends largely on the relative strength of the 
national industrial bourgeoisie over that of the commercial and 
landed oligarchy. Generally, the former's best interests involve 
expanding the domestic productive sectors and regulating and 
limiting foreign investment.
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(2) The definition also implies that the internal dynamics within an 
economy (e.g. , the role played by the state and its adopted 
strategies, class structure, surplus use) override, in most cases, 
the external dynamics (e.g., the role played by friendly or 
hostile countries and financial organizations). This emphasis on 
internal dynamics, however, does not mean that economic 
independence is equated with autarky; on the contrary, it implies 
economic interdependence with other countries, only however, on 
more equal terms.
Examination of the five different schools of thought in this 
dissertation, has revealed a set of different strategy proposals and 
policy recommendations. Further investigation of these strategies 
points out the importance of an industrial strategy, one that pays 
special attention to the development of the capital-goods sector and to 
those industries with the highest linkage effect. Such special 
attention would contribute greatly to the development of an economy's 
technical and productive capacity and increase the level of national 
integration.
Both 1S1 (Import Substituting Industrialization) and BI (Basic 
Industrialization) are important industrialization strategies. 
Although the theoretical examination pointed out the superiority of the 
BI strategy, an empirical examination of the Cuban experience showed 
that ISI contributed greatly to increasing the Cuban economy's 
independence. This was especially true when the strategy was pursued 
within a process of economic planning and applied in the intermediate 
and capital goods sector, not only in the consumer-goods sector. 
Furthermore, the negative impacts associated with 1ST, cited repeatedly
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in the literature, can be minimized when 1S1 is pursued in those 
industries with the highest linkage effects among themselves, and 
between them and domestic resources and output. When all these factors 
are considered, 1SI stand close to BI in enhancing the productive and 
technical capacity of an economy. Also, regional cooperation and 
demands for the NIEO (new international economic order) can be 
considered important long-run strategies, as they face external factors 
beyond the control of the national economy and require the committed 
collective effort of other countries.
The theoretical investigation also reveals a set of necessary 
policies which pursued simultaneously with the above strategies, would 
warrant achieving a higher level of economic independence. These 
policies are as follows:
(1) Regulating foreign investment (especially its direct form) will 
reduce both the outflow of surplus and foreign control over 
decision making.
(2) Regulating the transfer of technology will enhance an economy's 
technical capacity, if it involves the adaptation and innovation 
of technology suited for domestic resources and output.
(3) Undertaking a deliberate policy of income redistribution will 
contribute to increasing both the level of productivity and mass 
support.
(4) Transforming most (if not all) foreign ownership of the productive 
assets into national ownership (public and private) will increase 
the country's control over the national surplus and decision 
making.
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(5) Undertaking a marked policy of economic planning will enhance the 
implementation of the adopted strategies and reduce some of the 
ill effects that develop due to conflicting interests.
(6) Finally, the above policies call for the state to actively 
participate and intervene in the economy. This can be considered 
the "sufficient condition" for the successful implementation of 
the strategies and policies outlined above.
Though not addressed in this dissertation, there are other 
important social and political policies that would help a nation to 
develop a higher level of productivity and economic independence. 
Examples of such policies include the advancement of human power in 
terms of skills and education; the expansion of scientific and 
technical research; and the enhancement of mass participation in 
decision making, a policy which would strengthen a country's social and 
political stability.
All of the above socio-economic policies have been confirmed as 
essential in the empirical case of Cuba. Judged by the definition 
adopted earlier in this dissertation, and by its own definition of 
economic independence, Cuba has successfully managed to achieve a 
higher level of economic independence since the revolution. This fact 
is demonstrated by Cuba's increased level of productive capacity,
technical capacity, national integration and control over its own 
national surplus. Such achievement refutes the claim that Cuba
continues to be dependent on the Soviet Union, as it was on the United 
States before the Cuban revolution. This claim mistakenly equates 
"dependency" with "dependence" and focuses only on external
quantitative factors (e.g., volumes of trade).
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Cuba's higher level of productivity and national integration 
(especially industrial-agricultural integration) has been achieved 
mainly through determined efforts at industrialization (both 1SI and 
BI), export diversification, technical research and innovation, and 
provision of basic needs. Cuba's successful experience in the 
provision of basic needs, and its political and social democracy 
(evident in increasing mass participation in the decision-making 
process (Harnecker, 1979)) have further contributed to its internal 
social stability. Furthermore, by participating in the socialist 
international division of labor, through an active membership in the 
CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) , Cuba has facilitated its 
transition process and minimized the negative Impact of the world's 
economic fluctuations.
The particular definition of economic independence utilized in 
this dissertation retains its validity when applied to other economies 
(socialist, capitalist and mixed) in different levels of development. 
Such a definition, when utilized within an historical perspective, can 
demonstrate the relative change in the level of economic independence. 
Other studies have applied different conceptions of dependency and 
independence in assessing the experiences of other developing countries 
especially of those categorized as the newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) . There is an ongoing debate in the development literature on 
the issue of economic independence specifically as it applies to 
certain countries (e.g., South Korea and Brazil). Some writers (e.g., 
Luedde-Neurath (1980), Hamilton (1983), Barone (1983) and Foster-Carter 
(1985)) have argued that the economy of South Korea, for example, 
represents a successful model of an independent capitalist development. 
Other writers (e.g., Payer (1975), Sunno (1978) and Landsberg (1979)),
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however, emphasize the dependent nature of this development, and argue 
that it is foreign capital (mainly Japanese) that dominates the 
productive sector of the Korean economy. In their analysis of 
technology and the nature of NICs development, Baumgartner and Burns
(1981) argue that "isolated structural changes in specific industrial 
sectors have not affected the socio-economic and political metalevel 
structures which are all too characteristic of dependency" (Baumgartner 
and Burns, 1981:321).
No attempt is made here to settle this debate over the assessment 
of the actual experience of these other economies, which requires in-
depth case studies. It is important to mention, however, that the
distributional results of the process of independence would differ in 
the capitalist-oriented from the socialist-oriented ones. . In this 
sense the answer to the important question: economic independence for 
whom will differ, with the gains from higher productivity reaped by
different social groups in each case. While reaching conflicting
conclusions regarding the status of dependency or independence of 
specific capitalist-oriented economies (e.g., Brazil and South Korea), 
most writers on the subject agree that the dependent or independent 
development of these economies has been accompanied by repressive 
social and political measures, which raise doubts about their long-run 
internal social stability. Furthermore, many writers point out the 
increasing external obstacles (e.g., changing world demand, increased 
protectionist measures taken by the advanced countries (Bienfeld
(1982), Helleiner (1979)) which threaten these developing countries' 
long-run economic stability.
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In summary, economic independence is perceived not as an absolute 
condition, but as a gradual process towards a relatively higher degree 
of national integration. In this sense one cannot speak of countries 
that are independent and countries that are not, but rather of degrees 
of dependence and independence. Judged within an historical 
perspective, Cuba since the revolution has been able to attain a higher 
level of economic independence. Though still dependent on the Soviet 
assistance, this dependence can be considered a short duration or 
’tactical' ; it has been used to develop the economy's productive 
capacity and to ensure a stronger structure for future independence.
Without implying universal applicability and taking into 
consideration the specificity of the different political, economic and 
social factors facing each country, it can be said that lessons can be 
learned from other countries' experiences. In this instance, the Cuban 
experience (especially the efforts at increasing the technical and 
productive capacity, national integration and provision of basic needs) 
does provide useful insights for other small developing countries in 
their attempts at achieving a higher level of economic independence.
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